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Abstract 
The thesis attempts to revisit the British policy towards Jammu and 
Kashmir and to bring out the unexplored aspects of British Indian relations with 
the state. The study spans over a century and a year; that is from 1846—when as a 
result of the joint endeavour of Raja Gulab Singh of Jammu and the British liast 
India Company the state cartie into being—to 1947, when the state got divided 
between the two successor states of British Indian Empire: India and Pakistan. 
' v ? > : ' ' ^ . ' . ' •••*•'; 
Intriguingly, it was during'-the period of the British "territorial expansion that this 
•"5-, 
• ' • ; . ' -I'u 
* * 
^<^' princely state was created in the'*6X:tpeflrt6*riorth of India. What were the real 
motives behind handing over Kashmir to Gulab Singh, what was the legal staius of 
the state of Jammu and Kashmir vis-a-vis the British Indian Empire, and hov\ the 
regime was used by the British to strengthen their imperial position in India form 
the central theme of this thesis. 
The creation of Jammu and Kashmir State, closely followed by the uprising 
of 1857 and the subsequent Queen's declaration protecting the territorial rights of 
Indian princes, granted it protection from complete merger in British India but 
short of that the British established complete sway on its internal and exiernal 
affairs. The Treaty of Amritsar, which was instrumental in the creation of the state, 
had granted a somewhat "special status" to the state by giving it in the 
"independent possession" of Raja Gulab Singh, so far as its internal affairs were 
concerned. Notwithstanding that guarantee, we see the state was not only reduced 
to the position of any other princely state of India but in effect witnessed more 
interest and intervention in its affairs because of its geopolitical and strategic 
importance as a frontline state. As the state assumed an important position in the 
security of the British Empire from the emerging Russian threat and since the 
defence from foreign threat was the responsibility of the British themseh es. it 
provided them a convenient excuse to intervene in the affairs of the state. While 
the treaty only provided the broader framework for conducting the relations, the 
actual policy towards the state flowed, to a significant degree, from the geo-
political and strategic considerations of the English East India Company evei alert 
to the dangers on the north-western frontier to its expanding Indian dominion 
The study focuses on the processes and policies which were involved in the 
stationing of Resident in the state. The state did not have a Resident imposed on it 
until as late as 1885 and after that he did indeed become an instrument of colonial 
interference within the state. The appointment of the Resident is considered to be a 
major stroke of British policy towards Jammu and Kashmir. The British Indian 
government secured firm grip over Kashmir administration by divesting Maharaja 
Pratap Singh of his powers in 1889. While the Maharaja's powers were paitially 
restored to him in 1905, the full restoration was made only in 1924. Although the 
British intervention was essentially intended to fulfill their imperialistic designs, 
the policy makers adopted the pretence of being the guardians of the people of the 
state. One of the spin-offs of the intervention was that the state-led land and 
educational reforms created a milieu in which the people of the state launched 
educational and political reform movements. It also brought the princely state and 
the people into closer contact with the ideologies prevalent in British India at the 
turn of the twentieth century. 
British imperial policy towards the state of Jammu and Kashmir in the late 
19"^  century was guided primarily by the fear of a Russian advance towards India 
through the Pamir mountains. In addition, the British were continually troubled by 
the independent policy adopted by the Amir of Afghanistan, whose lands also 
extended as far as the north-western frontier of the sub-continent. On account oi" 
its strategic location, the state of Jammu and Kashmir appeared to be a sort of 
buffer against potential incursions particularly from Russia and Afghanistan into 
the sub-continent. Provided the British could maintain a workable alliance with the 
ruler of Jammu and Kashmir, they would not be obliged to incur the expense of 
fortifying the northern frontier themselves. With this end in view, the British 
decided to support the Kashmir Darbar in stabilizing its influence in the noithem 
tracts of Dardistan, in return of a British Agent to be stationed at Gilgit wiih the 
purpose of securing the north-western frontiers of their Indian Empire. Gilgit was 
considered as "a watch tower to the defence of the Indian Empire" and the Agent 
who remained stationed there till the British withdrew from Indian subcontinent as 
"a sentry at a vulnerable point of the India frontier". The establishment c^ f the 
British Residency and the deposition of Maharaja Pratap Singh resulted in a firmer 
British control over the administrative affairs of Jammu and Kashmir which in 
turn helped them to use Kashmir as a frontline state more effectively without any 
opposition from its government. Interestingly, Jammu and Kashmir not only acted 
as a frontline state but was made to bear, willingly or unwillingly, the large part of 
the cost of defence of British Indian Empire. 
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Introduction 
The Government of India Act of 1935 defines a princely state or an Indian State 
as, '"...any territory, whether described as a State, an Estate, a Jagir or otherwise, 
belonging to or under the suzerainty of a Ruler who is under the suzerainty ol His 
Majesty and not being a part of British India".' In a more comprehensive sense a state 
was considered to be, "a political community, occupying a territory in India of defined 
boundaries, and subject to a common and responsible ruler who had actually enjoyed and 
exercised, as belonging to him in his own right duly exercised by the supreme authority 
of the British Government, any of the functions and attributes of internal sovereigiit>."'-
The princely states came into being as a result of the treaties which were signed with, or 
were forced on the Indian rulers, who already existed or came into being in the process of 
the expansion of the British Indian Empire. By the second decade of the nineteenth 
century virtually all the major "country powers" had been linked to the East India 
Company by treaties. What is more, the essential elements of British "paramountcy'" 
—the system of Residents at the princely courts, the regulation of successions, and 
control over the states' foreign affairs—were all laid down in this period. As the British 
raj grew more secure and strong, the Company officials argued to extinct the remaining 
states on the ground that they fell short of the British "civilizational standards". Had the 
subsequent events, especially the revolt of 1857, not intervened, the remaining states 
would probably have suffered the same fate as befell Satara, Jhansi, Nagpur, Awadh and 
Punjab. Pondering over the different dimensions of the revolt, it became clear to the 
' Government of India Act. 1935, 26 Geo. V & 1 Edw. VIII Ch.2. (Great Britain; 1940). 
Lee Warner. The Native States of India, (London: 1910), p. 3 L 
British officialdom that it was their aggressive policy of territorial expansion that had 
turned a number of powerful princes into bitter enemies of the raj and it were they who 
played a prominent role in the rebellion. However, the princely states as a body proved 
remarkably helpful for the British to crush the revolt. So the princes were in a way the 
cause of the revolt as well as the agents of its suppression. This made the British realize 
the importance of harnessing the surviving Indian princes to meet any future eventuality. 
This realization called for a change of British policy towards the princely order. The 
policy of outright annexation gave way to value the states as imperial clients and they 
were incorporated into the imperial framework as collaborators. In this changed scenario, 
the princely states enjoyed the protection of a paramount colonial power which came in 
the form of Queen's Proclamation of 1858. 
The princes have generally been dubbed as vicious, bejeweled loafers, as 
unremitting despots, devoid of any common sense of politics and diplomacy. Though the 
princes in their own right were highly polished people, yet having been virtually caught 
between the devil and the deep sea they became objects of ridicule from both sides. 
However, a close examination of the princely order makes it amply clear that the vast 
majority of the princes, who occupied the throne during the colonial India were, by and 
large, a decent lot and usually kept a finger on the pulse of the changing events around 
them. So the princes who became junior partners in the British Indian F.mpire were far 
from being puppets under the control of the British; they were, in fact, significant actors 
on the Indian political stage. An anecdote of Maharaja Ranbir Singh in which he explains 
his strategic and important position in the British imperial scheme is a case in point here. 
Explaining the critical importance of the state of Jammu and Kashmir in the British 
Indian Empire, he once narrated to William Digby, a bitter critic of the British imperial 
policies—especially in Jammu and Kashmir, that, "Sahib, what do you call that little 
thing between the railway carriages? It is like button stuck on a sort of gigantic needle 
that runs through the train, and when the carriages are pushed at one end or the other you 
hear a 'houff, 'houff,' and bang they go against the poor little button. I felt very sorry for 
the poor little button, but it is doubtless useful in its way. What do you call it?" L>igby 
replied that it was called 'a buffer.' "Buffer, buffer," replied the Maharaja in earnest 
tones. "Yes, buffer, that's just what I am, and that shall henceforth be one of my tiilcs." 
"Never mind", goes Maharaja further explaining his position in the British imperial 
scheme in India, "it is all the same, I am a buffer; on one side there is a big train of the 
British possessions, and whenever they push northward they will tilt up against me; then 
on the other side is the shaky concern of Afghanistan, and on the other side of it is the 
ponderous train and engine caWed Roos. Every now and then there is a tilting 
of Roos towards Afghanistan, and simultaneously there is tilting upward of the great 
engine in Calcutta, and I am the poor little button between them. Someday, perhaps not 
far distant, there will be a tilting from the North, and Afghanistan will smash up. Then 
there will be a tremendous tilt from the South, and I shall be buried in the wreck and 
lost!"^ 
The grace and dignity they once enjoyed was because of the power they wielded 
and the sovereignty they enjoyed but having come under British supremacy they vvere 
purged of their military power and rendered incapable of making wars. It greatly limited 
not only their sovereignty but also sphere of activity. Further, guaranteeing them 
William Digby, Condemned Unheard, (London: 1890), p. 8. 
protection from any external threat and the immunity from internal revolts transformed 
the Indian rulers into tyrants. 
Intriguingly, it was during the period of the British territorial expansion that the 
princely state of Jammu and Kashmir was created in the extreme north of India. What 
were the real motives behind handing over Kashmir to Gulab Singh, what was the legal 
status of the state of Jammu and Kashmir vis-a-vis the British Indian Empire, and how 
the regime was used by the British to strengthen their imperial position in India form the 
central theme of this thesis. 
A great deal has been written on the relationship between the British Indian 
government and the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir. But most of the works arc 
either a simple narration of events or a partisan or politically motivated evaluation. Most 
of the writers have discussed the manifestation of British policy rather than delving deep 
into the actual reasons for British intervention in Kashmir. N.N. Raina, the author of the 
book Kashmir Politics and Imperialist Manoeuvres 1846-1947, who had the distinction 
of personally taking part in the events which unfolded on the political firmament of 
Jammu and Kashmir in twentieth century, though claiming to have written an impartial 
account of the British political maneuvering "not coloured by passion of the moment or 
blind prejudice", has nevertheless studied the British policy towards Jammu and Kashmir 
with a specific bent of mind. The events and facts presented in the work have been placed 
in such a manner so as to justify the ideology the author represents. As a result, the author 
has tended to produce largely partisan work which fails to convince the serious students 
of history. The other work entitled Kashmir in Transition. 1885-1893 by D.K. Ghose 
merits particular attention because of the definite perspective which the book has 
underlined. The book covers the critical years in which the British policy in Kashmir saw 
both its application and climax. The author has presented the British intervention as a 
specific historical development brought about in the wake of the creation of the state of 
Jammu and Kashmir. This work is more explicit—the author had the advantage of access 
to extensive archival material, and provides more facts regarding the British poiic\ 
towards Kashmir. Ghose, though, a brilliant writer, deliberately and systematically 
attempts to justify the British intervention in the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir. 
The author's contention that the British Indian government, acting as a paramount power 
in Kashmir, had every right to interfere is erroneous and unhistorical. The major theme 
ol^British Policy towards Kashmir (1846-1921) by P.M. Hassnain is the discussion of the 
approach of the British policy-makers towards Jammu and Kashmir in the backdrop of 
their relations with Russia. The book, wittingly or unwittingly, seems more interested in 
highlighting the positive impact of the British intervention in Jammu and Kashmir. The 
account given by Madhavi Yasin \n British Paramountcy in Kashmir 1876-1894 fails to 
add anything substantial to what has been given in the accounts discussed earlier. The 
book also suffers from the defect of incomplete referencing. 
Having analyzed the vast academic literature that has been produced oi the 
Anglo-Kashmir relations, it becomes clear that these writings have left much to be 
desired. In view of these facts an attempt is made to revisit the British policy towards 
Jammu and Kashmir and try to bring out the unexplored aspects of British Indian relation 
with the state. The study will cover a century and a year; that is from 1846—when as a 
result of the joint endeavour of Raja Gulab Singh of Jammu and the British East India 
Company the state came into being—to 1947, when the state got divided between the two 
successor states of British Indian Empire: India and Pakistan. While the structure adopted 
for this thesis, as the nature of the worl<. demands, is broadly chronological, a thematic 
framework is also given so that the events are put in their proper perspective. The study 
attempts to discuss the complexities of the relationship between the British colonial 
power and the Dogra Darbar. The major focus of this study is on the search of British 
imperialists' quest for a 'scientific frontier', and in this process how Kashmir was used as 
a 'buffer' against the Afghans and the perceived Russian threat. The stationing of 
Resident in the state is considered as a major stroke of British intervention which had far 
reaching consequences on the overall development of future events. The state did not 
have a Resident imposed on it until as late as 1885 and after that he did indeed become an 
instrument of colonial interference within the state. Although the British intervention was 
essentially intended to ftilfill their imperialistic designs, the policy makers adopted the 
pretence of being the guardians of the people of the state. One of the spinoffs of the 
intervention was that the state-led land and educational reforms created a milieu in which 
the people of the state launched educational and other political reform movements. 
People came into close contact with the ideologies and movements prevalent in British 
India at the turn of the twentieth century. 
In preparation of this thesis, source material has been largely drawn from various 
archives and libraries. Voluminous records available in the National Archives of India, 
New Delhi, particularly, Foreign Department Records, Foreign and Political Department 
Records, and Home Department Records, have been extensively used. Government 
documents preserved in Jammu Repository of Jammu and Kashmir State Archives, 
especially, Old English Records, Political Department Records, General Department 
Records, and Proceedings of the State Council of Jammu and Kashmir have been 
consulted to get a clear idea about the Anglo-Kashmir relations during the period co\ ered 
by this study. Furthermore, the Ex-Governor's Records and some other valuable files 
were accessed from the Srinagar repository of Jammu and Kashmir State Archives. Some 
rare and crucial manuscripts dealing with the Dogra rule in Jammu and Kashmir, v hich 
are deposited available with the Government of Jammu and Kashmir's Research and 
Publication Department at Srinagar, have also been tapped in order to build a strong 
argument. However, an effort has been made to make very cautious use of these oflcial 
documents. With the purpose of writing a balanced history, they have been cross-checked 
with the other available contemporary sources such as, the travelogues, memoirs, 
biographies, and private and secret letters written by different British officials to their 
families, iriends and the higher authorities in India and abroad. As may be expected from 
an autocratic regime, the fact that the people would have lived a life of subjection and 
misery, needs no explanation. It may, nevertheless, be noted that the majority of sources 
pertaining to this period were written by Europeans and the accounts given by tiem, 
although not wholly wrong, do appear exaggerated. They appear to have suffered from 
prejudice against the Dogra rule. Also, it seems that the motive of the earlier writings was 
to induce British intervention in the state while that of the later writings to justify that 
intervention. 
Having said this, however, it is always a big challenge to research on Jammu and 
Kashmir from 1925 onwards, due to the undeclared ban imposed by the central and state 
government on the consultation of unpublished official records dealing with Kashmir. 
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With the existing restrictions on the primary sources related to this period, much reliance 
has to be made on the secondary sources which create problems in objectivity. 
This thesis is divided into five chapters. Chapter one tries to explore how the 
princely India, which played significant role in the expansion and consolidation of British 
colonial power, came into being. It goes on to explain the British policy which was 
pursued in specific circumstances towards the princely India keeping in view the best 
imperialist designs. Specifically, the chapter discusses the British policy of cultivating 
and politicizing the Indian princes to counter the challenge of nationalism which had 
taken the shape of mass agitation with the dawn of twentieth century. The concluding 
part of the chapter analyzes how and why the princely order ultimately succumbed to the 
decolonization of the Indian subcontinent. 
Chapter two gives a historical background of the territories of Jammu, Kashmir 
and Ladakh, and the processes and procedures which were involved in cobbling together 
of these disparate territories by the English East India Company and Raja Gulab Singh to 
bring into being the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir. An attempt to highlight the 
polemic that followed the creation of this state is made to draw a conclusion regarding 
the handing over of Kashmir to Gulab Singh. It demonstrates the distinctive 
characteristics of the newly founded state. The chapter also discusses the strategic 
importance the state acquired for the British colonial power. 
Chapter three discusses the legal aspect of Anglo-Kashmir relations. It examines 
in detail the provisions of the Treaty of Amritsar in an attempt to indicate how far the 
British interference, which progressively increased throughout the period, was warranted 
by the provisions of the treaty. It argues that the treaty was not just an instrument for the 
creation of the state but determined the status of the two parties vis-a-vis each other The 
provisions of the treaty remained relevant throughout the period even if they were 
invoked more in violation than in observance. The chapter demonstrates that the treaty 
continued to serve as a frame of reference, whenever there was a controversy and 
disagreement between the two parties. 
Chapter four investigates how far the changing geo-political scenario ii the 
critical north-western frontier— the defeat of the Sikhs in the Second Anglo-Sikh war 
(1849), the mal-administration of the Kashmir Darbar and the British failure ir the 
Afghan war of 1878— prepared the ground for the direct British intervention in Jammu 
and Kashmir. The intervention manifested itself in the establishment of the British 
Residency in 1885 and, in a more aggressive form, the deposition of Maharaja Piaiap 
Singh in 1889.This brought Jammu and Kashmir under the virtual British control. The 
chapter explains how the British intervened primarily to secure their imperialistic 
motives, but they presented themselves in the guise of benevolent power. This 
"benevolence" indeed resulted in some positive changes in the state; it exposed the 
"medieval" socio-politico-economic and administrative structures of the state to 
somewhat "improved" British colonial structures. 
Chapter five focuses on the Russian advances towards the southern and eastern 
regions of Asia by mid-nineteenth century, the deteriorating relations with the Am r of 
Afghanistan and the territorial contiguity with China which persuaded the British colonial 
power to take serious note of the defense of the northern frontier. This resulted in the 
establishment of the Gilgit Agency by the British, considered as "a watch tower to the 
10 
defence of the Indian Empire", that remained in operation till 1947 when the Indian 
subcontinent was decolonized. 
The question that how far the appointment of the Resident and removing the 
Maharaja from the throne cleared the way for the colonial authorities to implement their 
comprehensive defence scheme without any opposition from the Kashmir Darbar has also 
been explored in this chapter. 
Chapter One 
Indian Princes and the British Paramountcy 
The "native states"' or "princely States", as they were referred to, represented a 
unique system of poHty that had developed in India, partly as a result of policy and partly 
as a result of historical accident. The princely States of India and their relations with the 
British Government offer no parallel or analogy to any institution known to histor\. It 
was neither feudal nor federal, though in some aspects it showed similarities to both. It 
was not an international system, though the principal States in India were bound to the 
British Government by solemn treaties and were spoken of in official documents as allies. 
Nor would it be correct to consider it a political confederacy in which the major partner 
had assumed special rights, because it was admitted by all parties that the constituent 
States had no rights of succession. So a polity so curious and so unique deserves o be 
studied and analyzed scientifically. 
To study the position and nature of the princely States is of special interest It 
raises so many questions in regard to the nature of sovereignty, the basis of law. and the 
position of judiciary in subordinate States, that an examination of the subject in all its 
aspects would illuminate almost every side of political theory. Nowhere had the div sion 
of sovereign attributes been carried to such an extent. The Indian States included among 
them every variety of political community ranging from "full-powered sovereign States", 
Many writers, including Indians, prefer the expression "princely States" to "Native States" of India. A 
probable reason for this preference is that during the British rule the word "native" was otkn used as a 
"smear word" in both the British official and non-official vocabulary. 
12 
like Hyderabad or Gwalior, whose rulers enjoyed legally "unrestricted powers"" of life 
and death over their subjects, and who made, promulgated and enforced their laws and 
maintained their own armies, to small chieftainships who were confined within their own 
palaces. They varied in size and importance too—from Jammu and Kashmir, which was 
bigger than France and Hyderabad, and had a population of 12,000,000,^ to little States in 
Kathiawad which consisted of a few acres of land. They were scattered all over, from 
Jammu and Kashmir in the extreme north touching Central Asia and the Pamirs to 
Travancore in the extreme south. Though the rulers of the bigger States were subordinate 
to the Government of India, their laws were supreme in their own States, and there was 
no appeal from their courts even to the Privy Council.'' 
Time and again, at critical junctures, the princes showed themselves as loyal and 
usefiil friends of the Raj. In the Revolt of 1857, during the anti-partition agitation of 
1905, in the war crisis of 1914 and 1939, and during the Quit India movement of 1942, 
princely money, princely forces and princely charismatic authority lent vital material and 
moral support to the imperial cause. Conversely, no other group of Indians was so 
consistently and generously feted by the British. Their services were recognized with 
land grants and special honour. 
The political relationship between the British and the States had deep roots. 
From the occasion of its first intervention in Arcot against the French (1750-54), to the 
battle of Buxar (1764), the British East India Company stood in relation to the Mughal 
^ Lord Chelmsford's Speech quoted by K.M. Panikkar, Relations of Indian States with the Government of 
India, (London: 1927), p. xviii. 
^ H.H. Risley, Census of India, 1901. Vol. I-A, (Calcutta: 1902), pp. 1-5. 
'' Lord Chelmsford's Speech quoted by K.M. Panikkar, Relations of Indian States mth the Government of 
India, p. xix. 
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Empire in position of subordination. With the victory at the battle of Buxar and the 
consequent fall of Nawab Shuja-u-Daula of Awadh, the Company got the Dewani of 
Bengal, Bihar and Orissa.^ From the time of the acquisition of Dewani to the end of 
Warren Hastings' tenure (1784), it got engaged in a life-and-death struggle, first with 
Mysore and then with the Marathas with the object of establishing an equality of status 
with the Indian powers. 
When Lord Cornwallis succeeded to the Governor Generalship, the Company had 
attained the position of equality with the Indian powers. The main States at that time in 
India were the Marathas of central and western India, the Nizam of Hyderabad, the 
Nawab of Arcot and the Sultan of Mysore. The British maintained relations of a friend l\ 
character with the Marathas—who ruled almost whole of central and western India, the 
Nizam of Hyderabad, and the Nawab of Arcot; while with Mysore their relations were 
merely proper but hardly friendly. 
The relative position of the States vis-a-vis the Company continued to be the same 
until the arrival of the Marquis of Wellesley. But among themselves their power and 
authority had undergone considerable change. The Nizam was reduced to impotence after 
the fatal field of Kurdla in 1795, where his army capitulated to the Marathas. In the 
Maratha Empire itself, the balance of power had altered. The central authority o ' the 
Peshwa had weakened. Mysore remained under Tipu, but that redoubtable Sultan's power 
Dewani means the right to collect the revenue. The Company after defeating the tripartite alliance of 
Shuja-ud-Daula of Awadh, Shah Alam-II, the fugitive ruler of Mughal Empire, and Mir Qasim of Bengal in 
the battle of Buxar on 22 October, 1764, got the Dewani of Bengal, Bihar and Orissa. Owing to the gram of 
Dewani and the reorganization of its political administration by the intervention of British Parliament 
through various Acts, the Company increased in authority and prestige. 
14 
was very greatly reduced. Scindia alone remained a power of first class military 
importance in Western India and the forces of Holkar held Central India. 
The East India Company finally defeated Tipu Sultan of Mysore in 1799. The 
position of Hyderabad state was also made subordinate when the Nizam was made to sign 
a subsidiary treaty in 1800.^  
With the Marquis of Hastings a new period opened in the relations of Indian 
States with the East India Company. The supremacy of English arms proved itself on 
every side. The large blocks of vaguely defined territory were broken up. Scores of States 
were added to the Company's protectorate. Though the Company had won in war. it was 
necessary for the peace of its own territories that neighboring powers should not fight 
each other on its borders; it assumed the right to arbitrate in disputes of princely States 
and deprived them of the right to make war. Rulers now signed treaties with the 
Company not as equals making arrangements of mutual benefit, but as subordinates who 
would cooperate with the Company in return for its "protection". This "protection" 
extended at that time only to the external affairs of the States. 
* Under the 'subsidiary system', the Company forced on the States a subsidiary force which was to be 
maintained by the States. The subsidiary force besides demoralizing the administration also provided the 
Company the opportunity to force the States to give away the portions of their territories to the Company. It 
was usually postulated that the subsidy (which formed generally about one third of the revenues of the 
States) should be paid annually. The Company's Government knew well enough that so heavy a demand on 
the States' revenues could not easily be met with any regularity especially in India, where revenues shrink 
or expand according to the monsoon. The result was, as the Duke of Wellington foresaw, that the States fell 
into arrears. This gave the Company opportunity to annex the most valuable portions of the territory of its 
allies. The principle on which the commutation of subsidy was generally negotiated is put in the following 
words by the Marquis of Wellesley himself, "In commutation of 40 lakhs a country rated at the annual 
value of 62 lakhs of rupees was taken away in full sovereignty in the Nizam's case." ll'ellesley's Despatch 
to the Secret Committee of the Board of Directors, quoted in C.L. Tuppcr, Our Indian Protectorate. 
(London: 1898), pp. 40-1. 
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When Lord Hastings left India in 1823, the broad outline of what came o be 
known as princely or Indian India, in contrast to British India, had been defined on 
British maps. There were three great blocks of what were called native States' territories. 
The largest one was the massive conglomeration of Rajput- and Maratha-ruled States. 
which spread from Gujarat in the west through Rajasthan to Malwa and Rewa in cc ntral 
India. This broad band included the States and estates of Saurashtra; the deserts of 
Rajasthan with Rajput rulers and large populations of aboriginal tribal groups; northern 
central India with the small States of Bundelkhand and Baghelkhand; and the Maratha 
holdings of the northern Deccan. In the east there was Maratha-ruled Nagpur and the 
Orissan States, constituting the Tributary Mahals of Chota Nagpur. In the sKith, 
Hyderabad and Mysore dominated the interior, with Travancore and Cochin or the 
southwestern coast. There was also the outlying group of smaller States north of Delhi, 
the Cis-Sutlej States of Punjab and some Rajput-ruled States in the Himalayan foothills. 
The British were nevertheless anxious to control most coastal tracts, the hinterland of 
their major entrepots, and economically productive area such as the Gangetic plains.'^ 
The Government of India pursued, in several marked periods of spectacular 
aggression followed by periods of hesitation and rest, a policy of enlarging the empire by 
annexing princely States. The Court of Directors in 1841 enunciated the policv of 
'abandoning no just and honourable accession of territory or revenue as may from time to 
time present.'^ Lord Dalhousie carried this theory into practice with such a determination 
that 'he changed the map (of India) with speed and thoroughness no campaign had 
' Lee Warner, The Native Slates of India, pp. 96-127. 
* Ibid., pp. 145-6. 
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equaled'. 'With the result, Awadh, Satara, Nagpur, Tanjore and numerous other States 
were annexed and became part of the territories of the Company.'" The additions he made 
to the British territory in India increased its revenue by four millions and a half sterhng 
and its area by districts equal to Russia in Europe." 
Thus by the second decade of the nineteenth century virtually all the major 
'country powers' had been linked to the company by treaties. What is more, the essential 
elements of British paramountcy—the system of residents at the princely courts, the 
regulation of successions, and control over the States' foreign affairs—were all laid down 
in this period. Indeed, by the 1850s, the only big question that still remained to be settled 
in regard to the States was how many ought to be left intact. As the British Raj grew 
more secure, and as the philosophies of evangelicalism and utilitarianism cast their spell, 
officials who had once cautiously advocated keeping a "ring fence" of friendly States 
around the company's territories, now argued forcefijlly for their extinction on the 
grounds that native rule—"oriental despotism"—fell short of the "standards of the 
civilizations" to which the people of India were entitled. If events had not intervened, the 
remaining States would probably have suffered the same fate as befell Satara, Jhansi, 
Nagpur, Awadh and the Punjab between 1848-1856—absorbed into the expanding Indian 
empire. The first of these events and, in retrospect, the critical one, was of course the 
Revolt of 1857 which compelled a review of every major policy of the British Indian 
government. 
' R.C. Majumdar, British Paramountcy and Indian Renaissance, Part 1, (Bombay; 1963). pp. 54-5. 
'° The Company's Government took over the administration of Mysore in 1831. and between 1832 and 
1835 annexed Cachar, Jaintia and Coorg. In February 1856, Lord Dalhousie, the predecessor of Canning in 
office, annexed Awadh and removed the King, Wajid Aii, from Lucknow to a suburb of Calcutta. 
" Majumdar, British Paramountcy. pp. 54-5. 
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The Revolt shocked the British officialdom with its suddenness, rapid spread and 
fierceness. However, it was the timely and whole-hearted support of most of the Indian 
princes which helped the British to carry the day. Indeed one of the significant fat ts of 
the Revolt was that the rulers generally aided the British Government, directi> or 
indirectly, to limit and suppress the revolt. Some of the princely States, like Nepal, 
Hyderabad and Patiala, gave valuable military aid to the Company's Government in 1857-
58. Even the passive loyalty of most of the princely rulers—because it limited the area of 
uprising and military action in the critical months of 1857—proved valuable to the British 
Government. 
Once the initial shock of the revolt had passed and it became clear that the 
rebellion would not succeed, the Company's senior men on the spot, such as Governor 
General, Earl Canning, began to look more deeply and analytically into its causes. Out of 
this thorough examination emerged the insight that the policy of territorial expansion had 
turned a number of peaceable rulers into bitter enemies, and thus could be accounted, as 
the Board of Control President Lord Stanley of Alderley declared in a speech to 
parliament, a major cause of the revolt. 
Lord Canning, the Governor General wrote, "The safety of our rule is increased, 
not diminished, by the maintenance of Native Chiefs." During 1857-58, "these patches of 
Native government", like Hyderabad, Gwalior, Rampur and Patiala, had "served as 
breakwaters to the storm which would otherwise have swept over us in one great wave." 
The Governor General believed that in times of threat to Britain's position in India and 
elsewhere, "one of [their] main-stays [would] be found in these Native States." "Not 
'- Thomas R. Metcalf, The Aftermath of Revolt: India. 1857-1870, (Princeton: 1965), pp. 323-4. 
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further extension, but strengthening of British rule in India should be our first care", 
declared Canning."'' The Governor General also put forward the economic reasons for 
abandoning the policy of annexations. Lord Cunning stated his conviction that if the 
policy of annexing princely States was not abandoned, it would impose on the 
Government of India the burden of a very big standing army of European troops, 
intensify the financial crisis produced by the Revolt, and by straining the existing 
military, administrative and economic resources of the Government, impede efforts to 
develop the vast territory already under direct British rule.''* 
So, Lord Canning with his strong views against any aggressive policy towards the 
States prevailed on the India Office to insert in the Queen's proclamation of I'*' 
November 1858—issued to mark the transfer of the East India Company's possessions to 
the crown— a pledge to 'respect the rights, dignity and honour of the native princes as 
our own'.'^ Thereby he ensured that in an undefined but substantial way, the fate of 
almost 600 royal houses in India became bound up with the reputation of the crown in 
England. He also succeeded in sanctioning from the Home authorities an assurance to the 
princes that their dynasties would not be allowed to lapse for want of natural heirs. The 
assurance came in the form of adoption sanads —which 'ensured' that the princely rule in 
'^  H.H. Dodwell, (ed.), The Cambridge History of India, Vol. VI, (Cambridge: 1932). p. 493. 
''' The Revolt then changed attitudes about the worth of the States as imperial clients: but it also provided, 
indirectly, a persuasive financial argument against further annexation. While the revolt had been 
suppressed, the costs had been heavy. In 1858-9 the government's budget deficit was a whopping 14 
million. By 1861, the British Government was driven to introduce income tax in a bid to raise revenue. This 
was clearly not the time to embark on an aggressive foreign policy which could only lead to new financial 
burdens on the government. Ian Copland, The Princes of India in the Endgame of Empire 1917-1947. 
(Cambridge: 1999), p. 16. 
" The amnesty proclamation, better known as the Queen's Proclamation, was published throughout India. 
This proclamation contained two paragraphs addressed to Native Rulers, though the document as a whole 
was addressed to the Queen's subjects in India. See, A.B. Keith, Speeches and Documents on Indian Policy. 
1750-1921, (London: 1922), Vol. I, pp. 383-4. 
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India was safe both from the whims of nature and ambitions of over-zealous officals."' 
Canning proved right. During the ninety odd years between 1858 and the British 
departure from the subcontinent in 1947, not one princely State lapsed—and nonf was 
annexed. While in British India provinces were created and carved up, the borders of the 
States stayed frozen in their post-mutiny mould. No wonder the princes in later years 
came to look back upon the Cunningite settlement as their Magna Carta. 
The proclamation's words, 'we desire no extension of our present territorial 
possessions', were most striking. This was so in the context of the Company's policv 
since thirties of the 19* century of annexing subordinate rulers on charges of misrule.'^ 
and by application of the Doctrine of Lapse.'^ But what the real meaning of this statement 
would be, or if it would prove a firm, honest statement of territorial policy, no one lould 
foretell. But one thing is for sure that the disastrous results of the Revolt forced the 
To scaUcr away 'the clouds of mistrust', the Government issued Sanads, some 140 in all to each if the 
principle States in India in 1860, assuring them that in case of failure of natural heirs, their adoptee: sons 
would be recognized as their successors. See, K.M. Panikkar, An Introduction to the Study of the Relation 
of Indian States with the Government of India, (London: 1927), p. 57. 
" On charges of misrule against their rulers, the Company's Government took over the administration of 
Mysore in 1831, and between 1832 and 1835 annexed Cachar, Jaintia and Coorg. In February 1856. Lord 
Dalhousie, the predecessor of Canning in office, annexed Awadh and removed the King. Wajid Ali. from 
Lucknow to a suburb of Calcutta. One of the largest Native States (24,000 sq. miles), Awadh was the home 
of the bulk of the sepoys and native officers of the Company's Bengal Army, which revolted in 1857. 
'* Under the Doctrine of Lapse, the Company claimed that on the death of a native ruler having no natural 
heir to succeed him, his State automatically 'lapsed' to the Company, the paramount power, and that such 
lapsed princely States could be annexed to the territory of the Company. In other words under this doctrine 
the Company claimed the right to withhold recognition in cases of succession by adoption from a gadi. 
Though according to the custom and laws of property of the Hindus since ancient times an adopted son is 
for all purposes of succession as good as a son bom in wedlock, the supporters of the Doctrine of Lapse 
held that the British Government, as the paramount power, need not recognize in cases of succession to 
chiefships, as distinguished from succession to private property according to English ideas of property, the 
succession of an adopted son. This doctrine was used to annex Mandavi in 1839, Kolaba and Jalaun in 
1840, Surat in 1842, Satara in 1848, Jaitpur and Sambalpur in Baghat, a Cis-Sutlej territory, in 1850. 
Udaipur in central India in 1852, Nagpur in 1853, and Jhansi in 1854. These annexations added about 
100,000 sq. miles to the British Empire within a short period of 15 years. 
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authorities to realize the 'failure' of the annexationist policy. After the Revolt, the British 
finally came to adopt the policy of perpetuating the princely rule. 
The policy of the Government of India since the Mutiny was directed at the steady 
consolidation of economic interests. The period following the Mutiny saw an 
extraordinary development in the economic life of India. The extension of railways, the 
sudden demand for Indian cotton owing to the stoppage of supplies from America during 
the civil war and the consequent rise of Bombay as a leading industrial and commercial 
centre, the growth of modern banking, posts and telegraphs, etc., led to a steady and 
irresistible movement towards economic unification. Railways were being pushed into 
the interior to service the long-distance trade. The States which lay within the operation 
of these currents began to seem a serious obstacle to progress. The attitude of the British 
Indian authorities changed and the darbari'' expectations that the States were about to 
come into their own were quickly shattered. They surrendered or were forced to surrender 
their economic independence. In the meanwhile, the Evangelicals launched a scathing 
attack on the post mutiny settlement. They argued that by issuing the sanads the 
government had provided the princes the shield which could be used by them to 
perpetuate the misrule in their States. Was it right, the evangelicals asked, that some of 
India's people should prosper while others languished in poverty and ignorance and 
suffered oppression just because they happened to be the subjects of a dependent prince? 
Was the British Government not morally obliged to ensure that the rulers who owed their 
power to the British did not abuse it? By the end of the decade, the British officials, such 
as Governor-General and his associates felt a need to change their attitude towards the 
' The term Darbar stands for Royal Court. 
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in princely States. The theory of suzerainty was put forward as a uniform principle 
relation to all the States for the first time. Lord Mayo, while addressing a gathering of 
princes of Rajputana at Jaipur in 1870 made it clear to them that, "If we respect >our 
rights and privileges you should also respect the rights and regard the privileges of those 
who are placed beneath your care. If we support you in your power, we expect in return 
good government."'^ 
Thus the British Indian Government again started pursuing a forward polic\. But 
this time they followed a different path. One way was to exploit the advent of mimtrs as 
rulers in the States, and then implement "reforms" directly through British guardian-
administrators. Such opportunities were relatively plentifijl."' Another area where the 
British could make the forward moves was to compel young princes entering their 
majority to sign legal documents which bound them to follow the advice of their 
Residents in all important matters, and to retain 'reforms' introduced during the minority 
period.'^ Yet another way was to make examples of rulers who defied them. In total, 
some twelve ruling princes were unceremoniously removed from their thrones in the later 
part of nineteenth century. 
^^  Writing to a Cabinet Minister in England he said: '"Our relations with our Native Feudatory States ire on 
the whole satisfactory, though they are by no means defined. We act on the principle of non-interference, 
but we must constantly interpose. We allow them to keep armies for the defence of their States, but we 
cannot permit them to go to war. We encourage them to establish courts of Justice, but we cannot hear ol 
their trying Europeans. We recognize them as separate sovereigns, but we daily issue to them orders ivhich 
are implicitly obeyed. We depose them when the ruler commits or sanctions a grievous crime; or create an 
administration for them when the chief misgoverns and worries his subjects. With some we place political 
agents, with others we do not; with some as with Jaipur, Bhopal and Patiala, we are on terms of intimacy 
and friendship. Others such as Dholpur and Alwar, we scarcely ever address except to find fault with them 
for some gross neglect of duty." See, W.W. Hunter, The Life of the Earl of Mayo. (London: 1876). Vol. 
II, pp. 207-10. 
"' The princely States of Orissa such as; Athgarh, Baramba, Bonai, Kalahandi, Narsinghpur. Nilgiri, 'ulna. 
and Talcher, remained under the minority administration for a considerable period of time. 
""" Ian Copland. The Princes of India, p. 19. 
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However, questions were raised from various quarters in regard to the legal aspect 
of intervention. For example. Sir Owen Tuder-Burne, the Political Secretary in the India 
Office, thought that the government had effectively given away the right to intervene in 
the States by conferring adoption sanads on the princes in 1860-2.-^ But his and the 
similar other questions from different quarters were laid to rest by a series of brilliant 
deductions on the part of a group of senior bureaucrats. In the early 1870s, Aitchison. the 
Foreign Secretary, came up with the view that the treaties needed to be read with an eye 
on the circumstances existing when they were drawn up and in the light of the subsequent 
evolution of the relationship between the States and the Crown.^'' 
The theory of suzerainty and the concept of 'usage' were also invoked to justify 
the new policies. In 1877 Lytton advised Lord Salisbury, his superior in London, that 
"[t]he paramount supremacy of the British Government is a thing of gradual growth; it 
has been established partly by conquest; partly by treaty; partly by usage.""' Thus 
paramountcy would buttress the British right to confirm all successions to the gaddi in 
princely States; the extension of British jurisdiction over railway lines that crossed the 
borders of the States; intervention in struggles between princes and their nobles; and the 
extension of advice to princes about the need to improve or reform their administrations. 
T. H. Thornton, the successor of Aitchson, developed the theory of "usage", which held 
that any "long-continued course of [governmental] practice acquiesced in by the States 
could be construed as lawful, since acquiescence implied consent."" William Lee 
" Minute by Sir O. T. Bume dated 22 Jan. 1875, quoted in Ian Copland, The Princes of India, p. 18. 
^^ Similar views have been expressed by Lee Warner. See, Lee Warner. The Native States of India, pp. 37-
9. 
" Despatch dated 11 June 1877, cited in Tupper, Our Indian Protectorate, p. 7. 
*^ Report of the Indian States committee 1928-1929, (Calcutta: 1929), para. 41. 
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Warner, the Political Secretary in the Government of Bombay contributed a doctrine 
which implied that "the treaties with the Native Sates must be read as a whole and 
applied equally to all States."^^ These all kinds of declarations reduced the treaties of the 
princes with the British Government as mere "scraps of paper"?^ Thus armed, the 
Government of India steadily deprived the princes of what was left of their sovereignty. 
From 1878-1886 most of the States were compelled to relinquish control over their post 
and telegraph networks and to integrate them into the imperial system; in 1879 the salt 
manufacturing States were prohibited from exporting it and from 1877 the States were 
gradually deprived of civil and criminal jurisdiction over broad-gauge railways passing 
through their territory. Bit by bit, too, British Indian currency became legal tender right 
across the subcontinent and by the end of the century almost all the rulers had been 
pressured into signing away their right to mint silver and copper coins. Again, after ! 879, 
the States lost the automatic right to employ Europeans; while their freedom to import 
weapons for the use of their police was steadily curtailed.^' 
So it becomes clear that the issuance of the sanads of adoption to the princely 
States should not be taken as if the British Government ceased to interfere in their 
internal affairs. It is not that the actual relationship between the British Governmeni and 
the States did not change, for there had been since the Mutiny a gradual and steady 
encroachment on the rights of the rulers in their internal affairs. The doctrine o" the 
'paramount power' had been a flexible, expanding concept which produced a complex 
and uncodified political 'law'. Under it, the Viceroy could intervene and deal with the 
"' I.ee Warner, The Native Stales of India, pp. 38-9. 
"* The term "Scraps of paper' was used by A.P. Nicholson to title his booic on the Indian princes. A.P. 
Nicholson, Scraps of Paper: India's Broken Treaties, The Princes and the Problem, (London: 1930). 
"" Ian Copland. The Princes of India, p. 20. 
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affairs of any State if he thought such action was necessary for the 'good of the State' or 
for the Government of India. 
Like so many other features of British imperialism in India, intervention in the 
affairs of the States reached its climax in the first decade of the new century during the 
stormy viceroyalty of Lord Curzon (1898-1905). In July 1900, the rulers were informed 
that they would in future need the permission of the government to travel overseas. In 
1902 Curzon personally browbeat the Nizam into renegotiating the 1860 treaty governing 
the administration of Berar on more favourable terms.^° He also overhauled the Imperial 
Service Troop Scheme which made it more expensive for the concerned States. Also the 
rulers of Jhalawar, Panna and Indore were deposed during his term. Sixty three States 
were placed under some form of temporary British control. "The tyranny of Curzon's rule 
had been so unbearable to his fellow princes", narrated Scindia of Gwalior to a British 
official that "nothing would have induced them to put up with it [much longer]".^' 
According to Ganga Singh of Bikaner, the viceroyalty of Curzon was so painful for some 
princes that merely talking about the epoch was enough to reduce them to tears.^^ 
Paradoxically, though, the Curzon's viceroyalty also marked the moment when, after the 
decades of indifference, the British once more began to view the Indian States as 
potentially useful players in the great game of empire. 
'" Under the agreement of 1860, the province of Berar had been placed under a British commis.sioner and 
part of its revenues attached to pay-off debts incurred by the British officered Hyderabad Contingent. The 
new agreement which Curzon wormed out of Osman Ali further integrated the administration of Berar with 
that of the Central Province, and considerably reduced the amount of the Berar surplus which was returned 
to the Nizam as 'rent'. Ibid. 
'^ Lord Minto to Lord Morley 12 Sept. 1907, Ibid., p. 21. 
" Minute by Bikaner, 1915, quoted in K.M. Panikkar, His Highness the Maharaja of Bikaner: A Biography 
(London: 1937), p. 164. 
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The second great imperial crisis of the nineteenth century—the challenge of 
nationalism—arose in the 1890s; but, unlike 1857, it arrived not suddenly but stealthily. 
Nationalism in the form of a political ideology began to manifest itself in the big 
Presidency cities around the middle of the century, but its transformation into an all-fndia 
phenomenon took another twenty years. The movement gathered the steam and bv the 
beginning of the twentieth century the 'Moderates' were giving way to the younge- and 
more outspoken men such as Bal Gangadhar Tilak, Lala Rajpat Rai and Aurobindo 
Ghosh. Some people took to violence and the attacks on British officials became more 
commonplace. 
The government became very concerned with the mass agitation and the 
revolutionary activities. They sought to find a counterpoise to this nationalist challenge 
which they found in the policy of cultivating and politicizing for imperial purposes the 
Indian princes keeping in view the influence and position they enjoyed in the sockity.^ ^ 
The progressive princely States were admired both by their subjects and the open-minded 
Indians. The nationalists put forward them as an evidence that Indians were really 
competent to rule themselves.^ "* The princely States were considered as "existing 
specimen[s] of Indian sovereignty." From almost every angle the princes looked a good 
bargain. 
' ' Besides using ihe princes against the nationalist challenge, the British also tried to marginalize the 
nationalists by using the card of Muslim friendship. 
•^^  In 1903, Romesh Dutt, Congress President and champion of good government, affirmed that "no part of 
the subcontinent is better governed to-day than these States, ruled by their own Princes". Romesh Dutt. 
India in the Victorian Age. An Economic History of the People, (London: 1904), p. 32. 
" Speech by Satyamurthy to the All-Parties Conference, Calcutta, 1 Jan. 1929, Times of India. 2 .Ian, 929. 
p. 10. 
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The princes thought on the issue of the nationalist challenge to the British 
authority in their own way. The challenge gave the princes new hopes and new fears. On 
the one hand, it is likely that they saw a chance to join in the challenge, or at least to 
profit by it, and stem and reverse the steady tide of imperial encroachment on their 
authority. They might have thought they could effectively press for their demands once 
they collaborate with the British Government. On the other hand, joining the nationalist 
movement was not a profitable deal for them. By going over to the side of the 
nationalists, there was everything for them to fear, for the nationalist movement was 
democratic. Democracy was a threat to their authority, their unregulated privy purse, 
perhaps to their "dignity". Probably after considering both the options, they decided to 
throw their lot with the British. 
Finally, the princes were called in to service by the British to deal with the 
nationalist challenge. Lord Minto issued a circular in 1909 in which he asked the princes 
to suggest the best ways for dealing with the "sedition". The princes responded very 
quickly and positively, and in a true loyalist tune. Most of them banned any public 
meetings, clamped down on the nationalist newspapers and any sort of anti-imperialist 
activity was banned in their territories.^* 
The wholehearted support of the princes against the nationalist forces convinced 
the British Indian authorities to concede to their long pending demand of internal 
autonomy.^^ On 1 November 1909, Minto delivered a speech at Udaipur, in which the 
policy of non-intervention in the internal affairs of the States was announced. Minto said 
^^ Ramusack, The Princes of India in the Twilight of Empire, pp. 36-7. 
" The princely support was not the only reason that made the British to grant them more freedom, but the 
home authorities were also determined to introduce constitutional reforms in the provinces keeping in view 
the ruthless criticism the authorities were facing at the hands of the nationalists leaders. So it became a 
moral obligation for the British to reward their most faithful allies. 
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that, "I have always been opposed to anything like pressure on Durbars with a vi(.'\\ to 
introducing British methods of administration". He fijrther stated that, "the reforms 
should emanate from Durbars themselves and grow up in harmony with the traditions of 
the States". Defining the fiiture role of the Residents in the princely States, Mintc said 
that, "it is not the only object to aim at[and] though the encouragement of it must be 
attractive to keen and able Political Officers and it is not unnatural that the temptation to 
further it should, for example appeal strongly to those who are temporarily in charge of 
the administration of a State during a minority...! cannot but think that Political Ofllcers 
will do wisely to accept the general system of administration to which the Chief and his 
people have been accustomed."^* On the basis of this speech, a set of instructions was 
issued confidentially to all Residents in 1910 in which it was impressed on them to place 
themselves in the princes' shoes, try to appreciate their point of view; abstain from 
offering any unnecessary advice, to uphold the dignity of the Darbars and not to interfere 
in the internal affairs of the States until an open violation of the "basic laws o" the 
civilization" was made by a prince.^^ The political Residents resisted the move as the 
declaration greatly curtailed their power. 
With the declaration of Lord Minto, the whole question of British relations with 
the princes was reconsidered. The declaration formed the bedrock of the future 
relationship between the Government of India and the princely States. A corner had lieen 
turned and the princes considered it as a new era in relation with the Raj. The princes 
started demanding for a permanent body through which they could communicate to the 
*^ C.H. Phillips (ed.). The Evolution of India and Pakistan, 1858-1947: Selected Documents (Lordon: 
1962). p. 427 
The instruction manual prepared for the Residents in the States came to be known as Pol Heal 
Department Manual. Ian Copland, The Princes of India, p.31. 
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Government their opinion regarding tiie legislations passed by the Government touching 
their interests. However, the demand was not heeded and the princes had to wait till 
another crisis—the World-War One—that forced the Government of India to make the 
structural changes which the princes were demanding. 
The princes stood out in their support for the British war effort. The States gave 
generously of money and munitions.'*° They helped out on the propaganda front too and 
stood on the Government's side against the elements opposed to the war on ideological 
grounds."*' The princes received the rewards for their help in the war effort in the form of 
titles and enhancement in their gun-salutes."*^ The war, however, offered an opportunity 
for them to press their demands more forcefully. The princes' demands included, among 
other things, the reformation of the political process in order to change the mental set-up 
of the officials in the political department and, more importantly, they advocated the 
setting up of a permanent body for the exchange of opinions and ideas between the States 
and the British India. 
The effects of the World War One on India, particularly in terms of economy, 
were not so pleasing. This generated discontent among the people.''^ Given the prevailing 
circumstances, the British had their own compulsions to turn to the princes to face the 
evident crisis."*"* 
'"' Ramusack, Indian Princes in the Tmlight of Empire, pp. 38-9. 
"' For instance, Nawab Osman Ali of Hyderabad was asked by Lord Hardinge to persuade the Indian 
Muslims to ignore the fatwa issued by the Ottoman Khalifa calling for a holy war against the Allied side. 
"^  At the end of the war Nizam of Hyderabad got the title of "Faithful Ally of the British Government" by 
King George V. 
•" A detailed account of the effects of the war on colonial India is given by D. C. Hllinwood and S.D. 
Pradhan (eds.), India and World War 1. (Delhi: 1978), pp. 19-48. 
'*'' The Muslim support which was available during the Bengal anti-partition agitation could not be gathered 
this time. The entry of Turkey in the war against the British side and the growing anxiety about the holy 
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After holding the third all India conference of the princes in Delhi in 1916, Lord 
Chelmsford, the viceroy, wrote to Lord Chamberlain—the Secretary of State—that, "such 
gatherings...ensure that the Chiefs' views are adequately put forward...and Sc;ve[s] 
Government fi-om the errors resulting from a misconception of their attitudes. ' "hese 
conferences act...as a safety-valve through which minor grievances find a harmless 
vent...The old practice of ...'subordinate isolation'... is now, owing to the greater 
facilities of communication and the spread of education, impossible to maintain, and it is 
recognized on all hands that the collective goodwill and support of the Ruling Chiefs is 
an imperial asset of incalculable value. If the growing demand for collective discussion is 
disregarded, we run the risk of alienating the sympathies of those whose support is most 
worth having."'*' Chamberlain, who belonged to the conservative thought, did not like the 
idea of the viceroy. But fortunately for the princes, he had to go in 1917 and was replaced 
by Edwin Montagu, a liberal, sympathetic to the princely order and to the aspirations of 
the Indian middle class. In August 1917, 'Montagu Declaration' was passed which 
pledged that, from now, British policy in India would be directed at 'the gradual 
development of self-governing institutions.'"*^ The declaration also raised hopes ainong 
the princes. 
In the wake of the 'Montagu Declaration', the States formed a 'joint committee" 
which gave its report on 4 February 1918 in which it was demanded that a Federal 
Islamic places in Palestine had turned the Indian Muslims against the British. So the only reliable option for 
the Government of India was the Indian princely order. 
•" Minute by J. B. Wood, Foreign and Political, Secret Intl., July 1916, 29, National Archives of India. New 
Delhi (hereafter NAl). 
P.O. Robb, The Government of India and Reform: Policies toward Politics and the Constitution. '916-
/92/, (Oxford: 1976), p. 3. 
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Chamber of princes be formed which would advise the government regarding the 
potential impact of any legislation on the States by the Government of India. 
The rulers finally got their long-desired council in 1919 when, as a part of its 
post-war reform package, the British Government announced the establishment of a 
'Chamber of Princes' to advise the viceroy on all the 'questions effecting Indian States 
generally or which [were] of concern to either to the Empire as a whole or to British India 
and the States in common'. The Chamber was to have 120 seats and was to meet, at least 
once a year, at the capital. This body of princes was free to have its own elected president 
or chancellor but under the overall control of the viceroy. It could elect a six-member 
Standing Committee whose job was to help the chancellor make the princes' views 
known to the government.''^ 
The installation ceremony of the Chamber of Princes was held at Red Fort on 9 
and 10 February 1921.''^ The message of the king George V was read out there by his 
cousin, the duke Connaught in which the king had declared that "every breath of 
suspicion or misunderstanding should be dissipated", and "His Majesty now invites Your 
Highnesses...to take a larger [role]...in the political development of your Motherland." 
Recalling the pledge his grandmother had taken "to maintain unimpaired the privileges, 
rights and dignities of the Princes of India", the king-emperor in his message had wrote: 
•''' Foreign and Political Dept., Secret Reforms, June 1920, 11-16, NAI. 
•** However, the Chamber of Princes which was expected to be the representative body of whole princely 
order could not succeed to bring in to its fold all the princes. Some of the premier States like, Hyderabad. 
Mysore, Udaipur and Indore did not join the Chamber. The Chamber came to be mainly dominated by the 
"middle class" States, "whose activities [were] known to be resented and feared by many of the smaller 
States and to be viewed with dislike by some of the leading princes". Thus the Chamber did not get its true 
representative character. A brief composition of the ruling elite of the chamber has been given by 
Ramausack, The Princes of India, pp. 119-22 and 133-38. 
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"the Princes may rest assured that this pledge remains inviolate and inviolable." ' This 
announcement of the king proved a high-water mark of the relationship between the 
princes and the British crown. "It may, with some justice, be said", wrote the standing 
committee of the Chamber of Princes in 1929, "that with the inauguration of the Chamber 
of Princes a new era has dawned in the relations between the Government of India and 
the States; that with the frank recognition of the Government...that treaties though 
declared inviolable and inviolate have often been treated as non-existent or obsolete, the 
rights of princes stand better chance of recognition. It is true that the Government of India 
do not now claim...that the interests of the States should give way before the interests of 
Indian Provinces."^'' 
The first twenty years of the twentieth century largely proved very fruitful tcr the 
princely India. Mere onlookers and a scorned lot in the times of Curzon, they emerged as 
acknowledged partners by 1920s. However, unlike the first two decades, the third decade 
did not prove to be so good for the princes. The reasons could be traced again in the 
changing political environment of the country and abroad. 
Though the government gave the princes the concession of forming a 
representative body of theirs, it soon began to feel uneasy with the behaviour o^ " the 
members of the Chamber of Princes. The Residents reported that the princes were 
avoiding them, ignoring their "advice", going over their heads to Delhi. One officer v> rote 
emotionally that if the trend continued he would soon be reduced to a "mere Post 
Office". Princes started meddling in the politics more than what was good for them, or 
"" The Times of India, 10 Feb. 1921. 
' The Directorate of the Chamber's Special Organization, The British crown & the Indian States. (London; 
1929). p. 97. 
" Ian Copland. The Princes of India, p.48. 
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the Government of India. Some of the princes were indeed becoming more assertive. 
Thus it became clear to the new viceroy, Lord Reading—who personally did not like the 
aristocratic nature of the Indian princely order—and the Political Department, that the 
policy of non-intervention which the Government was following in regard to States 
would have to be drastically changed so that there could be put a check on their powers. 
The offensive mood of the Political Department, dealing with the affairs of the 
princes, became clear to the princes when they brought before it some old issues and 
made some new demands. The deadlocks between the Standing Committee of the 
Chamber of Princes and the Political Department on the issues of treaty rights and 
political practice became frequent. The States' suggestion of exercising civil and criminal 
jurisdiction over the railways passing through their territories was met with strong 
opposition by the officials. Similarly the princes' request for a judicial enquiry into the 
erosion of their treaty rights was out-rightly rejected by the viceroy. The viceroy also 
issued orders to the Residents that they should watch the affairs of the States very keenly, 
and to report regularly on the style of the governance of the rulers. 
Lord Reading also came down too hard on some States individually. Maharaja 
Ripudaman Singh of the Punjab State of Nabha, was forced to leave the State and declare 
that he will abdicate the throne in favour of his son once he is of age as a penalty for his 
supporting the anti-British Akali-movement. The next to go was the Maharaja Tukoji Rao 
Holkar of Indore in 1925. He was also made to vacate the throne for his son.^ ~ The issue 
of Berar, which was considered to be the benchmark of the relations between the 
" The charges leveled against Tukoji Rao Holkar were that he had ordered to get back his court dancer. 
Mumtaz, who was living with a rich Muslim merchant of Bombay, Bawla. In the process, Bawla was 
murdered. The incident provided the British an opportunity to seal his fate by constituting a commission of 
inquiry against him. Fearing his dismissal, he voluntarily made way for his son. 
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Government of India and the State of Hyderabad, again came to surface during the 
viceroyalty of Lord Reading." When the claim of Osman Ali regarding the restorat>oii of 
the ftjil autonomy fell to deaf ears, he tried to challenge the validity of the Government's 
decision of not entertaining his claim. He wrote a letter to the viceroy informing him that 
the Berar matter could not be treated as a closed chapter. This infuriated the viceroy and 
in March 1926, he wrote a long letter to the Nizam which has been recognized as the 
classic statement of the doctrine of unregulated paramountcy. He wrote, '"The sovertignty 
of the British Crown is supreme in India, and therefore no ruler can claim to negotiate 
with the British Government on an equal footing. Its supremacy is not based on I) on 
Treaties and Engagements but exists independently of them, and... it is the right and duty 
of the British Government...to preserve peace and good order throughout India." The 
letter, which was released to the Government Gazette for a wide publication so that the 
other rulers could also see it, further wrote that, "the right of the British Government to 
intervene in the internal affairs of Indian States is another instance of the consequences 
necessarily involved in the supremacy of the British Crown... and where imperial 
interests are concerned, or the general welfare of the State is seriously and grievously 
affected by the action of its Government, it is with the Paramount Power that the ultimate 
responsibility of taking remedial action, if necessary, must lie. The varying degrees of 
internal sovereignty which the rulers enjoy are all subject to the due exercise b\ the 
" In I860, an agreement had been signed between the Government of India and the States of Hyderabad by 
which Berar was placed under a British commissioner and part of its revenues were specilled to pay-off the 
debts incurred by the British officered Hyderabad contingent. In 1902, Osman Ali was made to sign a new 
agreement by which the administration of Berar was further integrated with that of the Central Provinces, 
and considerably reduced the amount of the Berar surplus which was returned to the Nizam as Tent' In 
1919. Osman Ali revived his father's claim of complete restoration of the province to the States. 
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Paramount Power of this responsibility."^" In July 1926, the Nizam was asiced to delegate 
his executive powers to a council whose members would be under the overall control of 
the Government of India. 
Though the Government succeeded to intimidate these princes, these and other 
such actions and policies, for instance, fiscal policy, and the management of post offices 
and mainline railways came under fire from the States.'^ They did not feel cowed down 
and decided to take a firm stand against these arbitrary actions of the Government. 
The princes were also feeling marginalized in decision-making after the reforms 
were introduced as now the Legislature had elected Indians—the princes were 
unrepresented—which made policy-making more tilted towards provinces. Thus they 
decided to take the questions of paramountcy and the constitutional reforms of 
1919—which effectively denied them the representation in the Legislature—so that they 
could safeguard their interests. In November 1926, the Standing Committee of the 
Chamber of Princes called upon the new viceroy Lord Irwin, to hold an Independent 
Committee of enquiry to review the operation of the paramountcy. Though both the 
viceroy and the home authorities had reservations about princes' call, they gave go-ahead 
for the enquiry. By giving the green signal for an enquiry, the government just wanted to 
buy time.^^ Thus, a three-man committee under the chairmanship of Sir Ilarcourt Butler, 
'•* Quoted in Government of India, White Paper, Appendix I. 
" In regard to the Government's fiscal policy, the States argued that the goods imported from the British 
India were charged imperial customs duty. However, these States were not paid any remuneration for the 
income they indirectly generated for the Government. The States also felt that they were patronizing the 
post and railway systems but were not entitled to a return from these imperial services. The Stales were 
forced to use these services but they lay outside their control. The Directorate of the Chamber's Special 
Organization, The British Crown <i the Indian States, pp. 177-80, 183-92, 201-4. 
' ' Both Lord Irwin and the London officials did not want to change the status quo and believed that enquiry 
"would most completely allay the princes' apprehensions ...and hamper very seriously the conduct of 
35 
the retired governor of the United Provinces, was appointed to report upon the 
relationship between the Paramount Power and the Indian States and to inquire imo the 
financial and economic relations between British India and the States. 
Butler who presented his report to the parliament in March 1929, had some good 
points for the princely India but fell short of what the princes had expected. The Butler 
Committee report made a strong case for the princes by endorsing the rulers' assertion 
that their relations were with the Crown, not with the Government of India, and could not 
therefore be transferred, without their consent, to "a new government in British India 
responsible to an Indian legislature." However, the Committee reflised to oetlne 
paramountcy. It concluded that "[pjaramountcy must remain paramount; it must fuHili its 
obligations, defining or adapting itself according to the shifting necessities of time; and 
the progressive development of the States".^* Regarding the princes' claim that the 
powers of the paramountcy were defined by the treaties, the report said, "We cannot 
agree that the usage is in anyway sterile. Usage has shaped and the developed 
relationship between the Paramount Power and the States from the earliest times... in all 
the cases usage and sufferance have operated to determine questions on which the 
treaties, engagements and sanads are silent." The report further stated that the paramount 
power had an obligation to protect its clients against attempts to overthrow them, or to 
substitute another form of government. The report also explained that if, there was "a 
widespread demand for [constitutional] change" in a State; the latter would be obliged "to 
current relations with tiie States." But tliey decided to concede to tlie princes" demand ••merely for tlu sai<e 
of tlie Princes" peace of mind". Ian Copland, The Princes of India, pp. 64-65. 
" Report of the Indian Slates Committee 1928-1929, (London: 1929) p. 5. 
'Mbid., p. 31. 
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suggest such measures as would satisfy this demand."^' The Butler report came as a 
shock to the princes. They had expected some relief from the Government but the report 
warned them of interference if the reports of the misgovernment were received. 
However, soon the princes got another opportunity to plead their case before the 
Government when the viceroy announced that a Round Table Conference would be held 
at London in 1930. The main aim of the Conference, the viceroy declared, would be to 
discuss the constitutional reforms in accordance with the Government's understanding 
that Dominion Status was the logical and inevitable goal of the process of devolution 
begun by the 'Montagu Declaration'. However, Lord Irwin made it clear to the princes 
that the questions and issues dealt in the Butler report would not be taken for any 
consideration at the Round Table Conference. 
In the deliberations of the first Round Table Conference which were held at 
London in November 1930, the representative princes announced that they were ready 
and willing to join an all India federation occupying "a position of honour and equality in 
the British Commonwealth of Nations". "Our desire", declared Maharaja Hari Singh of 
Jammu and Kashmir, "to co-operate to the best of our ability with all sections of this 
Conference is a genuine desire; so too is genuine our determination to base our co-
operation upon the realities of the present situation."^'' Sir Muhammad Akbar Hydari, the 
Hyderabadi Minister spoke more or less in the same tone as did the Maharaja of Kashmir. 
He emphasized that "the States... can ftjily sympathize with the aims and ideals of the 
' 'ibid., pp. 24, 28, 31 and 32. 
*° Indian Round Table conference Proceedings, (Calcutta: 1931), p. 15. 
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peoples of British India and are ready to work in harmony with them for the Greater and 
united India"."' 
However, after returning from London, the representative princes found it 
difficult to rally the fellow princes around the idea of the federation. Gulab Singh of 
Rewa, Udaibhan Singh of Dholpur and many like-minded rulers did not want to be 
associated, even marginally, with democracy, and believed that federation Avould 
inevitably result in the subordination of the States to "the rule of the united majority from 
British India, who are republicans at heart"."^ The smaller States had their own 
apprehensions regarding the proposed federation. They feared that they would have no 
voice at the centre, and thus would be entirely at the mercy of the big States. 
Many conservative British Indian bureaucrats also were not in favour of the 
federation. They took the view that the devolution was incompatible with the 
maintenance of Britain's imperial position in the subcontinent and were in favour of 
limited reforms."^ 
The Simon Commission Report, the three Round Table Conferences, the 
publishing of the main constitutional reforms in a White Paper in 1933 followed by a bill 
" Ibid., p.l6. 
'"" Regarding a proposed federation Gulab Singh of Rewa had already made his concerns public. He had 
opined that the federation would "lead to democratization in the States and [institutionalize] aggnssion 
from the young nationalism of British India". See Ian Copland, The Princes of India, p. 87-92. 
''' In the meantime there was an unprecedented upheaval in the domestic life of the States; with Jammu and 
Kashmir, Alwar, Bharatpur, Bhawalpur, Kapurthala and Jind all experiencing major uprisings and b ood) 
communal clashes. These uprisings occasioned, in two cases, heavy-handed exercises of British 
paramountcy—Maharaja Hari Singh of Kashmir was made to take on an English ICS officer as his prime 
minister and the ruler of Alwar was deposed in 1934. These revolts had a great psychological effect en the 
minds of the rulers, for it made them realize how dependent they had become for their protection on the 
sheltering umbrella of British paramountcy that would vanish once they entered the federation. I or a 
detailed account of the 1931 uprising in Kashmir, See Chitralekha Zutshi, Languages of Belonging: 'slam 
Regional Identity, and the Making of Kashmir, (Panikeef. 2003), pp. 210-58. On the Alwar and Bharatpur 
risings see I.S. Marwah, Tabligh Movement Among the Meos of Mewaf, in M.S.A. Rao (ed), Social 
Movements in India, Vol. II, (Delhi, 1979). 
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based on the White Paper was introduced in the British Parliament on December 19, 1934 
and after months of protracted debates in the Parliament, the Bill finally received the 
royal assent on August 2, 1935. The Bill came to be known as the Government of India 
Act 1935. The Act had two main parts; one dealing with the Federation of India and the 
other with Provincial Autonomy. The Act provided for the establishment of a 'Federation 
of India' consisting of Governors' Provinces and princely States. Though the Act paved 
the way for an all-India federation; but it did not bring the federation into being. While it 
was not necessary that all princely States should join the federation, the federation could 
not be formed unless the majority of the States signified their adherence to it by signing 
the Instrument of Accession. 
With the passage of the Government of India Act, it seemed to many observers of 
the Indian political scene that the hard work of constitution-making was over. But it did 
not prove as smooth as the government had thought. The federal scheme was a non-
starter because the princely States did not join the proposed federation, which would have 
meant the surrender of some of their autocratic powers. 
The hesitancy of the rulers to join the all-India federation was greatly influenced 
by the fast changing political scenario of the country. The stunning rise to power of the 
Indian National Congress after the 1937 elections '^* made it to change its hitherto 
followed policy of laissez-faire towards the princely States. The victory made the 
^^ The Congress formed the government in five provinces: Madras, United Provinces. Bihar and Orissa; in 
Bombay, Assam and in the North West frontier Province it was the largest party and formed the 
governments. 
*' The former policy of the Congress during the 1920s and 1930s was to avoid entanglements in the States. 
both by prohibiting the setting up of local branches there and by making it clear to its supporters that it 
believed that the internal governance of the States was a matter for discussion and resolution between the 
rulers and their subjects. See James Manor, Political Change in an Indian Stales: Mysore 1917-1955. (New 
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Congress leaders so confident that they now wanted to dominate the federal part of the 
government as well. To meet that end, they had to change their stance on the prmceiy 
States.*"^  
In the Haripura session of the Indian National Congress in February 1938, !t was 
decided that the congress workers could participate in the political struggles in the States. 
In December, Gandhiji admitted in Harijan that he had been mistaken about the political 
potential of the States' peoples, and pronounced the policy of non-interference 
inappropriate "in the face of [the] injustice[s] perpetrated in the States" by autocratic 
darbars.^' Nehru accepted the presidency of the All India States' Peoples Conference in 
1939. In the inaugural address he asserted that time had come for the local States" 
struggles to be integrated with the major struggle against British imperialism to 
transform them into "one mighty struggle for India's independence." '^^  A month later, the 
Congress leaders endorsed this united front strategy and offered to meet with the 
Standing Committee of the All India States' People's Conference to devise a common 
programme of agitation. 
With the support of the congress workers, the political struggles in the States 
gathered momentum. In April 1938, in Mysore, at least twenty people were killed in the 
Delhi: 1977), chapters 6-7; Vanaja Rangaswami, The Stoiy of Integration: A New Interpretation. (New 
Delhi: 1981), chapter 6. 
*"' Though the Indian national Congress was assured of a healthy representation at the Centre also by the 
federal provisions of the Government of India Act 1935—the government calculated it could anticipate 
holding at least 75 percent of General, Scheduled Caste, Labour and Women's seats in the lower and 
perhaps 80 percent in the upper house— this was not enough, however, to give it an absolute majority, 1 f it 
wanted to govern in its own right, Congress would have to capture, by one means or the other, some of the 
princely seats. The Congress would require 63 per cent and 76 per cent of the States' seats in the Council 
and the Assembly respectively. 
'''' Ian Copland, The Princes of India, pp. 163-70. 
''* Ramusack, The Princes of India, p. 181-2. 
'•' 'Nehru's Presidential Address at the All-India States' People's Conference Session, Ludhiana. Februar) 
1939'. Jawaharlal Nehru, Unity of India, (New York: 1942), p. 30. 
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agitation which was mainly aimed at demanding the right for the States Congress to fly 
the national flag/" This and other types of popular agitations in the States, like Mysore, 
Hyderabad and Jammu and Kashmir, '^ raised the hopes and the Congress leaders 
seriously began to consider the possibility that the monarchical order might be 
overthrown in advance of the British departure. Had the British not responded to their 
urgent calls for help, some, if not all, of these darbars would certainly have fallen. 
Pressed for the rapid constitutional reforms, the States tried to pass the buck. C.P. 
Ramaswamy Aiyer, the Dewan of Travancore—while facing the agitation in his 
State—observed that it was legally "not possible" for the ruler to grant responsible 
government "without the concurrence of the British Government".^ ^ This did not have the 
desired results as the British Indian Government made it clear that "the Paramount Power 
would certainly not obstruct proposals for constitutional advance" in the States. 
Linlithgow, the viceroy, clearly remarked that "the great mistake, I am now disposed to 
think, lay in the change of policy after Curzon's retirement which led us to relax our 
control over individual Princes and happenings inside the States...we and the States have 
now...to pay for 30 years of laissez-faire"." In 1939, Linlithgow used his annual address 
''" Rangasvvami, The Story of Integration, p. 169. 
'^ In the wake of the Haripura decision, there erupted agitations in a number of States. From Orissa Stales. 
about 30,000 people took flight to the British India to escape persecution by darbars. In Ramdurg and other 
southern Deccan States, anti-darbar demonstrations were held. In Rampur, a British political agent v\as put 
to death. 
For a detailed discussion on the trajectory of the Congress policy and of other nationalist organizations 
towards the states and how the people's indigenous political movements in the states affiliated with the 
larger national movement of India, see Suhail R. Lone, Indian National Movement and the Freedom 
Struggle of Jammu and Kashmir (1931-47), M.Phil dissertation submitted to the Aligarh Muslim 
University, Aligarh, 2013. Though the study deals with the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir, the writer 
simultaneously explores the general policy of the Congress, the Muslim League and other political 
organizations towards the princely states. 
^^  Statement to the Travancore Assembly 7 Feb. 1938, cited in Ian Copland, The Princes of India, p. 165. 
" Linlithgow to Zetland 21 Feb. 1939, Cited in Ibid. 
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to the Chamber of Princes to announce his new poHcy of constructive engagement. To 
the Standing Committee of the Princes he stated that 'the fact is the older status is gone 
forever'/'' The announcement came as a rude shock to the princes. The announcement, 
the princes thought, would have a potential impact on their internal autonomy. For over 
two decades the princes had fought to have paramountcy circumscribed, and had 
persuaded the British into putting, if not legally, then at least conventional checks en the 
exercise of their rights of intervention. Now, Linlithgow was threatening to turn back the 
clock to the old days of Lord Curzon. 
The absence of the "protection of the treaty rights of the States" in the 
Government of India Act 1935,^ ^ the differences among the princes, the changed attitude 
of the Congress towards the States, the political unrest in the States, and the shift in the 
governments' policy finally made the States not to join the federation.^ *' The "federal 
offer" was finally wrapped up in 1939 when the negotiations between the British Indian 
government and the princely States broke down. 
To the British officialdom, the virtual abandonment of federation after ten years 
of intensive effort was more than just a political setback to their plans, to underwrite the 
Raj by building an effective counterpoise to Congressite democracy. It represented a 
personal defeat for them. Rightly or wrongly, the British believed they had been betrayed. 
•* Quoted in John Glendevon, The Viceroy at Bay: Lord Linliihgow in India, 1936-1942, (London: 1971). 
p.I18. 
Hyderi, the minister of Hyderabad complained that Hoare, the secretary of States had assured the 1 idian 
States Delegation that there would be no objection to the rulers protecting their treaty rights by means of 
specific clause in the Instrument of Accession; but the promise was not kept when the Act was finally 
drafted. See Ian Copland, The Princes of India, p. 175. 
The 1938-39 had badly shaken the princely order. The princes were also not happy with the response of 
the government to their call for help. The darbars complained that the government helped niggardl\ and 
took long in coming. 
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The Second World War changed the course of events dramatically world over; so 
did it in India. The advancing forces of Hitler crossed into Poland on I September, 1939. 
Within two days Britain was at war with Germany. The outbreak of the war provided the 
princes with the much needed opportunity to repair the damage done to the relationship 
between the States and the government by the federation debacle. The States generously 
helped in the British war efforts and altogether, the cost of war materials provided by the 
States down to 1945 exceeded £5 million. In addition, the States made numerous direct 
grants of cash and gave generously of their land, buildings and workforces for war 
purposes. Both Linlithgow and the home authorities praised the darbars' contribution to 
the war-efforts. As a gesture of good-will, the government instructed the Residents to halt 
the scheme of constitutional reforms for the time being. ^ ^ In his 'August Offer' of 1940, 
Linlithgow emphasized the right of the States to stand aside from any Indian union 
formed as a result of post-war constitutional discussions. 
Sir Stafford Cripps, who headed the Cripps Mission to India in March 1942 to 
persuade the Congress to drop its opposition to the war, told the Standing Committee, "so 
far as the undertaking of our obligations of defence of the States was concerned... we 
should stand by our treaties with the States unless they asked us to revoke them."^^ Fitz, 
the Political Secretary to the Government of India, informed the chancellor of the 
Chamber of Princes that the fulfillment of the treaty obligations remained "an integral 
part of His Majesty's Government's policy", that there would be 'no unilateral 
" Amery to Wavell 21 Jan. 1944, Nicholas Manserg, (ed.), Constitulional Relations Between Britain and 
India: the Transfer of Power, vols. 12, ( London: Her Majesty's Stationary Office, 1970- 1983). vol. II. p. 
295. 
'* Ibid., vol. I, p. 240. 
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denunciation' of the treaties, and that London had no objection to the States forming 
subsidiary unions among themselves. 
However, this war-time rapprochement which was strengthened by the Congress 
rebellion of 1942, did not last long. Taking advantage of the government relaxations, the 
princes grew more assertive and tried to act as a lobby group making demands on the 
government. This made the government uncomfortable. This, along with some other 
factors, such as the victories of the Allied forces in the war, made the British to again turn 
their attention towards the Indian affairs and to put screws on the princes. 
By the end of 1942, the government was convinced that the sweeping reforms 
were the need of the hour. The first thing Francis Wyle, the new Political Officer—with 
liberal views—did was to replace many senior Residents who had likely become too 
partial towards princes.*° In the next stern step he tried to 'redraw the map' of the 
princely States by eliminating the small States. This, he thought, would be done by 
merging them with the larger neighbours. Accordingly in 1943, various small States of 
Kathiawar and Central India including 300 square miles, inhabited by nearly 1.2 million 
people, were 'attached' by executive order to larger neighbours. ' There was a mixed 
reaction to this development from the bigger princely States.^' 
'"ibid., vol. 111. p. 370. 
**" Ian Copland, The Princes of India, p. 197. 
*' Various States challenged the legality of the order in courts. The initial opinion of the courts seemed to 
be tilted in favour of the States. This made the authorities uncomfortable because they did not want \v lose 
the gains made as a result of the 'attachment scheme'. They succeeded to bring a Bill in the parliament 
which was passed by the name of India (Attachment of States) Bill 1944. With the passage of the Aci. ihe 
process of the transformation of the political map of Central India got accelerated. Ibid., 199. 
*^  The Chamber of Princes got divided over the 'attachment drive'. Some thought that the rights ( f the 
rulers could be removed simply by a mere viceregal notification and they suspected dishonesty in the \.hole 
process. The order showed that if their patron, the British crown, was capable of legislating •sovei--ii;n" 
States out of existence; where they appeared to stand in the way of India's advancement. Sooner or later 
Delhi would try something similar with the larger States. While as others welcomed this decision: though 
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The next step which the government took was to tighten their control over the 
economic activities of the States. The States had made great strides during the war years 
in terms of industrial growth much to the dislike of the government because it threatened 
to divert its capital from the provinces, where it was badly needed, and the government 
had also serious reservations with the States' tax policies. After July 1944, the businesses 
in the States supplying goods to the government under wartime contracts were forced to 
accept payment through their head offices in British India, which made such payments 
liable to provincial taxation. Import and foreign exchange controls were also tightened.^^ 
Now it became clear that the British policy towards the princely States had been slowly 
but continuously changing, but the government was not yet prepared to sever its ties with 
the princes, for they were still contributing to the war efforts and potentially acting as 
counterweights to the nationalists. 
However, by May 1945, the war ended in Europe and within weeks the Congress 
leaders were released. In July, Britain saw the election of the socialist Labour 
government, which was committed, at least on paper, to the speedy decolonization of the 
subcontinent. This dramatic turn of events forced the Chamber of Princes to develop a 
strategy in order to safeguard their interests. The Chamber under the chancellorship of 
Nawab Hamidullah of Bhopal designed a strategy to insulate the States from the impact 
of an early British departure from the subcontinent. The strategy among other things 
included the acceleration of the internal reforms which would make the States able to 
privately. They argued that the continuous tradition of poverty and corruptions in these small States had 
tarnished the image of the monarchical order. See, Transfer of Power, vol. IV, p. 563. 
" The political department's Lepel Griffin complained that "the existence of taxation vacua or low pressure 
taxation areas within the geographical limits of India not only tends to suck...[new] industries out of 
British India into the States but creates conditions of unequal competition between [established] industries 
in the two areas". Griffin to chancellor 28 June 1944. Wavell Coll., Pol. Dept.. Special Branch. 78. .^ 0/ 
sb/46, July, 1944, NAI. 
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front up to the post-war bargaining with the bacliing of a solid core of'loyal subjects'.*^ 
The plan of the constitutional reforms produced results. Between a short period of two 
years—1945 to 1947— the proportion of Chamber States endowed with representative 
institutions went up from three-quarters to seven-eighths, while the number boasting 
partly responsible executives rose from 5 to nearly 25 per cent.'*^  
Despite having persuaded the fellow princes to introduce speedy constitutional 
reforms in their States, Hamidullah was still uncertain about the fijture. He continued to 
press the British to make a commitment regarding the ties between the princes and the 
crown, and their constitutional position within the framework of the new Indie. He 
wanted them to make their policy public, in order to put an end to the uncertainty. Paul 
Patrick, the Political Officer assured Hamidullah in private conversation that London 
acknowledged "the right of States, on the lapse of the Paramountcy, to enter into 
negotiations with the foreign powers".*^ Though the chancellor got the inforinal 
assurance from the government there was the next challenge in the offing: the Cabinet 
Mission. 
The Cabinet Mission left for India in March 1946. After much deliberations and 
discussions in India, they issued a document which came to be known as the 
'Memorandum of 12 May 1946'. The memorandum affirmed that, "when a new fully 
*'' The general assumption seemed to be that any devolution of power would be confined to the prov nces. 
and that the imperial links with the States would continue. However as peace started descendirg on 
Southeast Asia and the pacific, the Chamber under the leadership of Bhopal put the final touches to a j^ rand 
strategy designed to guard the princes and their States from the impact of an early British departure from 
the subcontinent. This strategy included: the further rebuilding of the Chamber of Princes; accelerated 
internal reforms; the maintenance of the imperial connection; a tactical alliance with the Muslim League; 
and a negotiated settlement with the Congress. 
*' The Times of India, 6 July 1946. 
*'' E.xtract from political advisor's talk with Bhopal 5 June 1946, enclosure in Abcll to lurnbuil 13 June 
1946. Transfer of Power, VII, p. 908. 
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self-governing or independent government or governments came into being in Britisli 
India, His Majesty's Government's influence with these governments would not be such 
as to enable them to carry out the obligations of paramountcy; nor did they contemplate 
the retention of British troops in India for that purpose. Thus, as a logical sequence, and 
in view of the desire expressed to them on behalf of the States, His Majesty's 
Government would cease to exercise the powers of paramountcy. This meant that the 
rights of the States which flowed from their relationship to the Crown would no longer 
exist, and that all the rights surrendered by the States to the paramount power would 
return to them. Political arrangements between the States on the one side and the British 
Crown and British India on the other would thus be brought to an end. The void would 
have to be filled by the States entering into a federal relationship with the successor 
government or governments in British India, or by entering into particular political 
arrangements". The memorandum also referred to "the desirability of the States, in 
suitable cases, forming or joining administrative units large enough to enable them to be 
fitted into the constitutional structure, as also of conducting negotiations with British 
India in regard to the future regulation of matters of common concern especially in the 
economic and financial fields."^^ 
The princes welcomed the Cabinet Mission Plan as it appeared that the Plan 
assured them the independence after the lapse of British paramountcy in India. The Plan 
also made the provision for an all-India assembly to settle the details of the new 
constitution. The States were also required to send their delegates to the Constituent 
Assembly. But the States had reservations about the nature of this proposed Constituent 
' ' V.P. Menon, The Story of the Integration of the Indian States, (London; 1955), p. 47. See also its 
Appendix II, p. 339. 
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body. Joining the Assembly, the States thought, would lock them into particular 
constitutional arrangements which would not be in the best princely interests. So the 
princes decided to lay down preconditions for the States' entry into the Constituent 
Assembly. In regard to the selection of the delegates, the Chamber of Princes rejected the 
mechanism of popular election; it expected a weighted representation and opposed any 
proposed constitution with provisions antagonistic to the monarchical form of 
government.*** It also stressed that the States be allowed to retain 'full rights of 
administration', subject only to central supervision.*' 
The unity of the purpose however needed unity in the ranks. Both the chancellor 
and his patrons—the British had realized that the group loyalty and the unity of purpose 
were essential if the princes hoped for a reasonable settlement with the nationalist centre. 
Polindia, the Political Secretary to the government of India wrote to the Resident in 
Jammu and Kashmir: "it is important that at this critical stage the States should maintain 
a common front for the purpose of negotiating with British India in the Constituent 
Assembly."'*^ Chancellor opined that, "we must hold together",^' but his message went 
unheard and the princely order could not hold their bond together during the concluding 
years of the Raj.*^ " 
** Circular from Maqbool Mahmud, 17 Dec 1946, Transfer of Power, IX, p. 365. 
"*' Record ofinierviews between Cabinet Delegation, Wavell and Bhopal, 9 and 12 May 1946, Transfer of 
Poiw. Vli,p. 473and521. 
'" Polinda to Resident in Kashmir 11 Dec. 1946, Foreign Dept., Sec. E, File No. 112. N.A.I. 
" Circular from Chancellor 31 Dec 1946, Pol. Dept., Special Branch, 78, 30/ Sb/46, N.A.I. 
- There are various reasons for why the princely sates could not hold together at this critical juncture I he 
gap that had already emerged between the large and small States grew much more pronounced during the 
concluding years as it became clear that there was going to be room for only a minority of the States in the 
new India. The princely order also got divided on the religious and linguistic lines. Till now the States had 
remained comparatively free from the communal violence, but as the barriers between the two Indians 
began to crumble, this syncretic darbari political culture began to wane. However, the most fateful reason 
that eventually divided the princely camp was not class or ethnicity as such, but ideology. The rulers for 
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Thus by the spring of 1947, the princely States had for all the practical purposes 
disintegrated and put themselves exposed to the assaults of their adversaries. 
It was during the decisive viceroyalty of Lord Mountbatten when the question of 
Indian provinces as well as States was "finally solved". He arrived in India on 22 March 
1947. In his first speech, he announced that he had come with the mandate from the 
British Government to transfer power to Indians by June 1948. It was on 3rd June 1947, 
that Lord Mountbatten came up with his famous plan for the partition of India. According 
to the plan His Majesty's Government would be prepared to relinquish power to two 
Governments—India and Pakistan—on the basis of Dominion Status. In regard to the 
States, the plan laid down that the policy of His majesty's Government towards the 
Indian States contained in the Cabinet Mission 'Memorandum of 12 May 1946' remained 
unchanged. 
No sooner had Mountbatten announced his 3rd June Plan than the nationalist 
camp, particularly Congress, rose in opposition to the States' non-participation in the 
Constituent Assembly. Jawaharlal Nehru of Congress, who had accused the rulers of 
having a 'shop-keeper mentality', declared that any State which refused to enter the 
Constituent Assembly would be treated as 'hostile'. He reiterated this line several times 
publicly and made it clear to the Viceroy that he would 'encourage rebellion in all States 
that go against us'.^^ This and some other factors raised serious questions regarding the 
practicality of the provisions, dealing with the States, of the 3rd June Plan.'^ The viceroy 
long had opposed the spread of democracy, but now, as the British departure drew near, some of them 
began to change their tone. 
' ' Record of interview No. 146 dated 10 June 1947, Transfer of Power, XI, p. 232. 
'" Viceroy was forced to change the policy of his government by some other factors such as; Rhopal. 
Travancore. Hyderabad and some other States' intentions of asserting independence after the proposed 
devolution of power. Mountbatten also thought that in the negotiated settlement with the Congress, the 
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was 'forced' to think for a via-media. Mountbatten, after much dehberations with a cross-
section of leaders, finally reached to the conclusion that, "As soon as I turned my 
attention to the problem of the States, it became evident to me that their [aspirations to J 
independence...would not be worth a moment's purchase unless they had the suppiirt of 
one or other of the Dominions."^^ With the problem redefined in this way, the soiuiion 
became obvious to him—the accession of the States to either of the two Governments. 
The solution was made easy by V.P. Menon, the Reforms Commissioner. He proposed 
that the States should be asked to accede only in respect of defence, foreign affairs and 
communications—areas over which they had long ceased to exercise jurisdiction.'^ ^ So it 
became clear that the viceroy's policy towards the princes had changed. He made it clear 
to the rulers that the only way they could stay in the commonwealth was to join up w ith 
India or Pakistan. In this way the plans of the princes for the formation of States" unions 
were shelved. The plan attracted vehement protests fi"om the princes and severe criticism 
from a section of the British officials. The government was accused of'a gross breach of 
faith'.'^ '' But all kinds of protests were in vain. 
Mountbatten gave go-ahead to the establishment of a new central department 
under Sardar Patel to oversee 'matters of common concern' with the States. The three-
subject accession plan was formally unveiled to the rulers and ministers at a meeting of 
the Chamber of Princes on 25 July 1947. The Instrument of Accession, prepared b} the 
Political Department, made it clear that acceding States were not bound, 'in any way', to 
States probably held the key. With this end in view, in conversations with the various Congress leadei s. he 
made it clear that he had set his face against any continuing relationship between the United Kingdom and 
the non-acceding States. 
'* Mountbatten to Listowel, 8 August 1947, Transfer of Power, XII, p. 585. 
Menon, The Story of Inlegralion, pp. 65-84. 
'" Memo by Corlieid, 29 May 1947, Transfer of Power, X, p. 1031. 
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the future constitution of India. It also stated that in all areas except defence, foreign 
affairs and communications, sovereignty would continue to lie with their rulers.*"* They 
were also assured that their extra-territorial rights would be respected and they would be 
allowed to democratize slowly.^^ 
Accession was facilitated by persuasion, pressure, blackmailing and warnings 
from time to time.'"" Thus the States were left with no option but to accede either with 
India or Pakistan. Most of them simply accepted their fate and signed the Instruments of 
Accession. 
However, the Mountbatten's scheme of accession did not address the concerns of 
the Congress and others about the viability of the States and the fijture of the monarchical 
system. It was then left to V.P. Menon and Vallabhbhai Patel to 'finally settle' the 
'problem' of the States. No sooner had the States signed the Instruments of Accession, 
than Patel and Menon began to plot their downfall. This 'project' which took about two 
years, involved the amalgamation of the States into larger administrative units and 
merger with the erstwhile provinces, their rapid democratization, and their total 
subordination to the federal centre. Merger and democratization together brought the 
States into line with the rest of the country as regards the manner of their governance; but 
the States in their relations continued to remain protected by the Instruments of 
Accession, which restricted the control of the Indian union in the States. The Congress 
'* Mountbatten reminded them that the powers in these three areas were already being exercised de facto on 
their behalf by the Delhi government. 
" Transfer of Power, XII, pp. 468-71; H.V. Hodson, The Great Divide: Britain-India-Pakistan. (London: 
1969) p. 368. 
'"" Mountbatten in his speech to the Chamber of Princes impressed upon the princes that the offer of 25 
July might not last; so the rulers should not think twice. Mountbatten under the influence of Patel issued 
Hamdullah of Bhopal and Ramaswamy Aiyer of Travancore with dire warnings about what might happen if 
they did not place themselves under the umbrella of the government of India. See, Alan Campbell-Johnson. 
Mission with Mountbatten, (^O'^^on: 1951) pp. 121-2. 
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leaders assumed that the Instruments of Accession would have to be renegotiated 
eventually in the 'interests' of nation and 'social justice'. Thus the States were made to 
sign new Instruments of Accession ceding to the union the power to pass laws in respect 
of ail matters falling within the federal and concurrent legislative lists. In this way the 
princely India and its age-old monarchical system, eflFectively disappeared dowa the 
trapdoor of history. 
Conclusion: 
Clearly, the princely states which covered one-third of the total area of India 
represented a unique system of polity that had developed in India, partly as a result of 
policy and partly as a result of historical accident. The Government of India pursued, in 
several marked periods of spectacular aggression followed by periods of hesitation and 
rest, a policy of enlarging the empire by annexing princely States. By the second decade 
of the nineteenth century virtually all the major 'country powers' had been linked to the 
company by treaty. What is more, the essential elements of British paramountcy -the 
system of Residents at the princely courts, the regulation of successions, and control over 
the States' foreign affairs-were all laid down in this period. However, after the Revolt of 
1857, the policy of annexation was abandoned by the British Indian Government. It was 
the theory of paramountcy and the concept of 'usage' which was put forward as a 
uniform principle in relation to the princely states. This gave the British ample 
opportunities to intervene in the internal affairs of the States which reached its cliinax 
during the viceroyalty of Curzon. It was the challenge of nationalism, which took the 
shape of mass agitation with the dawn of the twentieth century, that the government 
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decided to follow the policy of cultivating and politicizing the Indian princes to 
counterpoise this challenge. In 1909, in lieu of their support the policy of non-
intervention in the internal affairs of the States was announced by Lord Minto. The 
Residents were asked to put themselves in the princes' shoes. With the declaration of 
Lord Minto, the whole question of British relations with the princes was reconsidered. 
The long standing demand of Indian princes for the establishment of a permanent body 
representing them was finally met in 1919 when the British Indian Government, as a part 
of its post-war reform package, announced the establishment of the Chamber of Princes. 
However, unlike the first two decades of the twentieth century, the third decade 
did not prove to be so good for the princes. The government tightened the noose around 
the princes. The report of the Butler Committee, which was appointed by the British 
Government on the request of the princely states to review the operation of the 
paramountcy, came as a shock to the princes. The report warned the princes of 
interference if reports of misgovernment were received. 
In the wake of the strong nationalist upsurge in India, the British Government 
decided to take up the question of constitutional reforms for India. The Simon 
Commission Report, the three Round Table Conferences and the publishing of the main 
constitutional reforms in a White Paper culminated in the passage of the Government of 
India Act 1935. The Act provided for the establishment of a 'Federation of India' which 
could not be formed unless the majority of the States signified their adherence to it. 
However, the absence of the 'protection of the treaty rights of the States" in the 
Government of India Act 1935, the differences among the princes, the changed attitude of 
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the Congress towards the States, the political unrest in the States, and the shift in the 
governments' policy made the States not to join the federation. 
The damage done to the relationship between the states and the Government of 
India by the Federation debacle, the pressure on the princely states to introduce sweeping 
reforms and the government's decision to 'redraw the map' of the of the princely States 
by eliminating the smaller States made it clear that the British policy towards the princel> 
States had been slowly but continuously changing; but the government was not yet 
prepared to sever its ties with the princes, for they were still contributing to the war 
efforts and potentially acting as counterweights to the nationalists. 
The fast-changing political scenario in India and abroad after Second World War 
and the princes' failure to introduce the much needed reforms, the active support of the 
Indian National Congress for the peoples' movements in the princely states, the absence 
of unity in the ranks and files of the princely order and finally the speedy decolonization 
of the Indian subcontinent put the final nail in the coffins of the princely India. In this 
way the princely India and its age-old monarchical system effectively disappeared cown 
the trapdoor of history. 
It is in view of this broader context that an attempt would be made in the 
following chapters to study the relationship between the British Indian paramount power 
and the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir. 
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Chapter Two 
Formation of the Princely State of Jammu and Kashmir: The 
Historical Perspectives 
"...No Englishman can leave Kashmir without a sigh of regret that a province so 
full of promise should ever have been allowed to slip through our fingers..." 
—Lieut. Torrens 
Their fields, their crops, their streams. 
Even the peasants in the Vale, 
They sold. They sold all, alas! 
How cheap was the Sale. 
—Sir Mohammad Iqbal 
The princely State of Jammu and Kashmir,' the "Sentry State"^ of the British 
Indian Empire, bordering the three great powers in the East—the British, the Russian and 
the Chinese—came into existence with the ominous terms of the Treaty of Amritsar 
signed between Raja Gulab Singh of Jammu and the British East India Company on 16th 
March, 1846.^  The formation of the state of Jammu and Kashmir was unique as disparate 
territories stripped by the Company from Sikh Kingdom of Punjab were brought together 
to form the state. The boundaries of the state were redrawn more for geo-political and 
administrative convenience rather than on a commonality shared by the people living 
' The State of Jammu and Kashmir is usually referred to as simply Kashmir. In that, strictly speaking. 
Kashmir means the Vale of Kashmir only, and not other parts of the State such as Jammu, LadaWi and 
Baltistan. It has been tried here, as much as possible to use the term Kashmir to mean the Vale of Kasnmir. 
and Jammu and Kashmir to refer to the State as a whole. Inevitably, however, it has not been possible lo be 
consistent in this system of terminology as one might wish. 
^ Owing to its strategic position in the north-western frontiers of India, Kashmir was rightly described as. 
"The Sentry Slate" of British Indian Empire. Sachchidanand Sinha. cited in Madha\i Yasin, Briiish 
Paramounlcy in Kashmir, (Delhi: 1984), p. xv, fri. I. 
C.U. Aitchison, A Collection of Treaties, Engagements and Sanads relating to India and Neighbouring 
Countries, vol.6, (Calcutta: 1909), pp.165-6. 
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there. How did "he princely state of Jammu and Kashmir, which lasted for more than a 
century, come into being?"* 
Before moving ahead to the processes which were involved in the formation of 
the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir, it is necessary to give a brief historical 
background of Jammu, Kashmir and Ladakh which were brought into a single political 
entity. A significant point to take note of is that the administrative entities which formed 
the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir were politically independent of each other 
before 1846 A.D. 
Kalhana, the celebrated historian of the 12th century, recorded that Kashmir's 
political history began in the middle of the 3rd millennium. Most historians, however, 
started their history of Kashmir with the reign of Ashoka. The historical record becomes 
less ambiguous with the conquest of Kashmir by this Mauryan King, who lived between 
274 B.C. and 237 B.C.^ 
The succeeding two thousand years saw the constant flow of invasions and 
dynastic eruptions which brought to power ruling families representing the three major 
communities of India—the Hindus, the Muslims and the Sikhs—as well as the Afghans. 
A succession of Hindu dynasties reigned Kashmir until the early part of the 14th century, 
"At the time of the Transfer of Power in India in 1947, the conflict between the two successor stales—India 
and Pakistan—to the British Raj began over the right to control the destiny of the princely state of .lammu 
and Kashmir. In the process the state got bifurcated; the greater part of which is being held by India, while 
as the rest remains with Pakistan. 
' "Kashmir can claim the distinction of being the only region of India", wrote Dr. MA. Stein, the translator 
of the celebrated history book Rajatarangini, "which possesses an uninterrupted series of written records of 
its history... In other parts of India the student of histoi7 is obliged to reconstruct the general outlines of 
the history with the help of the scanty and frequently uncertain data.. .and can scarcely ever hope to recover 
a continuous account of the leading events even for a couple of centuries. If the student of the Kahmirian 
history finds himself in a far better position this is due to the preservation of the documents..." Kalhana. 
Rajatarangini, Tr. M.Aurel Stein, 2 vols, (Westminster: 1900), vol. 1, pp. 30-1. 
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when Rinchan Shah, a Tibetan soldier of fortune seized the power. Embracing Islam. 
Rinchan Shah became the first Muslim king of Kashmir. Kashmir attained the peak of her 
glory during the period of Sultan Zain-ul-Abidin (1420 to 1470 A.D.), popularly known 
in Kashmir as Budshah. Budshah's Kashmir was a model of economic prosperity, social 
justice and communal harmony in this part of the world. He was followed by various 
Muslim dynasties for next three centuries and in 1586, Kashmir became a part cf the 
Mughal Empire. As lovers of natural beauty, the Mughal kings visited Kashmir quite 
often and took steps to add to its loveliness by raising stylish buildings and beautifijl 
gardens. But Mughals, generally speaking, did not bother much to improve common 
man's lot. In 1752, with the collapse of the Mughal Empire, the power vacuum created 
was filled by the Afghans. The Afghan rule over Kashmir, which lasted for 67 years, was 
one of cruelty and loot. The valley was removed from the grasp of the Afghans by the 
Sikhs in 1819. The Sikh rule was not less worse than that of the Afghans. This was 
perhaps the shortest reign in Kashmir's long history, for in less than three decades the 
advancing power of the British East India Company, combined with internal dissension 
in the Sikh empire, following the death of Ranjit Singh, the fate of Kashmir was sealed 
and it was placed under the control of the Dogra dynasty.^  
Unlike Kashmir, the early history of Jammu is still folded in mist. From times 
immemorial—for 5000 years, the legends say— t^he principality of Jammu had been the 
seat of the rule of a Hindu dynasty, of a family of Rajputs, whose influence spread for 
" For a comprehensive history of Kashmir, See G.M.D. Sufi, Kashir: Being a History of Kashmir 'rom 
Earliest Times to our Own, 2 vols, (Delhi: 1974); Prithvi Nath Kaul Bamzai, A History of Kasnmir 
Political, Social, Cultural, From the Earliest Times to the Present Day, (Delhi: 1973): Also see, Prem Nath 
Bazaz, The History of Struggle for Freedom in Kashmir Cultural and Political: From the Earliest times to 
the Present Day. (Srinagar: 2003). A useful account is also given in W. Lawrence, The Valley of Kashmir. 
(Srinagar; 1967) 
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some distance over the lower hills. There was little intercourse with the outer world; 
some contact with it occurred indeed during the 16"^  century onwards from the passage 
near, if not through, the country of Mughal Emperors of Delhi towards Kashmir.'' Dhruv 
Dev (1703-42) established the Dogra^ Rajput family as rulers of Jammu in the declining 
days of the Mughal Empire. The most notable ruler of Jammu was Ranjit Dev. With his 
death, which occurred in 1780 A.D., began changes from outside influences. Jammu 
became the target of expanding Sikh power in the early years of the nineteenth century, 
and in 1808 General Hukam Singh conquered this hilly tract for the Lahore Durbar. In 
1822, Ranjit Singh, the architect of the Sikh state, made Gulab Singh the jagirdar** of the 
Jammu principality."^ 
Squeezed between Tibet, India and Kashmir, Ladakh as an independent entity 
suffered a precarious existence. The entire Baltistan-Ladakh area was one of the several 
small semi-independent Muslim and Buddhist states ruled by autocratic chiefs. Ladakh 
originally formed one of the provinces of Tibet. But in the 15th century A.D., when Tibet 
was conquered by the Chinese, Ladakh became completely independent." But Ladakh 
with its sparse population and strong neighbours was more often the victim of aggression 
^ Fredric Drew, The Jammu and Kashmir territories, (Jammu; 1999), p. 8-9. 
* The Dogras, broadly speaking, arc a linguistic group found primarily in the Jammu region. Their language. 
Dogri, is highly influenced by Punjabi. The Dogras include Muslims and Rajputs among their members. 
Ibid., pp. 9-10, 43-7, G.M.D. Sufi Kashir, vol.2, pp.752-4. See also, Lawrence, The Valley of Kashmir, p. 
201. 
' A jagirdar was the holder of a non-alienable land revenue assignment. He had to maintain law and order in 
his jurisdiction, collect the revenue on behalf of his overlord, keeping a part of it for his services, and to 
render military assistance to his overlord whenever asked for. 
'" A brief outline of the history of Jammu is given by Sukhdev Singh Charak, A Short History of Jammu Raj, 
(Jammu: 1985); Molvi HashmatuUah Khan, Tarikh-i-Jammu, (Mirpur: 1991) 
" William Moorcraft & George Trebek, Travels in the Provinces of Hindustan and the Punjab: in the 
Ladakh and Kashmir, (New Delhi: 1971), pp. 66-7. 
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than an aggressor itself. Occupied in 1834 by Gulab Singh, Ladakh was for the first time 
made the part of the Indian subcontinent. 
Raja Gulab Singh, a direct descendant of the Hindu ruler Dhruv Dev, was born 
near Jammu in 1792. He was enlisted in the army of Maharaja Ranjit Singh—the 
undisputed Sikh ruler of Punjab—in 1809, followed by his two brothers, Dhian Singti and 
Suchet Singh, and a nephew Hira Singh. It was mainly through his skill on the battlefield 
that Gulab Singh rose in the ranks of the Sikh hierarchy. His ascent was so remarkable 
that he came to be described by Victor Jacquemont, the French traveller, as "the greatest 
Lord in the Punjab; second only to the Sikh Maharaja."'^  Gulab Singh set out to the 
career of conquests —as a Sikh lieutenant— to a first expedition to Kashmir in 1813. 
Though the campaign led by Ranjit Singh in person into Kashmir ended in disaster, yet 
the courage showed by Gulab Singh in bringing his forces back safely pleased Ranjit 
Singh and he promoted him in his command. At the siege of Multan, in 1818, Gulab 
Singh's personal bravery attracted Ranjit Singh's favourable notice.'^ In 1819 he received 
the Sikh ruler's permission to crush the revolt of Mian Dido, 'the robber', at Jammu. "* He 
finished the campaign successfully. The next few campaigns which saw his bravery were 
against the pretty chieftains of Rajauri, Bhimber, Basohli and Kishtawar.'^  Delighted 
with the latest territorial acquisitions of Gulab Singh in the hills, Ranjit Singh decided to 
place Jammu solely under the charge of Gulab Singh.'^ He personally travelled to 
Akhnoor (Jammu) in 1822 to confer the title of Raja on Gulab Singh. At the same time, 
' Victor Jacquemont, Letters from India, (London: 1835), vol.2, p. 166. 
" Diwan, Kripa Ram, Gulabnama, tr. Sukhdev Singh Charak, (Delhi: 1977, repr. 2005), pp.65-8. 
'•* Jammu was conquered by Ranjit Singh in 1808. 
" Kripa Ram, Gulabnama, pp. 75-6., 83-5, 95-7, 104-10. 
'"ibid., pp. 115-6. 
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his brothers and a nephew also secured unique positions of authority and influence at 
Lahore Darbar. Dhian Singh was installed as the Wazir of the Maharaja and conferred the 
title of Raja-e-Rajgan, i.e. Raja of Rajas, in 1828.'^  His son Hira Singh became a 
favourite of Maharaja Ranjit Singh and "was allowed a chair in [the Maharaja's] presence 
when all others....stood or took less exalted places."'* Such a public demonstration of 
favour showed by Ranjit Singh towards the Dogra Rajas enhanced their stature and they 
became a power to be reckoned with at the Lahore Darbar. 
While his brothers remained at Lahore, Raja Gulab Singh focused his attention 
towards his newly assigned territory.'^ The ambition to acquire new territories certainly 
motivated Gulab Singh to send an expedition to Ladakh in 1834 under his ablest general 
Zorawar Singh^° which the latter successfully accomplished. Baltistan was conquered in 
1840, and an unsuccessful bid to control Tibet was made in 1841. Ahhough these 
conquests were carried out on behalf of the Sikh State, all these attacks originated not in 
Lahore, but in Jammu, and in result much of the region passed under the personal control 
of Raja Gulab Singh. Thus "whether it was a policy or whether it was accident, by 1840 
Gulab Singh had encircled Kashmir." '^ 
The stability of the Punjab depended on the astuteness of Ranjit Singh himself 
His death in June 1839 opened up many factions in the Sikh society, caused as much by 
'^  Syed Mohammad Latif History of Punjab, (Lahore: 1891, repr. 1984), p. 440. 
'* Lapel Henrey Griffin, Punjab Chiefs, (Lahore: 1890), p. 323. 
" Gulab Singh presented himself at the Sikh capital on important occasions. He visited the court on the eve 
of festivals, when he received Khilais (robes of honour) and was required to be present during the visits of 
foreign dignitaries. Shahmat Ali, The Sikhs and Afghans, (London: 1874), p. 94. 
°^ Born in 1786 near Kalhoor (now in Himachal Pradesh), he joined Gulab Singh's army during 1817. 
Nargisdas Nargis, Zonvar Singh, (Jammu; 1964), pp. 1-7. 
'^ The Imperial Gazetteer of India, Vol. xv, (Calcutta: 1908), p. 95. 
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the British presence at the Punjab frontiers as by the conflicts following the creation of a 
new army and the ranks of the nobility. The army and the royal relatives now came C'Ut in 
the open?- Dhian Singh continued as wazir under Kharak Singh, the new Maharaja. 
However, the attempts of the Dogra Rajas to fill the power vacuum, created at the Lahore 
Darbar, met with bitter opposition. Dhian Singh was caught up with court intrigues in 
1843 and was thus murdered. Same was the fate of the other Dogras Rajas. Thus, by the 
end of 1844 most of the powerful figures of the Rangit Singh era had been eliminated, 
save Gulab Singh, who stayed away from Lahore.^ ^ This changed political scenario of 
Lahore forced Gulab Singh to make his moves with extreme caution. Increasingl> 
marginalized at the Sikh kingdom, Gulab Singh waited for an opportune time to turn the 
tide to his favour.'^ '* 
In the meantime, the British officials of the East India Company were watching 
the factional fighting and the growing instability at the Lahore Darbar with great 
uneasiness because they had an important reason to see a strong Sikh kingdom, for they 
treated it as a useful buffer between their Sutlej boundary and the turbulent Afghans.'' 
This objective of the British had been duly fulfilled by the Sikhs after the treaiy of 
"perpetual friendship" was signed in 1809.^ ^ But after the death of Maharaja Ranjit 
Singh the British saw their interests in jeopardy. The situation was further aggravated by 
^^  C. A. Bayly, Indian Society and the Making of the British Empire, (Cambridge: 1993), p. 126. 
'^ Suchet Singh died in 1844 in a clash with his nephew, Hira Singh and the latter was murdered by the Sikli 
army in Dec. 1844. Bawa Satinder Singh, The Jammu Fox. (Delhi: 1988), pp.54-6, 63-73. 
"^  Mridu Rai, Hindu Rulers Muslim Subjects Islam, Rights, and the History of Kashmir. (Delhi: 2004). p.25. 
Bayly, Indian Society and the Making of the British Empire, pp. 126-8. 
The treaty of Lahore was signed on 25* April 1809, whereby it was agreed that the Sikhs would not 
commit any encroachment beyond the Satluj, while the British agreed to have no concern wit i the 
territories and subjects of the Maharaja to the north of the Sutlej. Aitchison, A Collection of Trtaiies. 
Engagements andSanads, vol. vi, p. 22. 
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the news of the efforts of the Afghan ruler to strengthen his army and an attempted 
alliance with Russia. Alarmed by the developments at the Northern frontier, Sir Henry 
Hardinge, the Governor General began to prepare his army for the final face-off with the 
Sikhs." 
On the other side, examining the political scene at the Lahore Darbar, Gulab 
Singh desired to become independent in the territories already under his jurisdiction. He 
was pragmatist enough to perceive that the expansion of the Company's power beyond 
the Sutlej was inevitable after the death of the old monarch. He concluded that his 
objectives could be achieved only under the patronage of East India Company. So 
keeping in view this motive, he made repeated offers to join the British against the Sikhs, 
if they would recognize his sovereignty. But his offers were either rejected or not 
responded.^* 
Though the first Anglo-Sikh war had begun in November 1845, the most 
memorable and the last battle of the war was fought at Sobraon on lO"^  February 1846.'^ '' 
In the meantime, Gulab Singh was installed as wazir at Lahore, who immediately put 
himself in communication with the British, tendering every assistance in his power for 
the fulfillment of any ends in regard to the state of Lahore which they might have in 
view.^° Gulab Singh took the decision of collaborating with the British after giving 
serious considerations to the other alternatives available to him. Gulab Singh thought that 
he could neither participate in the war on the part of the Sikhs, nor remain secluded at 
" Mridu Rai. Hindu Rulers Muslim Subjects, p. 25. 
*^ Bawa. Jammu Fox, pp. 98-9, 101-8. 
'" J. D. Cunninghum, A History of Sikhs. (London: 1853), pp. 327-8; Latif. History of Punjab, pp. 537-8. 
Lord Hardinge to Secret Committee, cited in Bawa, Jammu Fox, p. 112. 30 
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Jammu. He stood the risk of losing his territories in both the cases. In case o ' "an 
amicable Anglo-Sikh settlement, his territories would be negotiated away'', or his 
indifference would invite him the wrath of the Khalsa, if it emerged successful in the war. 
He thus concluded that his interests would best be served only by paving the way for a 
"decisive Sikh defeat". '^ 
Though leaderless and abandoned, the Sikh army fought with reckless resignation 
but was ultimately defeated.^ ^ However, the victory of the East India Company was 
achieved at a huge cost. Its budget went soaring back into deficit.^  It compelled the 
British to drop the idea of annexing Punjab to their own empire. There were certain other 
reasons which weighed on their mind for not taking control of Punjab. The acquisition 
would have brought them face to face with the Afghans who had defeated them in the 1 '^ 
Anglo-Afghan war (1839-42). The occupation of Punjab also needed a great military 
deployment. '^' So the best possible means to fulfill their objectives seemed to weaken the 
Sikh state militarily and to break its territorial unity.^ ^ These twin objectives were 
achieved through the treaties of Lahore and Amritsar. 
The treaty of Lahore signed on 9'^  March, 1846 brought to an end the 1^ ' Anglo-
Sikh War. Article IV of the treaty required the Sikhs to cede "...to the Honowahle 
'' Bawa, Jammu Fox, p. 121. 
' ' There is some evidence that Gulab Singh was not the only Sikh functionary to make overtures to the 
British. Lai Singh, Gulab Singh's predecessor at Lahore Darbar; TeJ Singh, the commander-in-chiel. and 
even Rani Jindan, the Regent of the infant ruler Dalip Singh, and other members of the Darbar had also 
secretly offered their help to the British against the Sikh army. Cunningham, A History of Sikhs, p. 327; 
Latit; History of Punjab, pp. 541-3, Khushwant Singh, A History of the Sikhs, (Princeton: 1963.1966). 
Vol. 2, p. 48. 
" Bayly, Indian Society and the Making of the British Empire, p. 127. 
'^  C. Hardinge, Viscount Hrdinge, (Oxford: 1891), pp. 132-3. 
"ibid., pp. 123-4 and 133. 
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Company the territories situated between the rivers Beas and Indus, including the 
provinces of Cashmere and Hazara. "^^ Article XII of the treaty obliged the Sikh 
Maharaja to recognize the independence of Gulab Singh in the territories as may be made 
over to him by the British government." The peculiarity of the treaty of Lahore lay not 
only in the fact that a new territorial unit of Jammu and Kashmir was created out of the 
Lahore State but clearly speaks of a pre-arrangement of Gulab Singh with the British.^^ 
The treaty of Lahore also virtually paved the way for the second treaty signed a week 
later on 16"^  March 1846. The second agreement signed by the East India Company with 
Gulab Singh came to be known as the Treaty of Amritsar. 
Article IV of the treaty of Lahore literally provided the opening for the Treaty of 
Amritsar whereby the British government transferred '...in independent possession to 
Maharaja Gulab Singh and the heirs male of his body, all the hilly or mountainous 
country...eastward of the river Indus and westward of the river Ravee...'^' Gulab Singh 
agreed to pay the British Government the sum of seventy-five lakhs of Rupees "in 
consideration of the transfer made to him", as stated by the Article III of the Treaty."*" The 
treaty obliged the Maharaja to submit any disputes to the British arbitration "that may 
arise between himself [Gulab Singh] and any neighbouring state."'*' The Treaty promised 
the British aid "to Maharaja Gulab Singh in protecting his territories from external 
^'Aitchison.// Collection of Treaties, Engagements and Sanads, vol. vi. pp. 38-41. 
" Ibid. 
" It was on the eve of Kasur negotiations, when a Sikh delegation led by Gulab Singh arrived to sign an 
agreement with the British authorities that the latter made a plan to sell Kashmir to Gulab Singh. "This 
could be done", Henry Hardingc conveyed to Prime Minister, "by forcing the Sikh government to surrender 
Kashmir to them, which would be then handed over to Raja". Hardinge, Viscount Hardinge, p. 123; 
Cunninghum, A History of Sikhs, pp. 322-4. 
" Aitchison. A Collection of Treaties. Engagements and Sanads, vol. vi, pp. 165-6, Article I. 
'" Ibid. 
"' Ibid. Article V. 
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enemies."^^ Article X of the Treaty stipulated that Gulab Singh acknowledged and 
recognized the British supremacy and would "...in token of such supremacy present 
annually to the British Government one horse, twelve perfect shawl goats of approved 
breed...and three pairs of Cashmere shawls.""*^  It was at this point of time that Crulab 
Singh is reported to have "...stood-up, and with joined hands, expressed his gratitude to 
the British Viceroy,—adding, without however any ironical meaning, that he was indeed 
his Zur-Khureed, or gold-boughten slave!"'*'* The phrase ''Zar-Khureed" had unfortunate 
overtunes and would haunt Kashmiri self-respect for many generations to come.'*'' 
The Treaty of Amritsar only transferred the legal title of Maharaja to Gulab 
Singh. He had to face a stiff resistance from Sheikh Imamuddin, the Sikh governor, who 
refused to turn over Kashmir to him. It was only after the united authority of the Bntish, 
Lahore and Jammu governments that Imamuddin cleared the way for Gulab Singh's t;ntry 
into the Valley in November 1846. Thus emerged the princely state of Jammu and 
Kashmir.^ ^ 
Why Transferred? 
There followed a heated debate in and outside the British official circles pertained 
to the wisdom of handing over of Jammu and Kashmir to Gulab Singh. The polemic 
continued throughout most part of the nineteenth century. Lord Hardinge, the then 
Governor General had been severely criticized for the transfer of Kashmir to Gulab 
"^  Ibid. Article IX. 
« Ibid. 
Cunningham, A History of Sikhs, p. 324. 
M.J. Akber, Kashmir Behind the Vale, (New Delhi: 2002), p. 59. 
' Bawa, Jammu Fox, pp. 125-9. 
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Singh. General Charles Napier, the then governor of Sindh, remarked about the transfer: 
"What a king to install! Rising from the lowest foulest sediment of debauchery to float on 
the highest surge of blood he lifted his besmeared front, and England adorned it with a 
crown!" Lord Ellenborough, the predecessor of Hardinge in India, irritated by the 
creation of the new mountain state, wrote "there have been times when the treaties with 
Gulab Singh as the minister of the Lahore Government and the detaching from the 
Lahore dominions a very extensive territory for the purpose of placing it under the 
independent authority of that minister, thus rewarding a traitor, would have been 
measures a little too oriental in principle."''^ 
Lieut. Colonel Torrens during his visit to Kashmir in 1861 wrote, "Poor Kashmir! 
When after so many vicissitudes of slavery to a foreign yoke,... it seemed that at last its 
condition was about to be ameliorated, its old ill-luck stuck by it still!...and they were 
again sold into the hands of the Philistines." Further, lamenting over the 'sale-deed'—as 
the Treaty of Amritsar was denunciated—Torrens remarked, "No Englishman can leave 
Kashmir without a sigh of regret that a province so fijll of promise should ever have been 
allowed to slip through our fingers."'*' 'Surprise has often been expressed,' wrote Sir 
Francis Younghusband, sometime the British Resident in Kashmir 'that when this lovely 
land had actually been ceded to us, after a hard and strenuous campaign, we should ever 
have parted with it for the paltry sum of three-quarters of a million sterling.""^ 
"' William Napier, The Life and Opinions of General Sir Charles Napier, (London: 1857). Vol.3, p. 400. 
"* Ellenborough to Hardinge, quoted in Bawa, Jammu Fox, p. 120. 
"'' Lieut. Colonel Torrens, Travels In Ladakh. Tartary and Kashmir, (London: 1978). pp. 300-1. 
'" Sir Francis Younghusband. Kashmir, (Srinagar: first published 1908, repr. 2008). p. 90. 
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After his sojourn in Kashmir in 1875, W. Wakefield observed, "...the huckstering 
spirit that so often pervades our national policy, and which caused the great Napoleon to 
apply to us the term of a nation of shop-keepers, was dominant in this case: ibr, 
relinquishing all the advantages that accrued to us from its possession, the supreme 
government sold this fair province to the Rajah Gulab Singh."^' 
J.D. Cunningham, who had served under Lord Hardinge, wrote in 1853 that, "the 
arrangement was a dexterous one, if reference be only had to the policy of reducing the 
power of Sikhs; but the transaction scarcely seems worthy of the British name and 
greatness."^^ Robert Thorp, who visited Kashmir in 1870 and openly criticized the Dogra 
regime, wrote, "...in no portion of the treaty made with Gulab Singh was the sligntest 
provision made for the just or humane government of the people of Cashmere and others 
upon whom we forced a government which they detested."^^ 
As late as in the beginning of the 20 '^' century, the controversy over the Treaty of 
Amritsar was perhaps revived by poet Mohammad Iqbal. It is important to mention here 
that the poet never wrote in the context that the Dogra rule should have been substituted 
by that of the British. He expressed himself in an entirely different perspective.^ '* But his 
views echoed the same feelings as were those of the critics of the treaty. His now famous 
verse reads as: 
" W. Wakefield, The Happy Valley, (Delhi: first published 1908, repr. 2008), p. 90. 
'" J.D. Cunningham, A History of Sikhs, p. 323. 
'' Robert Thorp, Cashmere Misgovernment, (London: 1870), p. 60. 
Dr. Iqbal, who had a Kashmiri ancestry, wrote this verse on the occasion of the inauguration of the League 
of Nations. His motive seems to have been to seek the attention of the international community towarcs ihe 
pitiable conditions of the people they were in after British handed over Kashmir to Gulab Singh. Further, 
IqbaFs condemnation of the treaty as 'sale-deed' might well have inspired the people of Kashrrir to 
denounce the Dogra hegemony, and uniting them into an organized struggle against their rulers. 
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Oh! Morning breeze! If thou happen to pass by Geneva, 
Convey my message to the League of Nations. 
Their fields, their crops, their streams. 
Even the peasants in the Vale, 
They sold all, alas! 
How cheap was the Sale.^^ 
It seems that the handing over of Kashmir to Gulab Singh, as the above-
mentioned views reveal, was a foolish act and a short sighted stroke of British policy. 
The critics were of the opinion that the cool and temperate valley could have been 
utilized as a colony. But the fact of the matter is that the British were becoming a 
paramount power in the Indian subcontinent and all the policies they followed were 
perceived to be in the best interests of the new imperialists. It was not without taking into 
consideration all the relevant circumstances that the agreement by which Gulab Singh got 
Kashmir was signed. 
The handing over of Kashmir to Gulab Singh was a deliberate attempt on the part 
of the British. It seems that it would have been difficult for the British at that point of 
time to hold Kashmir. There are some important reasons which were advanced against 
holding Kashmir. Its occupation, wrote Lord Hardinge to the Secret Committee, "'would 
result in collision with neighbouring chieftains, for whose coercion a huge military 
presence and greater resources would be needed."^^ This they could not have afforded at 
that time owing to their weakened military strength and a deficit in the Indian treasury 
because of their successive military actions against the Afghans and the Sikhs. The 
extension of the boundaries of the British Empire beyond Sutlej at that time would have 
been difficult to protect. With a hostile Punjab on the line of communications—as the 
" Mohammad Iqbal cited in Bawa, TheJammti Fox, (Delhi: 1988), p.l03. 
*'' Harding to Secret Committee, Foreign Dept., Sec. Branch, Ref. No. 7, 4 March, 1846. N.A.I. 
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Lahore kingdom was still outside the pale of the British Empire—it would have been 
difficult to hold Kashmir.^ ^ Hardinge further emphasized that the move to take possession 
of "these largely mountainous territories would be an economy liability, because while 
the territories except Kashmir were deemed as unproductive which would not ever pay 
the expenses of its management."^^ One of the main features of the British policy ai that 
time was its anti-Muslim stance that had developed in the wake of its disastrous defeat at 
the hands of the Afghans. The British officials thought that the creation of the Jammi. and 
Kashmir state and handing over it to Gulab Singh would prevent its emotional and 
political links with the neighbouring Muslim states.^ ^ 
The other considerations which weighed with the British authorities for slicmg 
away Kashmir from the Lahore Durbar and making it over to Gulab Singh were, their 
desire to weaken the Sikh state and to reward Gulab Singh for his behavior during the 
Anglo-Sikh War. The new hill state would be setup to act as a counterpoise to the Sikh 
state at Lahore.^ ° 
The debate over the Treaty of Amritsar continued. Its advocates, however, 
prevailed, and Kashmir remained under the control of the Dogras until the British 
withdrawal from India. '^ 
" K. M. Pannikar, The Founding of the Kashmir State, (London: 1930), p. 105. 
'* Foreign Dept., Sec. Branch, Ref. No. 7, March, 1846, N.A.I. 
-'" Foreign Dept., Sec. Branch, Ref. No. 8, 19 March 1846, N.A.I. 
^^  Bawa, Jammu Fox, p. 118. 
"' Ibid., p. 120. 
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Emergence of a Distinctive Entity 
By virtue of the Treaty of Amritsar, Gulab Singh succeeded not only in severing 
his feudatory allegiance to the Lahore Durbar but he now became an independent ruler of 
his native land Jammu and the Himalayan kingdom of Kashmir. He also retained his 
authority in the frontier areas of Ladakh and Gilgit. The princely state of Jammu and 
Kashmir thus assembled was, therefore, of considerable complexity. It was, moreover, in 
the context of the broad sweep of Indian history a totally new polity quite without 
precedent. The complex configuration of the princely state was acutely summarized by 
Sir Owen Dixon, a United Nations Mediator, in his report to the Security Council in 
1950: "The state of Jammu and Kashmir is not really a unit geographically or 
economically. It is an agglomeration of territories brought under the political power of 
one Maharaja. That is the unity it possesses."*^ 
The newly formed state of Jammu and Kashmir consisted of the three distinctive 
entities which differed from one another not only in physiography, but also in 
demography and culture. The Valley of Kashmir, a structural basin, with its temperate 
climate and fertile soil was enclosed by high mountains which gave it rather clearly 
defined physical boundaries.*^ Its position between roughly parallel ranges—the Pir 
Panjal to the south-west and the Great Himalayas to the north-east—gave a singular 
insularity to the Valley. Constituting a little more than 10% of the total area of the 
" Michael Breacher, The Struggle for Kashmir, (Oxford: 1953), p. 4. 
" A. N. Raina, Geography of Jammu and Kashmir (New Delhi: 1981), pp. 9-10. 
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princely state, over half of the population of the state was found in the Kashmir province, 
of which over 90% comprised of Muslims.^ '* 
The original heartland, Jammu, which was separated from the valley by the Pir 
Panjal range, rose gradually to the south-west from a low alluvial plain of the Punjab. 
Jammu was predominantly Hindu in population and dominated by the Dogras. 
The frontier areas of Ladakh, Gilgit and Baltistan consisted of high and dry 
mountains, and covered almost three-fourths of the total area of the new state. Though 
being the largest division of the princely state in respect of area, Ladakh and Gilgit were 
sparsely populated areas. The people of Ladakh were almost entirely Tibetan Budddhists. 
Gilgit and Baltistan formed an overwhelmingly Muslim population.^ ^ 
In ethnic and cultural terms, as with its physical makeup, the identities ol' the 
people of the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir were characterized by a 
heterogeneous quality. The great geographical barriers which separate Kashmir from the 
rest of India, occupied with the marked difference of climatic conditions, have from early 
times assured to the alpine land a distinct character of its own which manifests itself in all 
matters of culture, customs, and social organization. The seclusion which Kashmir has 
enjoyed owing to its peculiar position has even to the present day materially restricted the 
geographical horizon of its inhabitants. This small mountain territory to which nature has 
Walter Lawrence, the Settlement Commissioner of Kashmir, %vrote liiat the Muslims formed 93% if ihe 
total population of the valley. The rest included the Hindus and the Sikhs. Lawrence, The Valhy of 
Kashmir. The census report of India gave, by and large, the same figures. R.G. Wreford, Census of India. 
1941. Vol. xxii. Jammu and Kashmir, Parts I and 11, Essays and Tables, Ranbir Government I'ress. 
1943, p. 81. 
" Census of India, 1941, vol. xxii, p. 80. 
"" Ibid., p. 82. 
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given sharply-defined boundaries and a uniform character of its own has had always 
borne a distinctly local culture. It cannot be doubted that this fact has decidedly been 
advantageous for the preservation of historical traditions/^ 
The people of Ladakh were of Mongolian stock while those of Jammu and 
Kashmir provinces descended from the Indo-Aryans. The cultural distinctiveness was 
reflected by the affinities of the people of Jammu to the culture of Punjab, and by those of 
Ladakh, to the culture of Tibet. Furthermore, the new state became a multi-lingual entity, 
with Kashmiri and Dogri as its principle languages.^^ 
The newly-founded state of Jammu and Kashmir became territorially the largest 
princely state of India. It had an area of over 84,000 square miles, followed by Hyderabad 
with an area of over 80,000 square miles.^^ The state occupied strategically a unique 
position in the All India British Empire. The state was created in the interest of the 
imperialist frontier defence—a policy which postulated that the state should be 
sufficiently strong for such a role, and that the British-Indian government should have an 
adequate control over its affairs.™ The touching of the boundaries of the newly-founded 
state of Jammu and Kashmir with the big powers of the time, particularly Russia, was the 
^^ Kalhana, Rajatarangini, vol., I, p. 30-1. 
'* About 34 percent of the population speak Kashmiri, and nearly 15 percent Dogri. while Punjabi is the 
tongue of nearly 30 percent. A great variety of languages are used, in various parts of the state, by 
comparatively small numbers. Imperial Gazetteer of India, (Oxford: 1908), vol. xvi., p. 99. 
'*'' Sufi. Kashir. vol.2, p. 776. 
^^  The British hoped that the state "would resist any establishment of a Muslim state on this side of the 
Indus", and also to "act as a counterpoise against the Sikh state." Governor General's Despatch to Secret 
Committee, 19 March 1846. No. 8, Foreign Department Proceedings, NAI. 
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key factor to determine the formulation of the British policy in regard to the state. Fhe 
state acted as a sort of buffer between their Indian Empire and Russia 71 
Thus, the foundation of the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir and the 
assumption of power by Maharaja Gulab Singh in 1846 was attended by extraordinary 
circumstances. Further, the heterogeneity of the state was the direct by-product of the 
military and diplomatic accomplishments of the founder of the Dogra dynasty, combined 
with the political acumen which completed the expansion of British power into northern 
India. And yet the Dogra rulers were not able to unify the state. The different 
communities continued to live a separate existence. As noted by Richard Temple, a 
Resident in Hyderabad, the "double title" of the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir was 
"characteristic of his country...: a political agglomeration of mountain tracts that have 
little connection otherwise with each other."^^ 
Rai, Hindu Rulers Muslim Subjects, p. 26. 
" Richard C. Temple, Journals kept in Hyderabad, Kashmir, Sikkim and Nepal, 2 vols. (London: 1887.. \ol. 
l,p. 267. 
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Chapter Three 
Legal Status: Provisions for Intervention 
The phrase, legal status of the intervention, might seem paradoxical at first sight 
but given the fact that the state of Jammu and Kashmir and the British bound b) the 
treaty of Amritsar, were not as two independent states but one as a supreme state and the 
other as a subordinate state, and the supremacy of the British was granted by the treaty 
itself Whenever the government of India intervened in the affairs of the state there v as a 
considerable debate on the legal aspect of the issue. The relations were by and large 
conducted under the broad framework of the treaty. The treaty was not just an instrument 
for the creation of the state but determined the status of the two parties vis-a-vis each 
other. Thus the provisions of the treaty remained relevant throughout the period even if 
they were invoked more in violation than in observance. The treaty continued to ser\ e as 
a frame of reference whenever there was a controversy and disagreement between the 
two parties. The British intervention progressively increased throughout the period. How 
far that interference was warranted by the provisions of the treaty is what the chapter tries 
to explore. 
The references made to the treaty throughout the period are so numerous and 
frequent that one is tempted to explore the extent of its influence on the relations o^the 
two parties and any student working on British intervention in Kashmir finds it difficult 
to ignore the provisions of the treaty while studying the relations. The uniqueness o "the 
treaty, which is at once a sale deed, an instrument for the creation of the state, and a 
document governing the future relations compels one to study its impact on the future 
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relations. It is also interesting to see if the treaty served the same purpose to the British as 
the treaties with other Indian princes or was it anyway different. As the treaty was 
conducted in the last phase of the Company's rule, which was soon after succeeded by 
the Crown, did the British Indian government under crown behave anyway differently 
with the princes as the Queen's Declaration would tend us to believe? 
In the interstate relations the treaties are generally made to create a new 
arrangement which better suits the two parties or at least the stronger party. But in case 
one party is dependent on the other its adherence to the provisions is the barest minimum 
required of it. The treaty of Amritsar had given the British sufficient leverage and scope 
to exploit it to their fullest benefit. Still recourse was taken to the tenants of the treaty 
only where it suited their interest. In case it failed to serve the purpose even through self-
serving interpretations, the desired results could be achieved through arm twisting. 
The treaties and agreements concluded by the British in India were deliberately 
kept vague and self-contradictory so as to enable the powerful party to make anything out 
of it. As discussed in the previous chapter, the main purpose in handing over Jammu and 
Kashmir to Gulab Singh was to secure the north-western frontiers of the Indian Empire.' 
It pre-supposed a strong state with sufficient British control over its affairs. But no such 
provision was included in the treaty of Amritsar, and this led historians like K.M. 
Panikkar to emphasize the independent status of the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir. 
Panikkar supported his claim by arguing that "no control was exercised by the British 
government in the [Kashmir] administration, and no Resident was appointed"." 
' Foreign Department, Sec. Branch. Ref. No.8, IQ* March, 1846, NAI. 
^ K.M. Panikkar. The Founding of the Kashmir State, (London: 1927), p. 126. 
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Whenever, in fact, the question of appointing a Resident in Jammu and Kashmir was 
raised by the Indian government, the Maharaja objected to it on the ground that his 
independent status was guaranteed by the first article of the treaty of Amritsar.^  However, 
reading between the lines, it becomes clear that the treaty was never meant to be what it 
tends us to beheve. The Treaty of Amritsar was a classic example of self-contradiction, if 
Article 1 gave the state "in the independent possession to Maharaja Gulab Singlf; this 
independence was certainly diminished by the definite assertion of British supremacy in 
Article X/ Besides, the above Article reduces the ruler of Jammu and Kashmir to a mere 
feudatory chief as he is expected to engage himself to send to the British Government an 
annual gift which "'signiflies] more than an exchange of courtesy, being a symbol of 
allegiance and subordination".^ Further, the ambiguity is so glaring that the word 
"independent possession" in the Article I does not make it clear whether it is independent 
from the British or from the Lahore durbar. While the Maharaja reads it as independent of 
the British in the internal affairs, the British make it otherwise. Barely three days after the 
treaty had been signed, Lord Hardinge, the Governor General wrote to the Secret 
Committee of the Board of Directors that, "the Maharaja is declared by the T eaty 
^ Maharaja to DutTerin, 14 Jan. 1886, Foreign Department Progs., Sec. E, July 1886, Progs., No. 427. NAI. 
'' The clause one of the Treaty of Amritsar reads as: "the British Government transfers and makes over for 
ever in independent possession to Maharajah Gulab Singh and the heirs male of his body all the hi'h or 
mountainous country with its dependencies situated to the eastward of the River Indus and the westward of 
the River Ravi including Chamba and excluding Lahol, being part of the territories ceded to the British 
Government by the Lahore State according to the provisions of Article IV of the Treaty of Lahore. Jated 
9th March, 1846." Laying down a subordinate position for the Kashmir ruler. Article X reads as: 
"Maharajah Gulab Singh acknowledges the supremacy of the British Government and will in token ol such 
supremacy present annually to the British Government one horse, twelve shawl goats of approved irced 
(six male and six female) and three pairs of Cashmere shawls". Aitchison, A Collection of Treaties. 
Engagements and Sanads, pp. 165-6, Articles 1 and X. Full details of the Treaty of Amritsar are given in 
Appendix 1. 
' Warner, The Native States of India, p. 322. 
76 
independent of Lahore state and under the protection of the British Government",* 
although the territory had already ceased to be under the Lahore Durbar by dint of the 
treaty of Lahore. 
After a carefljl perusal of the treaty of Amritsar one thing becomes clear that so 
much ambiguity was left; in the document that even if taken literally anything could be 
made out of it. What the Maharaja is granted by one article stealthily and vaguely is taken 
away by the other openly. Since the British themselves were the arbiters in any dispute or 
controversy, their understanding or interpretation was bound on the Maharaja.^ Whenever 
there was a controversy regarding any issue—be it imposition of the Resident, stationing 
of the British troops or appointment of any British Indian in the services of the 
Maharaja—the British always prevailed whether convincingly or unconvincingly. 
While dealing with the Maharaja, the British employed the method of gradual 
imposition of their version rather than a sudden one to make it less offending and look 
less ultraviolent. When Lord Hardinge makes of "independent possession" as 
"independent of Lahore state" this point is not stressed upon the Maharaja as these were 
early days in the relations and there was no urgent need to drive it home to him; instead it 
is revealed to the Secret Committee. In fact, it is in a way contradicted by Henry 
Lawrence, the British Resident at Lahore while writing to Gulab Singh in 1847 when he 
makes the "independent possession" conditional to his capacity to govern his subjects 
with justice and equanimity.* In other words, the word independence does not refer to 
*• Hardinge to Secret Committee, Foreign Department, Secret, March 19 1846, NAI. 
' See Article V of the Treaty of Amritsar. 
^ Foreign Department, Secret, 28"' January, 1848, 43-A., NAI. 
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independence from Lahore state but it is not unconditional. Whenever a controversy 
propped up or the British tried to do something against which the Maharaja protested as 
something against the treaty, they would in effect grant him some time but only after 
asserting their position on the issue. As a result, when the time of real action came, the 
Maharaja would be psychologically prepared for it as something unavoidable. Thus the 
British would first establish their claim firmly and act only when the necessity warranted 
such intervention. 
A classic example is the question of establishing British cantonment in the state 
on which Maharaja Pratap Singh offered most stubborn resistance. He was personally 
very much disinclined to see British troops stationed in his territory, and laboured under 
the apprehension that the measure would badly compromise his "independent status'. He 
feared that the British officers quartered in Kashmir would interfere with his officials and 
subjects; the collusion that would consequently occur would result in British interference 
with the internal administration of the state. He argued that the measure contemplated 
was contrary to the treaty of Amritsar, and offered instead to raise an army of his ow n to 
be trained by British officers in his paid employment. In return he demanded that the 
Indian government should grant him a subsidy necessary for the maintenance of such 
force. A similar subsidy, he argued, was being paid to the Amir of Kabul for maintaining 
an army to check Russian advance towards India.^  Lord Dufferin, though prepared to 
consider Pratap Singh's representation, was determined that there should be no 
misapprehension in his mind about his position vis-a-vis the British government. He 
Memorandum of conversation between Lord Dufferin and Pratap Singh, 15 January 1886. Foieign 
Department Progs., Sec. E, July 1886, No. 426, NAl; Maharaja to Dufferin, 14 Jan. 1886. Foieign 
Department Progs., Sec. E, July 1886, No. 427, NAI. 
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made it quite clear that if in future the government of India should decide in favour of 
such a cantonment he would expect Maharaja as a loyal feudatory of the Queen Empress 
to accept the decision with readiness and goodwill.'" 
Broadly speaking, the British intervention was made on two grounds both of 
which had been conveyed to Maharaja in clear terms time and again. The first being the 
security of the state, as the state of Jammu and Kashmir had to be used as a frontline 
state. The phrase "independent possession" even from Maharaja's point of view was 
restricted to the internal matters. Any intervention to counter the foreign threat, whether 
real or perceived, did not fall under its purview." The second being Maharaja's capacity 
to govern his subjects with justice. Barely had the ink of the treaty of Amritsar dried-up, 
the British starting impressing upon the Maharaja that they had every right to meddle in 
the affairs of the state.'^ Henry Lawrence, the British Resident at Lahore, who was 
deputed by the Governor General to make an on the spot inquiry on the reports of 
misgiving or oppression, impressed upon the Maharaja that "the essential condition of his 
independence was the capacity to govern his subjects with justice and equanimity, and his 
ability to ameliorate their condition; and in case the administrative set up was not 
reorganized some other arrangement will be made...".'^ Lawrence also made the 
Governor General to administer a stem warning to the Maharaja that if he failed to 
ameliorate the situation, "a system of direct intervention must be resorted to". "* 
'" DutTerin to Maharaja, 16 March 1886, Foreign Department Progs., Sec. E, July 1886. No. 427. NAl. 
'' See Articles IV, V and VI of the treaty. 
'^  Foreign Department, Secret, 28* November, 1847, Nos. 36-41, NAl. 
" Foreign Department, Secret, 28"^  .Ian. 1848, No. 35, NAl. 
'•* Foreign Department, Secret, 28'" January, 1848, No. 43-A., NAl. 
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Given the geographical location of the state bordering the most formidable 
adversary of the British Indian Empire, the Russia, any interference in the subortlinate 
state for upgrading the security carried sufficient weight. Likewise being the supreme 
power'^  it was responsibility of the British government if the subordinate ruler, relieved 
of any outside threats, oppresses his own people with impunity. Since no such explicit 
provision was made in the treaty, the British made it emphatically clear to the Maharaja 
in the subsequent communications like the above one. Thus, the rules of the game set so 
early by the British Government in their dealings with Maharaja were, by and large, in 
accordance with the real politic, but how far these rules were played fairly witii the 
administration of the state of Jammu and Kashmir need further probing. 
If the treaty was deliberately kept ambiguous, why then the British so earh felt 
the need to spell out character of the treaty and convey to the Maharaja overtly and 
covertly is intriguing. Whether these references by various British officials aimed at 
removing the ambiguities in the treaty and misgivings in the mind of the Maharaja or 
were a result of the change of heart with regard to the creation of the state or change in 
circumstances or a combination of all is difficult to tell. However, one thing is clear that 
the British officials were disenchanted with the Maharaja soon after the creation ol the 
state of Jammu and Kashmir. Lord Hardinge, notwithstanding his concluding the treaty 
with Gulab Singh, did not admire the latter. Despite the favourable settlement he awarded 
to Gulab Singh, he described the Jammu Raja as "the ablest scoundrel in all Asia."'" To 
his wife he wrote, "Gulab Singh is the greatest rascal in Asia. Unfortunately it [was] 
necessary to improve his condition, because he did not participate in the war against 
'^  According to Article X of the Treaty signed in 1846 the British declared themselves the supreme power 
Bawa, Jammu Fox, p. 118. 
80 
us...and give him a slice of the Sikh territory... and treat him better than he dcserv[ed]."'' 
Lord Dalhousie despite his change of heart since the Wazirabad Conference'^ typified the 
same disenchantment on the eve of his retirement, when he said "in 1846 we unwittingly 
handed over [Kashmir] to a chief who has proved himself a veritable tyrant, and who 
already appears to be the founder of a race of tyrants."'^ 
Deeply apprehensive of these persistent misgivings of the British, Gulab Singh 
worried that an ordinary succession might not follow his demise. Failing health increased 
his fear. To avoid any would-be pitfall and determined to ensure the continuance of the 
Dogra dynasty, he abdicated early in 1856 in favour of Ranbir Singh, the heir apparent. 
And Gulab Singh thereupon assumed the Governorship of the Kashmir province. For all 
practical purposes, however, Gulab Singh continued to be the real sovereign of the 
kingdom until his death.^ " Abdicating throne in favour of his son to avoid any danger 
goes directly against the assurance given by the British government in the Treaty of 
Amritsar that the British government "transfers...to Maharajah Gulab Singh and the heirs 
" Ibid. 
'* The East India Company's directors appointed Charles Napier as the Commander-in-Chief of Lord 
Dalhousie. Napier was one of the most zealous critics of Gulab Singh. Soon after his appointment. Napier 
singled out the Kashmir ruler as one of his chief targets. He wrote to his brother that "my first blow will 
probably be at Goolab Sing." Declaring that "Goolab is not to be trifled with"', the General threatened that 
he would resign if his advice were disregarded. Napier, Life of Charles Napier, Vol. IV. p. 156. 
In spite of Dalhousie's indifTerence towards such schemes, the constant clamouring of his Commander-in-
Chief persuaded him to make an on-the-spot check in the north-west by the end of 1850, and he asked 
Gulab Singh to meet in Punjab. Two men met at Wazirabad on December 26. Determined to allay the 
suspicions of the Governor-General, Gulab Singh startled Dalhousie when he unblushingly grabbed his 
dress in his hands, and cried loud, "thus I grasp the skirts of the British Government, and I will never let go 
my hold." The gesture impressed the Governor-General immensely. Pledges of friendship and loyalt)- were 
given by Gulab Singh. The parleys with Gulab Singh created a lasting impact on his mind. Williams Lee 
Warner. The Life of the Marquess of Dalhousie, 2 Vols., (London: 1904), vol., i, p. 366. 
''' Bawa, Jammu Fox. p. 179. 
'' Ibid. 
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male of his body all the hilly and mountainous country"."' So this shows that the British 
government never meant to go by the provisions of the treaty. 
The annexation of Punjab to British India further wetted the appetite for this 
border state. However having put Maharaja under sufficient control, the British sei to 
become the virtual rulers while keeping the shadow of the Maharaja in place. 
The physical presence of the British in the state administration started earlier 
with the appointment of Officer on Special Duty to look after the interests of European 
tourists in the state.'^ The annexation of the Punjab pushed the British Indian frontiers 
along the state of Jammu and Kashmir. The territorial contiguity opened up the flow of 
European tourists into the state particularly the valley of Kashmir which provided a 
welcome refuge from the scorching heat of Indian summer. Maharaja tried his best to 
come up to the expectations of the tourists but the alleged arrogance of some tourists who 
treated the administration like their personal attendants forced the Maharaja to complaint 
to the British government. The complaint proved counterproductive as it offered the 
British with much needed opportunity of establishing their physical presence in the 
affairs of the state administration. Ostensibly acceding to the grievances of the Maharaja 
the British would grind their own axe. The Governor General decided to appoint a British 
officer to be posted in Srinagar. This appointment had a huge symbolic importance as it 
set the precedence for the physical presence of the English officials for conducting the 
official business of the state, which went against the letter and spirit of the treat) of 
Amritsar with far reaching consequences. The appointment of Officer on Special Duly 
Aitchison, A Collection of Treaties, Engagements andSanads, pp. 165-6. Italics mine. 
" Foreign Department Progs., Political, 14*^  Dec, 1852, Nos. 82-83, NAl. 
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paved the way for physically manning the administration of the state which culminated in 
the imposition of the Resident.^^ (The role of the Officer on Special Duty and the 
circumstances which led to the establishment of the British Resident in the state shall be 
discussed in detail in the next chapter.) 
The proposal of Viceroy Lord Northbrook in 1875 to appoint a Resident in the 
state led to a heated debate. It was not only disliked by the Maharaja but there was a 
serious difference of opinion in the official circles too who argued that the proposed 
measure was in violation of the Treaty of Amritsar. Argyll, the Secretary of State, 
referred the question to Political Committee where it was hotly debated. Some officials of 
the Committee like Frere, Perry and Rawlinson supported the Viceroy's case, while as 
Montgomery, Fredric Currie and Clerk strongly protested against it and pointed the 
impropriety and illegality of the proposed measure. '^* It was argued that the appointment 
of the Resident in Kashmir was never contemplated when the treaty of 1846 was 
concluded. It could only be justified as a "penal measure" in consequence of Maharaja's 
disloyalty to the British government or "as a political arrangement arising out of absolute 
necessity for the preservation of [their] position on the frontier."^^ Currie even made a 
striking disclosure that at the time of the Treaty of Amritsar a promise had been made to 
the Maharaja "that as long as His Highness remained faithful to the conditions of the 
treaty and loyal to British government, no interference with his government would be 
" Ibid. 
-" Sir Bartie Frere, Sir Thomas Erskine Perry, Sir Henry Rawlinson and Sir Robert Montgomery were all 
the members of the India Council and Sir Fredric Currie was the Vice-President of the Council. 
'^ Foreign Department, Secret-E, Currie's Note, 31 October 1873, No. 15, NAI. 
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attempted and no Resident established at his capital."^^ Argyll, while agreeing with 
Currie that the appointment of the Resident was "virtually a penal measure", expressed 
the doubts as to the wisdom of adopting such a course, except on the grounds of treacherv 
on the part of the Maharaja.^ ^ (The details about the Maharaja's alleged intrigues with 
Russia against the British are discussed in chapter four). 
The charges leveled against the Maharaja in a way provided legal justification for 
the appointment of the Resident. If it could be only done on the grounds of disloyaliv or 
threat to the security let those very grounds be made available. But how far those charges 
were well founded determines the justification of the act. 
Whatever verbal assurances were given to the Maharaja at the time of the signing 
of the treaty, the fact is that once Maharaja accepted the appointment of the Officer on 
Special Duty, the appointment of the Resident was an act only different in degree, not in 
kind. If the British were the acknowledged supreme power then they owed it to the 
people of that area as moral and legal responsibility, that wanton oppression is not let 
loose against them.^ * However, British intervention was neither out of concern for 
administrative reforms nor as a fiilfillment of the treaty but only in extending their own 
interests. They could well overlook Maharaja's open violation of the treaty if it served 
their interests as well. The territories acquired by Gulab Singh in Gilgit, not to speak of 
those of Ladakh and Baltistan went straight way against the Article IV which clearly 
" Currie to Argyll, 27 November 1873, enclosed in Argyll to Northbrook 28 November 1873, Foreign 
Department, Secret, Nos., 103-05, NAI. 
•' Foreign Department, Secret-E, Currie's Note, 31 October 1873, No. 15, NAI. 
*^ Foreign Department, Secret, 28'" January, 1848, No. 43-A., NAI. 
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reads that, "The limits of the territory of Maharaja Gulab Singh shall not be at any time 
changed without concurrence of the British government."^' 
The treaty did not provide for all kinds of situations which again helped the 
British to intervene in the garb of handling new developments. The imposition of the 
Resident and the establishment of Gilgit Agency were such types of interventions. 
Why should the British make distinction between the case of Jawahir Singh 
(Gulab Singh's nephew) and the case of an unfortunate weaver in Kashmir who may 
complain of Gulab Singh's oppression? The British had neither had any sympathy with 
Jawahir Singh nor with the weaver of Kashmir but apparently wanted to take advantage 
of both as justification for intervention. They immediately used their good office to 
exhort Gulab Singh to act justly towards his nephew, which in a subtle way conveyed to 
Maharaja his precariousness. The Kashmiri weaver, on the other hand, would not be 
heard as that does not seem of any benefit; while his grievances, if allowed to 
accumulate, will become much more useful for the British in future. The handing over of 
^'Aitchison,/4 Collection of Treaties. Engagements and Sanads, pp. 165-6. 
As far as the treaty of Amritsar was concerned, Gulab Singh had been given possession of the country 
situated east ward of the river Indus. As such Gilgit, Hunza, Nagar and Dare! and other hilly country 
situated on the westward of the river could not be deemed to come under the domain of the Maharaja. So 
when the British Indian government deputed Lt. Vans Agnew and the other members of the Boundary 
Commission to Gilgit to obtain information about the hilly territories, the tribal chiefs opposed their 
presence in their territories. The raja of llunza declared that he would not allow any British or for that 
matter any Kashmiri official in his territories because by the treaty stipulations they were not authorized to 
enter there. He referred to the Treaty of Amritsar that the British government had affected transfer to Gulab 
Singh the country "situated to the eastward of the river Indus and westward of the r'wer Ravi". This clearly 
reveals that Gulab Singh had no right to cross the Indus with the aim of subjugating Gilgit and other 
territories. Ladakh and Baltistan had been subdued on behalf of Maharaja Ranjil Singh. As such the 
Maharaja had no right over Ladakh and Baltistan. What to speak of Gilgit! The British government had 
given him "all lands and hills between the western side of the river Ravi and the eastern side of the river 
Indus". As such he had no right to change his boundaries, more so, to cross the river Indus, including 
Hunza and Nagar. This clearly reveals that the tribesmen believed and which was legally true that the 
Dogra Maharaja had no legal right to conquer the region. F.M. Hassnain, Gilgit: The Northern Gate of 
India, (New Delhi: 1978), pp. 33-4. 
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Jammu and Kashmir to Gulab Singh is a case in point. The choice of a Hindu ruler for a 
Muslim majority state seems deliberate. Exhibiting the anti-Muslim stance characteristic 
of British officials since the disastrous war against Afghanistan, Lord Hardinge wrote to 
the Secretary of State: "I have done this on the principle that it is our policy to prefer 
Hindoo governments, or any race in preference to the Mahommedans on this great 
entrance into India."^° H.M. Lawrence, the signatory to the Treaty of Amritsar offered his 
argument against the British taking over Kashmir directly and in favour of handing it 
over to Gulab Singh. Explaining himself, Lawrence observed that, " [Kashmir] would be 
a pleasant land for a man to dwell in, but I am not a whit more satisfied after seeing i- that 
we were wrong in not taking it... Just now the people would be glad to have us for 
masters, but being all Mussalmans or Brahmins they would soon prove restive. About 
four fifths are Mahomedans and would of course kill cows while the minority would be 
hostile to the measure... between Moollas and Pundits our Raj would not long be declared 
to be Heaven sent." '^ 
The British policy-makers thought that the Hindu ruler and his Muslim subjects 
could act as a check on the aspirations of each other. While the ruler would prevent the 
emotional and political links of the Muslims of the state with Muslim countries like 
Afghanistan and the intervening IVluslim areas, Muslim discontent within the state could 
always be used by the government of India as an excuse to interfere in its affairs. This 
consideration later on proved to be an excuse for the British to interfere in the internal 
affairs of the state. 
Foreign Department, Sec. Branch, Ref. No.8, ig"" March, 1846, NAl. 
Foreign Secret/Cons. 26 December 1846/no. 1240-1 + K.W., NAl. 
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The Persian version of the treaty is a literal proof of how it was the English 
(read British) version or interpretation which finally mattered. The Persian/English 
version controversy of the Treaty of Amritsar gave final blow to the Maharaja's reliance 
on the treaty. Maharaja Pratap Singh drew up a plan to reorganize his administration. The 
new scheme proposed the appointment of a Council, consultative one, composed of 
President, Vice President and other members. The appointment of Nilamber Mukherjee. a 
Bengali, raised controversy. Plowden, the Resident objected to the appointment of 
Nilamber till the Government of India should have examined the scheme of 
reorganization of Jammu and Kashmir administration. But the Maharaja claimed that 
according to Article VII of the Persian version of the treaty of Amritsar, which alone was 
signed by his grandfather, Maharaja Gulab Singh, he was entitled to appoint any British 
subject without the consent of the colonial government. He argued that a person was only 
bound by a document to which he was a party; since his grandfather never signed the 
English version of the treaty of Amritsar he, as Gulab Singh's successor, was not bound 
by its stipulations. Pratap Singh knew, however, that the matter was complicated one; 
he therefore left it to the government of India for final decision. '^' The Maharaja's 
arguments evoked a smart rejoinder from Plowden which was submitted to Durand for 
consideration of Lord Dufferin's government. In this Plowden pointed out the fallacy, 
even the danger, in Pratap Singh's contention. He argued that if the state of Jammu and 
Kashmir was bound only by the Persian version of the treaty, by the same reasoning the 
British government was obliged only to respect its English text, in accordance to which 
" Interestingly, what Maharaja claimed was totally opposite to the English version of the treaty. Article VII 
of the English version reads: "Maharaja Gulab Singh engages never to talcc.any British subject...without 
the consent of the British Government." So it was a huge claim on the part of the Maharaja. 
" Maharaja to Plowden, 24 April and 8 May 1888, Foreign Department, Political. Sec. E. March 1889. 
Cons. 157 and 160, NAI. 
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the English government had hitherto recognized the Maharajas existence as the ruling 
chief. In other words, the repudiation by Pratap Singh of the EngUsh text of the reat> 
would at once mean, from the British point of view, the forfeiture of his right to continue 
as the ruler of Jammu and Kashmir. 
The British declined to permit the employment of Nilamber Mukherjce as 
member of the council in charge of the revenue administration. As regards the question 
whether Maharaja was at liberty to employ British subjects without the consent cf the 
Indian government, Plowden was asked to tell him that the interpretation of the treaty of 
1846 with regard to this point was no longer open to discussion. Further, the government 
of India was willing to give the Maharaja every possible assistance in regard to such 
appointments, but insisted that "they must maintain their right to be consulted" bt^ fore 
any British subject was appointed by the Darbar.^ ^ 
It was clear assertion of the right granted by Article VII of the treaty which 
clearly barred the Maharaja from employing any British subject or the subject of any 
European or American state without the consent of the British government.''*' The 
provision in a way made Maharaja dependent on the British for any improvement in the 
administration of the state. It virtually created the situation where British intervention in 
the internal affairs became "indispensible". If Maharaja would not be able to emplo> the 
experts from outside the state for improvements in revenue administration and other 
developments, the state "[would] suffer from mal-administration" and become fit case for 
" Plowden to Durand, 12 May 1888, Ibid., No. 159, NAI. 
•" Government of India to Kashmir Resident, Foreign Department, Secret-E, 25 July 1888, end. ) m 
Government of India to Secretary of State, 18 August, 1888, NAI. 
" See Appendix 1 for the Article VII of the Treaty of Amritsar. 
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intervention; if he intended to employ, then he had to consult the British. The experts and 
technocrats appointed on the British recommendation would be obviously more loyal to 
the British than to the Maharaja and hence itself become instruments of intervention. 
To Sum Up: 
The treaty no doubt gave both the parties some rights and obligations. But 
because of the overwhelming power and prestige of one party over the other, the British 
always had the upper hand. Since Gulab Singh was at the receiving end, the British were 
always in a better position to use the provisions of the treaty to their own advantage. 
More importantly, if the British were recognized by the treaty as arbiters in any dispute 
arising with the neighbouring states how could their arbitration be challenged with regard 
to the dispute with the British itself. These inherent contradictions in the treaty gave them 
the role of both the judge and the jury in any dispute and they successfully gave their 
every act a legal cover of the treaty. 
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Chapter Four 
Changing Geo-Political Scenario: A Stairway to Ascendency 
The handing over of the state of Jammu and Kashmir to Maharaja Gulab Singh 
does not seem to have raised his stature in the eyes of the British government. Despite 
parting of the ways between the Sikhs and the Dogras, the new anti-British movement 
among the Sikhs led the British to cast a shadow of doubt on the extent of the Dogra 
Maharaja's loyalty. The continued presence of Gulab Singh's sympathizers at the Sikh 
court and the eruption of an anti-British revolt in Multan led by Mul Raj during April 
1848—which set the stage for the Second Anglo-Sikh War—only fuelled the British 
suspicion. The Multan revolt coincided with that of the Hazara where Chattar Singh 
raised the standard of rebellion. Chattar Singh sought the assistance of Amir Dost 
Muhammad of Afghanistan, whom he promised Peshawar in the event of a Sikh victory.' 
Chattar Singh also turned to Gulab Singh for armed assistance. Rumour spread that the 
Dogras chief had been in clandestine alliance with Chattar Singh and Amir of 
Afghanistan. This led several European officials to doubt the loyalty of Gulab Singh to 
the British Empire. 
The first major battle of the second Anglo-Sikh War was fought at Chillianwala 
on 13' January 1849, in which the Sikhs got initial success but the ultimate result was a 
stalemate. Hearing of the Punjab forces successes Dost Muhammad crossed the Indus and 
captured the fort of Attock. He sent a force of fifteen hundred men under his son, Akram 
' George Bruce, Six Battles for India, (London: 1969), p. 233. Amir Dost Muhammad had lost the province 
of Peshawar to Ranjit Singh in 1834. He had got an obsession for Peshawar. 
^ James Lionel Trotter, Life ofHodson of Hodson'sHorse, (London: 1901), pp. 58-9. 
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Khan, to assist the Sikhs. Amir of Afghanistan and Sikhs made several appeals to Gulab 
Sigh for help.^  Dost Muhammad claimed that Gulab Singh had promised him the 
financial and military support but when the time for help had come, he refrained. Dost 
Mohammad wrote to Mul Raj that "if Gulab Singh does not now lend his assistance in 
supplying us with money, and neglects to join our cause, he will eventually repent it'"."* 
He fiirther wrote, "Had Golab Singh shown as much valour and resolution as you have, 
the Sikhs would now be in possession of the sovereignty of Lahore."^ 
But the Maharaja's primary concern was the security of his kingdom. Anticipating 
a new round of Anglo-Sikh fighting, he first of all took precautionary measures by 
enlarging his army and reinforcing his frontier posts. With regard to the Sikh-Afghan 
overtures, he made all his calculations before taking a final decision. Joining the conflict 
on the side of the Sikhs, he thought, would prove suicidal for him. Highly disturbed over 
the imminent Afghan entry into the conflict, Gulab Singh feared that Dost Muhammad's 
true motives were not merely to regain Peshawar but also to re-establish the Afghan 
hegemony over Kashmir.^  He concluded that the Sikh-Afghan victory over the British 
' Pointing to the unexpected but apparent Sikh-Afghan alignment and by the desertion of various Dogra 
regiments to Chattar Singh, James Abbott, the assistant British agent at Hazara, remarlced that the loyalty of 
Gulab Singh was also doubtful. Excerpts from the Diary of Abbott, Dec. 18, 1848, contained in Currie's 
letter to Elliot, Dec. 28, 1848, quoted in Bawa, Jammu Fox, p. 145. 
'' Dost Muhammad's letter to Mul Raj. Jan 18, 1849. This time Mul Raj was already defeated by the British. 
The letter was intercepted by them. Cited in Bawa, Jammu Fox p. 148. 
' Ibid. 
' There are some references that after not getting any response from Gulab Singh, the Amir of Afghanistan 
had actually sent his envoys to the several hill chiefs promising rewards in return of their help in restoring 
the Afghan rule in Kashmir. Warner, The Life of the Marquiss of Dalhoiisie, vols. 2, (London: 1904). vol. 
l,p.213. 
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would inevitably enhance the danger of an Afghan invasion of Kashmir.^  So he decided 
that his interests would best be served by adopting a cautious pro-British posture while at 
the same time avoiding direct involvement in the Punjab affairs.^  To give effect to his 
plans, Gulab Singh appealed for British assistance in the event of an Afghan aggression 
on his kingdom. To give a further proof of his loyalty, he forwarded the original 
communications from Dost Muhammad to Currie and reaffirmed his devotion to the 
British.' 
Taking into cognizance all the events and circumstances, Governor-General 
communicated a carefully worded reply to him. Dalhousie wrote that "if the Maharaja 
shall really do effective service against the Sikh army now in arms against the British 
government, or against Dost Mahomed, in the event of that person attempting to aid the 
Sikh army, he may rest assured that Dost Mahomed will not be permitted to injure him." 
He, however, charged Gulab Singh with lack of active support and conveyed a grim 
warning to the Maharaja that in the case of not playing "expected role", the British ' will 
be compelled to regard His Highness not as a friend, but as, in truth, an enemy; and will 
proceed in due time, to seize such portions of His Highness's territory as may '^ive 
reparation for his breach of treaty, and compensate for the expense which will be caused 
thereby, or to inflict upon His Highness such other punishment as [he] may think suited 
' Gulab Sigh feared that the Sikhs would not treat him sympathetically either. The Sikh victory wjuld 
inevitably revive at Lahore the painful memories of his role in the first Anglo-Sikh War and encourage a 
Sikh attempt to regain the Himalayan territories so reluctantly surrendered in 1846. 
* Saif-ud-Din to Currie, July 17, 1848, Mirza Saif-ud-Din "Mirza Saifuddin Papers", vol. 1, folio :3 2. 
(Manuscript Section, Research and Publication Department, Srinagar.) 
' Gulab Singh's undated letter to Currie, cited in Bawa, Jammu Fox, p. 148. 
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to the faithlessness of [His Highness's] conduct. [He] trusts that the Maharaja, by 
prompt and vigorous action, will avert this misfortune''}'^ 
Gulab Singh maintained his composure despite being hurt by the remarl<s of 
Dalhousie casting doubts on his loyalty. He, however, reaffirmed his commitment to the 
Treaty of Amritsar and indicated his intention of assisting the British even at the risk of 
jeopardizing his own kingdom." Gulab Sigh's reaffirmation led to a distinct 
improvement in Anglo-Dogra relations. 
The fateful battle of Second Anglo-Sikh war was fought at Gujarat on 21 
February 1849, in which some Dogra troops also participated on the side of the British. 
The Sikhs were finally defeated in the middle of March. The Afghan troops, seeing no 
prospects of a Sikh victory retreated to their homeland. 
Thus in this way Punjab was annexed and the boundaries of the British Indian 
Empire now directly touched the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir. The importance 
of Gulab Singh as an influential chieftain in the eyes of the British somewhat diminished. 
As is true for the every other empire, the changing geo-political scenario in the north-
western regions of the British Indian Empire made the authorities to pursue their policies 
which would suit the best imperialistic interests. Now the British could pursue any policy 
forcefully in regard to Kashmir which would suit their best imperialist interests. To meet 
this end, the focus of the British policy now shifted directly towards .lammu and Kashmir. 
'° Lord Dalhousie to Currie, Jan., 12, 1849, Ganda Singh, (ed.), Private Correspondence relating to the 
Anglo-Sikh Wars, (Madras: 1955), p. 147. Emphasis mine. 
" Bawa, Jammu Fox, p. 150. Acknowledging his gratitude once again for the "bestowal" of the Himalayan 
province in 1846, he told Currie: "Cashmere, my friend, is not my hereditary country". By this time, Henry 
Lawrence had returned as Resident of Punjab but Gulab Singh was not aware about that, so he v\Tote to 
Currie. 
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The British Residency 
As early as 1846, the British had received the reports of misgivings or oppression 
by Maharaja Gulab Singh in Jammu and Kashmir. These reports came handy to the 
British Indian administration and they started impressing on the Maharaja that thev had 
every right to meddle in the affairs of the Kashmir Darbar. Henry Lawrence, the British 
Resident at Lahore, who was deputed by the Governor-General to make an on-the-spot 
enquiry on the reports, impressed upon the Maharaja that the essential condition of his 
"independence" was his capacity to govern his subjects with justice and equanimity, and 
his ability to ameliorate their conditions; that "the British Government will not permit 
any tyranny in Cashmere", and in case the administrative set-up was not reorganized, 
"some other arrangements will be made for the protection of the hill people."'^ Lawrence 
also made the Governor General to administer a stern warning to the Maharaja. In his 
communication, Henry Hardinge blankly told the Maharaja that, "in no case will the 
British Government be the blind instrument of a ruler's injustice towards his people, and 
if, inspite of friendly warning, the evil of which the British Government may have just 
cause to complain, be not corrected, a system of direct interference must be resorted to, 
which as your Highness must be aware would lower the dignity and curtail the 
independence of the Ruler".'^ 
The establishment of the British rule in Punjab made it easy and safer foi the 
European tourists to travel to the valley of Kashmir. With the result, the flow of tourists 
to Kashmir greatly increased. The Maharaja offered every possible facility to the visitors 
' Translation of a letter from Lieutenant Colonel Lawrence to Maharaja Gulab Singh. 29"" November. 
1847, Foreign Department, Secret, 28* January, 1848, No. 42, NAI. 
" Foreign Department, Secret, 28"' January, 1848, 43-A., NAI. 
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in the valley. However, many of these visitors were frightfully arrogant, acting as if 
Gulab Singh was personally indebted to each of them for the grant of Kashmir and often 
proceeding to treat the valley as their own private fief'"* These officials, we arc being 
told, paid little or nothing for the goods procured from the locals,'^ and one English 
visitor even made off with money collected from the Kashmiris under false pretenses.'^ 
The Maharaja himself "complained that many of the European visitors abused the 
hospitality displayed towards them, for they were frequently taking with them very large 
quantities of saffron, and other products of the country, much beyond what they could 
really use during their sojourn".'^ With the result, the Maharaja complained to the British 
Government of the hospitality extended to the tourists being abused.'^ The Maharaja's 
complaints provided the British with the much needed opportunity of establishing their 
political ascendency in the affairs of the Kashmir Darbar and they were thus eager to 
consider the appointment of a regular British agent there. They thought that if a British 
officer (ostensibly to deal with the offending Europeans) could be posted in Kashmir, he 
would, besides keeping them in check, be also able—as contemplated by the Governor-
General—to serve "the purpose of making enquiries into the condition of the people, 
under the Maharaja's rule and reporting generally upon the state of the country".''* This 
would help them to find more convenient means to control the overall administrative 
machinery of the state. They quickly responded to the Maharaja's complaint; but in their 
'" John Morison, Lawrence of Liicknow, (London: 1934), pp. 241-42. See also, Honibergcr, Thiily Five 
Years in the East. pp. 182-3. 
" Morison, Lawrence ofLucknow, pp. 241-2. 
" Mir Saifullah, Tarikli-Nama-e-Kaslimir", (Persian Scroll), Research and Publication Department. 
Srinagar. 
" Honiberger, Thirty Five Years in the East, pp. 182-3. 
" Ibid. 
" Dalhousie to Sir H. Lawrence, 8 July 1851, Dalhousie Papers/Section 6, No. 98. Quoted in Ghose. 
Kashmir in Transition, p. 4. 
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own way. The Governor-General decided to appoint a British officer to stay in the \ alley 
for the purpose of looking after the foreign tourists. Initially the Maharaja resisted the 
move but ultimately made the way for the new officer provided the officer remained in 
the valley only during the summer months.^ " The officer came to be known as the Officer 
on Special Duty. '^ 
The officer thus appointed in 1852 was, theoretically, only authorized to arbitrate 
in any dispute between the authorities of the princely state and the European visitors, and 
to take cognizance of any oppression or irregularities which could be charged against 
them.^ ^ Outwardly, therefore, this appointment was of little importance. But keeping in 
view the real intentions of the Government it was an important constitutional gain, lor it 
was the recognition of the right of the British Indian government to post their officer in 
the state.^ ^ 
Although the British Officer on Special Duty was appointed for a specitlc 
purpose, a close vigil was maintained on Kashmir developments through a local agent, 
Mirza Saif-ud-Din. Mirza was a local Kashmiri employed by the Company to spy on the 
policies of the Kashmiri Maharajas and the general condition of the state. Saif-ud-Din, 
through his extensive confidential dispatches, captured in minute detail the everyday 
-° Foreign Department, Political, 1852, Nos. 82-83, December, 1852, NAI. 
'^ Foreign Department, Political, Nos. 82-8, December, 1852; John Lawrence letter to Jawala Sahai the 
Dewan of Gulab Singh, January 14,1852, Foreign Department, NAI. 
" John Lavvrence mentioned that the Officer on Special Duty had his concern only with the European 
visitors to Kashmir. He had no right to interfere in the internal administration of the state. He was also not 
to be the medium of communication between the Maharaja and the Government of India. Foreign 
Department, Political, 1852, Nos. 82-83, December, 1852, NAI. 
" But it is pertinent to note here that the Officer on Special Duty did not interfere in the internal 
administration of the Kashmir Darbar; he was more interested and reported regularly regarding the trims-
frontier activities of the Maharaja. Memo by C.U. Aitchison, 15 May 1870, Argyll Papers/Red 312, p..>92, 
cited by D. K. Ghose, Kashmir in Transition, p. 7. 
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occurrences during the entire reign of Gulab Singh and the first few years of Maharaja 
Ranbir Singh's rule.^ '* 
The more British started penetrating into Jammu and Kashmir and knowing about 
its beauty, the strategic importance and the pathetic conditions the people were living 
in,^ ^ the more they began to lament over the sale of Kashmir to the Dogras.^ *^  Most of the 
Europeans who visited Kashmir or had some professional or other links with it, in a true 
imperialistic tone advocated the annexation of Kashmir for the British Empire; perhaps 
none of them "truly" campaigned for its deliverance from the Dogra oppression. Lieut. 
Colonel Torrens during his visit to Kashmir in 1861 lamented that "No Englishman can 
^* The confidential dispatches of Mirza Saif-ud-Din, written from Srinagar between 1846 and 1859 to the 
British authorities at Lahore, forms one of the most important sources for the early history of the Dogra 
rule, in .lammu and Kashmir. This enormous manuscript, comprising twelve volumes, after its discovery in 
1960, has been deposited with Research and Publication Division of Jammu and Kashmir Government. The 
information in his communications is arranged in chronological order. Each dispatch either bears a specific 
date or refers to the months it covers. To some degree this work may be compared to the now famous 
Umdat-ut-Tawarikh written by Sohan Lai Suri, who provided extensive eyewitness accounts of the Sikh 
rule in Punjab. But unlike Suri, Saif-ud-Din was not an official scribe and was prohibited from appearing at 
Gulab Singh's court. He collected most of his information through others who were allowed admittance, 
but claimed he never sent it to the British before verifying it. He also gathered news of events taking place 
in Srinagar and intelligence reaching the capital from other parts of the Dogra kingdom. His reports, for the 
most part, must be considered impartial because Saif-ud-Din, whatever his own sentiments toward Gulab 
Singh, was aware that the British authorities had employed him mainly to acquaint them with the true state 
of affairs in Kashmir. Consequently, baseless and fabricated accounts could have jeopardized the 
informer's credibility with the British upon whom he depended both for his economic and physical 
security. His writings, therefore, contain both disparaging and commendatory accounts of the rulers of 
Jammu and Kashmir. Bawa, Jammu Fox, pp. 193-4. 
It seems that sometime after Saif-ud-Din's death the British employed his brother, Mirza Muhi-ud-Din to 
act as the khufia navis (secret writer). But no trace of his correspondence has been found. Ibid., p. 236. fn. 
13. 
'^ Gulab Singh, the first Dogra ruler, was determined to make his power felt throughout his newly founded 
kingdom. His successors were in no way better than him. The Dogra rulers were greedy for revenue and the 
taxes were burdensome, with the result the standard of living of the people did not show any positive 
change. Aggravating to the situation was the fact that though the vast majority of the state happened to be 
Muslims, they were treated as second class citizens by the rulers and their officers. 
^^ Letters from India and Kashmir, (Anonymous, London: 1874), pp. 160-70, letter no. xiii: Anslcy Murray. 
J.C, Our Visit to Hindostan, Kashmir and Ladakh, (London: 1879), p. 202; Wakefield, The Happy Valley, 
p. 86. 
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leave Kashmir without a sigh of regret that a province so flill of promise should ever have 
been allowed to slip through our fingers".^^ "Surprise has often been expressed," wrote 
Sir Francis Younghusband, "that when this lovely land had actually been ceded to us, 
after a hard and strenuous campaign, we should ever have parted with it for the paltry 
sum of three-quarters of a million sterling."^^ 
Robert Thorp, a young British Army officer, who visited Kashmir in 1865, openly 
criticized the ruthless Dogra rule in Kashmir.^ ^ He also launched a fierce attack on the 
British government for selling Kashmir to Gulab Singh.^ ° It was urged that a pi)licy 
which suited to the complete growth of the Empire, and not the prevailing attitude of aon-
interference with "Native States", should be adopted, so that "the Queen's supremacy 
which was unquestioned in fact could as well be recognized in form by the Kashmir 
Prince". '^ 
The Dogra Maharajas, who ruled Jammu and Kashmir on sectarian lines, backed 
and supported the interests of the Dogras and the Kashmiri Hindus while as the Muslims 
who were largely concentrated in the valley of Kashmir were left out. The British Indian 
government which was acting as a paramount power had made a "promise" as earh as 
1847 that "in no case [would] the British government be the blind instrument of a Rulers 
'^ Torrens, Travels In Ladakh, Tarlary and Kashmir, pp. 300-1. 
*^ Younghusband, Kashmir, p. 90. 
'^ Robert Thorp had come to visit the birth place of his mother—as she belonged to Kashmir—, but mc ved 
by the dilapidated and miserable condition of the Kashmiris, he decided to raise his voice against the 
oppressive Dogra rule. He wrote extensively to the British press about the misgovernment in Kashmir, 'his 
apparently did not suit the autocratic Dogra regime. He died in mysterious circumstances on November 21, 
1868. 
^° Robert Thorp wrote that "...in no portion of the treaty made with Gulab Singh was the slightest provision 
made for the just or humane government of the people of Cashmere and others upon whom we forced a 
government which they detested." Robert Thorp, Cashmere Misgovernment, (London: 1870), p. 60. 
" Ibid., p. 64. 
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injustice towards his people...";^^ but the "promise" was not fulfilled which gave rise to 
the public resentment. The callous attitude of the British was disapproved both in Indian 
and British circles and it was this "public" resentment which prompted the British Indian 
Government to intervene, but this does not follow that the intervention was still primarily 
meant to alleviate the conditions of poor masses of Kashmir. 
The mishandling by the Dogras of the famine of 1877-9 shone the spotlight 
particularly brightly on the plight of the Kashmiri Muslims. A section of British and 
British-Indian press came to the fore to highlight the grievances and oppression on the 
people of Kashmir by the Dogra Darbar. Newspapers in the Punjab, particularly those 
owned by the Muslims, were unrelenting in their criticism of the Dogra state and also of 
the British for having permitted such gross neglect by a protected prince." In the name of 
"humanity" the annexation of the valley was suggested by some, while others urged the 
British Government to intervene "effectively" in order to afford the people some 
immediate relief '^' 
Some Muslims in the valley had made their own attempt to voice their discontent 
with prevailing famine conditions. In 1877 some "unknown" Kashmiris had submitted a 
memorandum to the Viceroy. It was never published but sections of it had made their 
way into the accounts of some British writers and into the Indian press. The accusations 
" Gadru, Kashmir Papers, (Srinagar: 1973), p. xvii. 
" In 1877-9 Kashmir was hit by a famine liked to the Great Famine of British India that spread from South 
to North India in the year 1876-8. However, in the case of Kashmir it was not the failure of moonsoons. but 
instead an abundance of the rains that destroyed the crops, which was left to rot in the fields due to the rigid 
revenue mechanism that prevented peasants from harvesting grain until a revenue official was present at the 
site. See, Lawrence, The Valley of Kashmir, pp. 214-18. The newspapers which highlighted the devastation 
caused by the famine are: Civil and Military Gazette, 5 Sept. 1878, p.l; The Times. 25, 27, and 30 August. 
1879, Newspaper cuttings in Pros. No. 211/Part B, Home Department (Public)/ February 1879, NAI. 
•"' Newspaper cuttings in Pros. No. 211/Part B. Home Department (Public)/ February i 879. NAI. 
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of maladministration levied in it were of the gravest character. The most serious charge 
made was that "in order to save the expense of feeding his people" Maharaja Ranbir 
Singh had preferred to drown boat-loads of Muslims in the Wular Lake. The B-itish 
government had taken these allegations seriously enough to appoint a commission of 
enquiry but Kashmiri Muslims had, supposedly, been too frightened to come forward to 
provide corroboration.^ ^ Although the Maharaja was exonerated, the outrage aroused by 
this advertisement of the shocking conditions of the valley's Muslims called for some 
measure of intervention by the colonial government. Even more critically, the Kasamir 
Darbar's attitude during the famine had demonstrated its incapacity to rise above the 
preferential treatment of its already privileged Hindu subjects to the detriment of Muslim 
cultivators who were the greatest sufferers. 
The press also raised the point that the acquisition of Gilgit and Yasin by the 
Maharaja was in contravention of the Treaty of Amritsar.^ ^ It advised the Government 
that the Maharaja's annexationist policy should be stalled and he should be asked to 
discharge his feudatory duties so long exempted. 
Among the other factors which prompted a serious reconsideration of the colonial 
policy of non-interference in Kashmir was the British failure in the Afghan war. "After 
this ill-starred campaign of 1878", the pressure grew on the government to have a more 
tight vigil of the north-western frontier regions." "The key to India [was] as much Kabul 
as Cashmere; we should render the ruler of Cashmere to be flilly subservient to 3ur 
Bazaz, The History of the Struggle for Freedom in Kashmir, p. 127. 
Gadru, Kashmir Papers, p. 3. 
" William Digby, Condemned Unheard, (London; 1890), p. 46. 
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interests".^ ^ This, they thought would be done by having a control over the Kashmir 
affairs through a Resident.^ ^ In 1884, Lord Ripon argued that the appointment of the 
Resident was important both for assisting and supervising reforms and also to obviate the 
disturbances on the Afghan frontier.'*" The frontier and foreign policies pursued by the 
rulers of Kashmir also came under fire/' 
Thus, the mal-administration of the Kashmir Darbar, the changing geo-political 
nature in the north-western region of the British Indian Empire, the ruthless criticism of 
the Anglo-Indian and British press and the political nature of the activities of the Officer 
on Special Duty " combined to form a pressure on the Dogra rulers which made it easy 
for the British authorities to provide for efficient political ascendency and supervision, 
not only in the "interests" of the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir, but more 
importantly, to safeguard the British imperial interests. 
•" Gadru, Kashmir Papers, p. 41. 
'"ibid., p. 126. 
"^  The Afghan and later on the Russian threat on the north-western borer began to occupy the British 
government with the increasing urgency. In 1880, the Afghan Amir declared that Chitral was a part of the 
Afghan territory. This made the British close in on the Kashmir Darbar. N.N. Raina. Kashmir Po/iiics and 
Imperialist Manoevueres, 1846-1980, (New Delhi: 1988), pp. 35-7; Foreign Dept., Sec. E, Pros. May 1884, 
nos. 354-57, N.A.I. 
"" Maharaja Ranbir Singh's attactc on Shahdullah fort in the frontier region of Korakuram in 1865-66 was 
considered by the British Indian Government the breach of agreement signed by them with Gulab Singh. 
They thought it to be very dangerous for their Indian Empire for it would "involve the Government of India 
into a war; with Turkistan, or Bokhara, or with Russia herself" Thorp, Kashmir Aiisgovernment. The 
papers are in the edited form in S.N. Gadru's Kashmir Papers, pp. 90-2. 
""^  The result was that the powers and position of the Officer on Special Duty were increased bit by bit with 
each new viceroy. He was designated Political Agent and .Justice of Peace in 1872. During the vicero)alty 
of Northbrook the Officer's stay in 1874 was extended to eight months and he was further allowed to deal 
with the affairs of Central Asia. Till 1877 the affairs of Kashmir state were conducted through the Punjab 
Government; the Government of India took over the direct charge in the same year. The Government of 
Punjab was thus divested of the charge of the Kashmir affairs. This was prelude to the appointment of the 
Resident. Maharaja to Punjab Governor. 16 April 1874, No. 5, N.A.I; Foreign Department. Progs.. Sec. 
Nos. 5I8-525(K.W.),No. 525, Dec. 1881, NAI. 
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The British finally intervened in the administration of Jammu and Kashmir it the 
accession of Maharaja Pratap Singh who ascended the throne in September 1885 at the 
death of his father Maharaja Ranbir Singh (his death provided the British wilh an 
opportunity for direct intervention as the new Maharaja was not as redoubtable as his 
father). The new Maharaja, Pratap Singh was asked to withdraw his agent from the 
headquarters of the Government of India,'^ ^ as all political relations with the Kashmir 
Government in future would be carried out through the British Resident, the recognized 
representative of the Government of India/'* Pratap Singh vehemently protested against 
the new arrangement but Lord Duflferin conveyed to him that the decision was final He, 
however, 'assured' the Maharaja that the appointment of a Resident was not a penal 
measure, and should in no way be considered "derogatory to the dignity of the Kaslimir 
State". He "could not see how an arrangement, which had been accepted by all the great 
feudatories of the Queen, could lower the prestige of the ruler of Kashmir.""*^  The 
Governor-General stated that Pratap Singh should regard the officer "neither as 
governing authority, nor as a pedagogue, but as a friend and an advisor".'*^ 
The Government of India also impressed upon the new Maharaja that there was a 
dire need to overhaul the defunct administrative machinery of the state. A wide range of 
reforms were needed to be introduced in Jammu and Kashmir. These included the 
introduction of a lighter assessment of revenue to be collected preferably in cash; the 
abolition of the system of revenue farming; the cession of state monopolies; the revision 
" The Maharaja's Agent or Vakil hitherto carried out the communication with the Government of India. 
With the appointment of the Resident, he was set aside, 
"" Political and Secret Letters, 1/45, p. 1-19, Durand to St. John, October 5, 1885, enclosure 2i in 
Government of India to Secretary of State, October 18, 1885. 
'' Ibid. 
*' Ibid. 
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of existing taxes; the reforms in the educational sector; a reorganization of the army; a 
system of proper financial control; improvements in the judicial administration of the 
state; and the construction of proper roads/'' These reforms were demanded by the 
colonial government in the name of impressing upon the Kashmir government "its 
obligations to its own subjects", and it was made clear to the Maharaja that he would not 
be permitted to dodge these reforms. The initiation of these reforms was, however, left to 
Maharaja Pratap Singh/^ 
The establishment of the Residency gave a wide leverage of powers to the British 
government in the administrative affairs of Kashmir. Taking a further dig on the 
Maharaja's authority, the persons of their own choice were recommended to be appointed 
by the government of India ostensibly to reorganize the Kashmir administration. The 
Maharaja was almost forced to appoint Lachman Dass as the Prime Minister of the state. 
The new Prime Minister along with the other ministers and with the full backing of 
Plowden, the Resident, began to show his authority. A check was placed on the 
Maharaja's extravagance by depriving him of his right to sign public bonds 
independently.''^  Two of the private servants of Maharaja Pratap Singh, Miran Bakhsh 
and Sawal Singh were accused of the financial irregularities of the state ftjnds and were 
thus prosecuted. Maharaja's efforts to save them led to an open rupture between him and 
his council of ministers. Pratap Singh complained bitterly both to the Viceroy and the 
Resident that his council had been acting like a Council of Regency and treating him like 
a minor; that although he would "like very much to have a Council" to advise him, he 
"^  Foreign Department, Sec. E, Pros. October 1886/no. 725, NAI. 
'' Ibid. 
"" Foreign Department, Sec. E, March 1887, NAI. 
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was thoroughly dissatisfied with the present one. The crisis was however temporarily 
averted by Plowden's intervention.^ " 
The conflict again revived, this time between Diwan Lachman Dass and the 
brothers of the Maharaja—Raja Amar Singh and Raja Ram Singh. Maharaja took tht side 
of his brothers, and declared on March 19, 1888 the dismissal of the Diwan from his 
office. The decision was communicated to the British Resident. This providec the 
Resident an opportunity to complain against the Dogra Darbar. He wrote to the higher 
authorities that it was now time "for the Government of India to reconsider the entire 
situation". The question, he emphasized, was what form of government should now be 
constituted. Personally, he believed that a drastic reduction of the Maharaja's authority 
was an essential preliminary to any form of government in Jammu and Kashmir. Pratap 
Singh might reign but must not govern: that was the demand made by him.''' 
Plowden recommended a complete reconstitution of the Kashmir government. 
"Until the entire Kashmir establishment ha[d] been recast, and the honest and the 
competent servants substituted for the fraudulent and incapable men now employed, no 
reforms [could] be carried out, nor [could] any mere alteration of the form of government 
be of any use." ^^  Among other things, he prescribed the immediate removal of the 
"corrupt and mischievous officers who [were] at the bottom of most of the intrigues", and 
in their place the "appointment of the trained Indian officials who could be trusted to 
carry out the orders given out to them."" Plowden remarked that he anticipated an 
^° Plowden to Cunningham, 14 Feb. 1887, Foreign Department, Sec. E, April 1887, Pros. 510-2, NAl. 
Ghose, Kashmir in Transition, p. 65. 
Gadru, Kashmir Papers, pp. 215-9. 
" Ibid. 
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objection which, he foresaw, was likely to be raised—that of interference in the internal 
affairs of an Indian state. Notwithstanding, he argued, that the British government was 
pledged not to interfere with the internal affairs of a princely state, a clear case of 
unavoidable interference had occurred in Kashmir. "The continuing misgovernment", he 
wrote, "ha[d] produc[ed] evil consequences to the people, and, though a wide margin of 
time and opportunity ha[d] been allowed, there seemed no hope whatever that State, 
unaided, [would] be able to settle its own affairs." Further, "the condition of Kashmir 
effect[ed] countries on its northern border beyond its limits, and thus [became] an 
injurious and disturbing element in the Imperial scheme of frontier defence." He 
concluded that "a strict adherence to the principle of non-interference [would merely 
prolong] the local disorder and maladministration" in Kashmir, and therefore to check its 
mischievous course, a decided and effectual interference had become a necessity.'^ '' 
Though the government of India considered the action of the Dogra ruler without 
their previous consultations to be absolutely improper, but Lord Dufferin, the Viceroy, 
was not happy with the Resident too.^ ^ 
Prejudging the stiffening attitude of the British Indian government, Pratap Singh 
drew up a scheme of reorganizing his administration and sent it to Lord Dufferin for his 
consideration.^ * Although the government of India accepted the Maharaja's scheme of 
'' Ibid. 
" Writing to the Secretary of State, Dufferin wrote, "I am not satisfied with the condition of public affairs 
in the State. We have tried Agent after Agent there, and none of them had done well. The fact is that our 
politicals are a very poor lot...They are devoid of any real energy." Dufferin to Lord Cross. Foreign 
Department, Sec. E, Pros. 89, 16 April 1888, NAI. 
' ' The scheme proposed the appointment of a consultative Council, composed of a President, a Vice 
President, three Members and a Secretary. The Maharaja chose himself to be the President of the proposed 
Council. Gadru. Kashmir Papers, pp. 219-21. 
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reorganization, they made a forgone conclusion that the scheme would likely prove a 
failure, "partly on account of His Highness's personal character and partly for ether 
reasons".^ *' The British government, however, decided "to allow the Maharaja a fijrther 
opportunity of showing whether he [was] competent to discharge the duties of a 
responsible ruler."^* 
The India Office was more skeptical about the success of the new arrangement 
but admittedly their official attitude seconded the Government of India's decision, 
however, with the apt remark that if the present arrangement failed, and it became 
necessary "[tjhereafter to remove the Maharaja as incapable of ruling his State, it w[ould] 
not be possible to charge the Indian Government with acting in an arbitrary manner or 
without having giving Maharaja every chance of showing that he possessed the will and 
capacity to govern his Kingdom wisely".^  
Matters really came to a head during the tenure of Colonel Parry Nisbet—who 
succeeded Plowden as the Resident of Jammu and Kashmir— when a batch of 34 letters, 
allegedly written by Maharaja Pratap Singh, disclosing his treasonable correspondence 
with Russia and of plotting the assassination of Plowden, the erstwhile Resident, as also 
of his own brothers, the Rajas Ram Singh and Amar Singh,^ ^ "fell" in the hands of 
Nisbet.*' Nisbet submitted matter to Lord Lansdowne, the Viceroy, who instructed that 
Nisbet should first hold a full inquiry into the matter. But the Resident was in no mood to 
" Ibid., pp. 222-3. Emphasis mine. 
'' Ibid. 
' ' The Secretary of State to the Government of India, October 12, 1888, The abstract of the correspondence 
cited in Gadru, Kashmir Papers, pp. 226-7. 
*'" Of late there had developed animosity between the Maharaja and his two brothers. 
" Mridu Rai, Hindu Rulers Muslim Subjects, p. 137; Chose, Kashmir in Transition, p. 81. 
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make any ftirther investigation, and urged Durand, the Foreign Secretary to the 
Government of India, to take his word for it that the letters were undoubtedly genuine. He 
ftirther wrote that "it [would] be politically dangerous to leave the actual administration 
of this great State in the hands of an individual who may play us false at any moment, 
without, perhaps, appreciating the disaster that would follow"^^ ; so the Government of 
India should, without any further delay, directly interfere into the affairs of Jammu and 
Kashmir. 
The Government of India concurred with the observations of their man-on-the-
spot and decided to divest Maharaja Pratap Singh of ail his powers. The Maharaja was 
presented with an irshad (order) which forced him to "voluntarily" abdicate his powers to 
govern even while he was allowed to continue as the titular chief of the state. A State 
Council, whose members were appointed by the Government of India, was formed to 
take over the administration of the state of Jammu and Kashmir. The Council consisted of 
the Maharaja's two brothers. Ram Singh and Amar Singh, two of his ministers. Pandit 
Suraj Koul and Rai Bahadur Bhag Ram, and a British officer nominated by the 
Government of India. And although the Council was given full powers of administration, 
it was "expected to exercise these...under the guidance of the Resident... [taking] no step 
of importance without consulting him, and follow[ing] his advice whenever it may be 
offered"." 
The decision of stripping the Maharaja of his powers was not based on mere 
evidence of the letters, but there was more to this action on the part of the British 
*^  Gadru. Kashmir Papers, pp. 230-1. 
" Foreign Dept., Sec. E, Pros. August 1889/ nos. 80-98, NAI. See also, Digby, Condemned Unheard, p. 
156. 
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government. As it has already been mentioned that the Secretary of State and the 
Resident Plowden had a year before made it clear that they had serious reservations about 
the Maharaja's ability to rule citing his failure of implementing the reforms he had 
promised at the time of his accession. '^' The correspondence between Col. Nisbet and the 
several officials of the British Indian government also shows that the Indian authorities 
had already made up their mind to dethrone the Maharaja. Lansdowne and Durand 
attached little importance to the "episode of letters". They thought that the discovery of 
these letters just betrayed the "incapacity [of the maharaja] to govern th[e] State". The 
Viceroy believed that the "episode of letters" should make the occasion for a radical 
change in the state, though not its main justification. He made it clear that whatever the 
measures taken, they should be adopted on grounds of protracted misgovernment ir the 
state.^ ^ It was in regard to "the interests of the people of Kashmir, and for the ruling 
family itself that the colonial government "no longer [considered] it right or possible to 
leave the affairs in the hands of the Maharaja."^^ In the light of the aforementioned 
correspondence, the British government appeared to have decided to deprive the 
Maharaja of all effective authority almost a year before the actual "abdication". They 
were just looking for an opportunity which the forged letters provided. In this way 
Jammu and Kashmir virtually passed under the direct control of Government of India. 
The news of the Maharaja's deposition generated a mixed reaction in diffeient 
quarters. Some Anglo-Indian newspapers supported the official line while as the Indian 
press criticized the action as "unethical, outrageous and uncalled for" and attacked the 
^ Digby, Condemned Unheard, pp. 146-7. 
" Foreign Dept., Sec. E, April 1889, Pros. 80-89, K.W.I., NAI. 
*^ Government of India to the Secretary of State for India, Fort William, dated 3 April 1889, reproduced in 
William Digby, Kashmir Papers, pp. 155-6. 
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irsahad (order) which forced Pratap Singh to abdicate the throne. Amrita Bazar Patrika 
even published an article which concluded that "His Highness was deposed not because 
he...oppressed his people, but because Gilgit was wanted for strategical purposes by the 
British Government."*^ Charles Bradlaugh, the member of the House of Commons in 
England, and William Digby of the Indian Political Agency, demanded that an enquiry 
should be made by a Select Committee in to the circumstances which led to the 
resignation of Maharaja Pratap Singh.*^ Bradlaugh even moved the adjournment in the 
House of Commons on the question of Maharaja's suppression. He asked a series of 
questions regarding this matter. He complained that the Maharaja had been condemned 
unheard in spite of his appeal to the Government of India for a fair trial.'''' 
The Maharaja appealed to the British Indian government for the restoration of his 
powers. The Maharaja complained that he had been "extremely misrepresented to the 
Government of India by his enemies, chiefly, Amar Singh." He appealed to the Viceroy 
"to give [him] a fair trial in order to see what [he] is capable of doing for the fiirtherance 
of the interests of the Supreme Government and the prosperity of [his] State... provided 
[he is] allowed full strength and independence to choose [his] own councilors and 
'^  Pioneer and Civil and Militaiy Gazette supported the action while as Akhbar-i-Am and Amrita Bazar 
Patrika vehemently denounced the government action; A Minute on Gilgit Defence by Sir Mortimer 
Durand was also reproduced in the article which was published in Amrita Bazar Patrika. 3 October 1889. 
p. 6. 
'* William Digby wrote a long letter to U.K. Shuttleworth, sometime the Under Secretary of State for India. 
The letter, mainly a resume, in defence of the Dogras, is reappraisal of the British policy of aggrandizement 
which finally led to the deposition of Maharaja Pratap Singh. The letter took the form of a book when it 
was published under the title "Condemned Unheard", in 1890. Gadru, Kashmir Papers, p. xxxv. 
' ' The series of questions asked in the house, their replies and the other relevant documents have been 
reproduced in William Digby, Condemned Unheard pp. 30-40. 
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ministers,...and British Resident [should] support and strength [his] hands".™ However, 
the reply from the Government of India was somewhat different. Lord Lansdowne 
communicated to the Maharaja that there was no sufficient reason that would justify a 
reversal of the decision of the Government of India. He made it clear to Pratap Singh that 
he was satisfied with the intervention of the paramount power. The Viceroy, therefore, 
advised him to accept the decision and "entreat [His] Highness to show to the people of 
Kashmir, as well as to the Government of India, by bearing in a dignified manner the loss 
of power which [he had] sustained." The Viceroy informed Pratap Singh thai the 
arrangement was "not a permanent one", but his restoration would "depend upon [his] 
own conduct in the meanwhile". '^ 
Maharaja Pratap Singh spent sixteen years appealing to the British Indian 
government for the restoration of his powers. On the eve of the visit of Lord Lansdowne 
to Kashmir in October 1891, the Resident in Kashmir suggested that some powers of 
Maharaja could be restored provided he promised to be guided by the Resident in all the 
matters.''^  Accordingly, he was offered the presidentship of the Council which he readily 
accepted. In 1902, the viceroy. Lord Curzon, while not out-rightly rejecting the 
Maharaja's requests, had repeated that the full restitution would depend on the Maharaja 
himself" 
Maharaja of Kashmir to Marquess of Lansdowne, May 14, 1889, reproduced in Digby, Condemned 
Unheard, pp. 171-2. 
" The Governor-General of India to the Maharaja of Kashmir, June 28, 1889, reproduced in Digby. 
Condemned Unheard, p. 176. 
'^  Speech of Prideaux quoted in The Times of India, 26 Oct, 1891. 
" Foreign Department, (Secret E)/ Pros. December 1902/no. 112, NAl. 
no 
In 1905 the Council was finally abolished when Maharaja was empowered to 
appoint his ministers in consultation with, and the final approval of the Government of 
India. He was still bound not to take any "step of importance without consulting [the 
Resident]"/^ The powers of the Maharaja were fully restored to him in 1924. Though the 
British Resident continued to remain stationed at the Kashmir Darbar till the British 
vacated the Indian subcontinent, but he was marginalized to a great extent. The readiness, 
with which the Government of India relaxed their grip over the administration of Jammu 
and Kashmir, was actuated by a new dimension which the politics of India had assumed. 
The British were frantically building the princely states into a powerful bulwark against 
the Indian national movement which had now entered a decisive phase of its 
development. 
Impact of the British Ascendancy: The Land Settlement, Commerce, Educational 
Reforms 
The British ascendancy on the political affairs of Jammu and Kashmir was 
presented not merely as a strategic move to protect the British Indian Empire, but to 
alleviate the misery of the people of Kashmir by reforming the administration. Soon after 
its establishment, the Residency persuaded the Maharaja to accept a land settlement in the 
valley of Kashmir. In 1887, A. Wingate was appointed to carry out this much-needed 
task. It is here that the significance of British perception of the economic structures of 
Kashmir becomes apparent. Following from the traditions of the colonial government in 
British India throughout the nineteenth century, Wingate made a strong argument in favor 
'"' Documents relating to the Abolition of the State Council, File No. 15 of 1905, Kashmir Government 
Records. Jammu and Kashmir Archives, .lammu. 
Ill 
of granting occupancy rights to Kashmiri peasants. According to him, the land revenue 
system in place in the Valley had left the coffers of the state empty because of the 
existence of the class of officials between the state and the peasantry. Additionally, t had 
created an itinerant peasantry with no interest in cultivating the land. Therefore, the 
Commission suggested, to replenish revenue, and to convert a discontented and thriftless 
peasantry into a contented, thriving community, peasants had to be given interest in the 
land they cultivated. To achieve this, Wingate argued, it was necessary to fix the state 
demand at a fair sum for a term of years and a system of accounts established v hich 
would confine the powers of the tehsildars to revenue collection.^' Another aspect cf the 
changes suggested by Wingate, which was to have far reaching consequences fo- the 
social structure of the city of Srinagar, was the release of the grain market frorr the 
monopoly of the State. Wingate clearly disagreed with the collection of revenue in kind, 
which allowed for the State to fix prices of grain and act as the sole grain trader ir the 
Valley. According to him, the price oi shall (unhusked rice) had to rise and fall with the 
outturn of the harvest, because as soon as it got scarce, huge profits were made by the 
officials in charge of collection. However, although he proposed in his settlement rules 
tor the Valley that the settlement should be made in cash, Wingate allowed for the Darbar 
"upon report by the Settlement Officer to accept whole or part of the assessment in shall 
under defined conditions..."''^ Wingate suggested that the settlement rules declare the 
state as ultimate proprietor, and at the same time confer the right of occupancy on all 
persons entered as occupants at the time of settlement yamaftawc^ / (assessment).^ ^ It is 
essential to note that Wingate's arguments were designed to bolster the authority of the 
A. ^'mgaie. Preliminary Report of Settlement Operations in Kashmir and Jammu, (Lahore: 1888), p. ?4 
''ibid., p. 18. 
" Ibid., 34. 
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state through the foundation of a peasantry willing to pay land revenue and determined to 
defend their lands against encroachments. 
Walter Lawrence, who took over from Wingate as Settlement Commissioner in 
1890, followed the principles introduced by his predecessor in the land settlement of the 
Valley. According to the Lawrence Settlement, as it came to be known, permanent 
hereditary occupancy rights were bestowed on every person who, at the time of 
assessment or at the time when the distribution of assessments was effected, agreed to 
pay the assessment fixed on the fields entered in his or her name in the settlement 
papers.''* And so long as the assessment was paid, the occupant could not be ejected. 
However, the right to occupancy was not alienable by sale or mortgage. He argued that 
giving cultivators the right to alienate their land would create a class of middlemen who 
would procure land for themselves and rich urban individuals. He records that he "c[a]me 
across cases where whole villages [had] been sold for paltry sum of Rs. 50 and Rs. 60." 
This persuaded him to form a strong opinion that "the Kashmiri cultivators [did] not yet 
understand the value of land or rights in land, [and he], therefore, fear[ed] that the right to 
sell or to mortgage land would be the signal for extensive alienations; and that in a few 
years large properties would be acquired either by the officials, or by the more influential 
Musalman lambardars"^^ "I hold strongly", wrote Lawrence, "that the State should 
avoid, as far as possible, the creation of middlemen, and 1 regard the proposal to give the 
rights of sale and mortgage to ignorant and inexperienced cultivators as the surest way 
'* The Settlement entered only cultivated land as in the occupancy of the assamis; the waste and fallow 
lands being recorded as khalsa, or State land. Out of this waste-land, however, 10% was to be left for 
collective usage, such as grazing. Lawrence, The Valley of Kashmir, p. 427. 
' ' Lambardar, or the village headman, was responsible for collecting the revenue under his control; was 
paid 5 per cent of the total revenue collected. Lawrence, The Valley of Kashmir, p. 447. 
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towards the creation of the middlemen".*" He advised that "the Darbar should not bestow 
the right to sell, mortgage, or transfer until it [was] satisfied that the occupants [were] 
capable of properly using this right." 
Further, the revenue assessment was fixed for a period of ten years, to bt paid 
partly in cash and partly in kind, depending on the produce of the village. Lawrence 
stressed in his assessment report that the revenue should be wholly in cash, but he faced a 
strong opposition by the Dogra administration. It appears that there were two reasons for 
the officials and the influential classes to fiercely oppose a cash settlement. The first 
reason was that the collection of revenue in kind gave employment to a large number of 
Pandits (Kashmiri Hindus), and also gave them great opportunities for perquisites and 
peculation. The men who were responsible for the collection of revenue (at village level) 
took sometimes as much as one-fifth in excess of the legal state demand. Further, they 
would adulterate the grain on its way to Srinagar.^ ^ The class of revenue officials, thus, 
had the reason to oppose the land settlement of the Valley. These officials had '^ een 
reduced—by the new assessment—from all powerful individuals with huge amounts of 
grain and land under their control, to mere bureaucrats in the employ of the State.*^ 
The second reason for the Dogra Darbar's opposition was the issue of the supply 
of grain to the city of Srinagar. The city population which was mainly associated with the 
shawl trade and was an important source of the state income was supplied with cheap 
*" Lawrence, The Valley of Kashmir, pp. 429-30. 
*' Ibid., p.432. 
'^  Ibid., pp. 438-9. 
*' Wingate liad predicted the opposition of the official class to settlement rules that attached the peasantry 
to the land. Wingate, Preliminary Report of Settlement Operations in Kashmir andJammn. p. 32. 
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grains by the state.^ " However, by the time Lawrence took over as the Settlement OfTicer, 
the shawl trade was on the decline; but the city people who were accustomed to get the 
shall at cheap rates demanded the supply of cheap grains to continue. The financial crisis 
due to the declining shawl trade had further made them dependable on the state. This 
prompted the Dogra administration to decline the proposal of Lawrence to accept a 
purely cash settlement.^ ^ 
Besides the actual cultivated land the people possessed other assets which had 
always been liable to taxation by the state, such as walnut trees, fruit trees, apricots and 
apricot oil, and honey. Lawrence made a provision in his settlement that the taxes on all 
these items should be included in the land revenue, except the pony and sheep taxes. 
Additionally, Lawrence attempted to reform the system of collection, storage and sale of 
state grain.^ ^ 
In the first round of the settlement only the khalisa (state owned) land in Kashmir 
was assessed. The jagir lands came under assessment only in the mid-1890s when Capt. 
J. L. Kaye was appointed as the Settlement Commissioner. He laid down the rules for 
*'' '"In 1871 there were some 24,000 persons employed in tlie manufacture of shawls. In that year the value 
of the land revenue taken in kind was Rs. 16, 93,077, and the revenue taken in cash was only Rs. 9, 62,057. 
But the state derived revenue of 6, 00,000 from taxation on shawls and Rs. 1, 13,916 from taxes on city 
shopkeepers. From a financial point of view there were some excuses for taking a large proportion of the 
land revenue in kind. The losses attending collections in kind were more than balanced by the handsome 
income so easily collected from the shawl-workers". Lawrence, The Valley of Kashmir, pp. 440-1. 
'^  From the time immemorial, the state invariably kept a reserve of grain for the town of Srinagar, making 
supplies at rates far below the market price of staples. Depending on the bounty of the state, the people 
naturally neglected to avail themselves of the benefits of the self-help, and their happiness was centered in 
the fullness of the state godowns and the readiness with which supplies were issued from them. LauTcncc. 
The Valley of Kashmir, pp. 440-1. 
"' Lawrence, The Valley of Kashmir, pp. 437-43. 
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governing jagir lands in Kashmir.^ ^ This resulted in the curtailment of the powers of the 
jagirdars and the revenue farmers (in whose hands the estates of jagirdars had fallen). 
Kaye clearly suggested the active interference of the state in jagir holdings, along with 
specifying the status of jagirdars and the tenants on these holdings. Sanads, or land deeds 
were now to be prepared for each jagir, which specified its precise area and value, the 
term for which, and the conditions under which the grant had been made. Jagirdars, it was 
stated, were no more than mere assignees of state revenue, and the tenants in jagir tracts 
were as much tenants of the Darbar and entitled to protection as any of its other 
subjects.^ ^ Jagirdars, on the other hand, were not given occupancy or proprietary rights to 
their estates. The report argued that the jagirdar, to whom the revenue derived from 
certain lands had been assigned by the Darbar, could not possibly be a tenant: 'The 
jagirdar stands in place of the Darbar as the collector or assignee of this revenue 
*' Jagirdars formed part of the steadily declining landed elite of the Kashmir Valley. There were several 
reasons for this decline, all of which were related to economic conditions of the pre-settlement period. The 
jagirdars had farmed out their lands to revenue farmers, which ultimately seems to have led to severe 
indebtedness and the impoverishment of the jagir lands. Additionally, the State had lost control ove the 
parceling out of the jagir lands, and over the ways in which they were inherited. This had led to the division 
of jagir lands among the numerous heirs of a certain jagirdar without reference to any rule. Zutshi. 
Languages of Belonging, p. 95. 
** Colonial officials in British India regarded jagir lands as most detrimental to the interests ot the 
agriculturists, particularly when fanned out to revenue contractors, which according to them, led to an 
internal confusion of village tenures. Jagirdars in Kashmir had also assigned portions of their lands to 
revenue farmers. Additionally, the state had lost control over the parceling out of jagir lands, and over the 
ways in which they were inherited. This had led to the division of jagir lands among the numerous heirs of 
a certain jagirdar without reference to any rule. According to the settlement officials, thus, jagirs had been 
fragmented into several small holdings run by jagirdars who had no influence or respect. 
Although the British presented this as a recent phenomenon that was ruining jagir lands, there are several 
instances of jagirdars farming their lands out to revenue contractors during the Mughal period. In fact, ir 
1694, it was reported to the Mughal emperor that some of his mansabdars, who had jagirs in Kashmir, vere 
farming them on to local men. Although the Mughal court disapproved of this practice, there was nothing 
to prevent a jagirdar from sub-assigning part of his jagir to any of his officials or troopers. See Irfan Habib. 
The Agrarian System of Mughal India, 1556-1707, (Bombay: 1963), pp. 328-29. 
J.L. Kaye, Note on the Assessment Report on the Minor Jagir Villages situated in the Valley of Kashmir, 
(Lahore: 1897), p. 14-7. 
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only...Under the grant he has absolutely no connection with the land, only with the 
revenue derived from it."^ *^  Just as the Darbar could not be its own tenant in Khalisa 
(state owned) villages, according to Kaye, so too jagirdars could not claim occupancy 
rights that belonged to peasants. Furthermore, Kaye mentioned that jagirdars had no right 
to collect taxes or to make the villagers pay for items of expenditure which were purely 
personal, thus cutting short the formidable list of taxes extracted by jagirdars from their 
peasants. In the same tone, the report also denied jagirdars any right to the wastelands 
that they had included with their original grants over the years.^' 
Thus, Capt. J.L. Kaye's assessment of jagirs brought all jagir lands in line with 
the land settlement in the rest of Kashmir Valley. Jagirdars had been curbed and the 
revenue famers had been rendered ineffective. The conferral of occupancy rights on 
cultivators effectively curbed the powers of the jagirdars' to evict them at will. 
The significance of state intervention in jagir lands under the British ascendancy 
lies in the fact that it threatened the financial and social bases of the Kashmiri landed elite 
for the first time, replacing them with a non-Kashmiri, predominantly Hindu landholding 
class. Colonial records, such as the 1901 census, recorded that many landed families of 
note had lost wealth as a result of the "better administration", which had led to a loss of 
their power and influence, "birth alone, nowadays, being no qualification for employment 
in the civil service of the State."'^ 
""ibid, p. 13. 
" Ibid. 
'^  Khan Bahadur Munshi Ghulam Ahmed Khan, Census of India. 1901, Vol. XXIH. Kashmir. Part I. Report 
(Lahore: 1902). p. 9. 
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The Kashmiri peasantry, on the other hand, seems to have benefitted to some 
extent from the settlement, and the Village gradually claimed its position in the economy 
of the State. Several writings from the period note the increasing prosperity cf the 
peasantry as a result of the settlement. Though the description given by Lawrence ma> be 
an exaggeration, '^' the assertion that the peasantry was firmly established in this period 
can hardly be denied. The confidence inspired by the conferral of occupancy rights on 
assamis led to a gradual return of fugitives to their lands, not only from other villages in 
Kashmir but also from the Punjab.^ ** Deserted villages, we are being told, were resettled 
as whole families returned to till their lands. A contemporary account places the number 
of families returning from the Punjab in particular village to be at 23. More and more 
waste lands were cultivated, "fields fenced, orchards planted, vegetable gardens stocked 
and mills constructed".'^ The 1901 census noted that the cultivators were better off than 
before and enjoyed peace and prosperity as a result of the settlement and considerable 
areas had been converted into flourishing fields during the last decade. Not only was the 
'^  Walter Lawrence mentions that after the settlement operations "'Kashmir is now more prosperous and 
more ftiliy cultivated. The agriculturists, who used to wander from one village to another in quest of t le fair 
treatment and security which they never found, are now settled down to their lands and permanentl) 
attached to their ancestral villages. The revenue is often paid up before the date on which it falls due, and 
whereas in 1884 it was necessary to maintain a force of... soldiers for the collection of the revenue, now 
the tehsil chaprasi (peon) rarely visits a village. Every assami knows his revenue liabilities in cash ind in 
kind, and he quickly and successftilly resists any attempt to extort more than the amount entered in his 
revenue-book. The annual dread that sufficient food-grain would not be left for the support of himself and 
his family has ceased, and the agricultural classes of Kashmir are...at the present time as well off in the 
matter of food and clothing as any agriculturalists in the world." Lawrence, The Valley of Kashmr. pp. 
450-1. These statements are certainly highly exaggerated because if the settlement led to so much 
improvement in the condition of the peasantry, why would there be resentment among them even atter the 
settlement restored to them their just rights? In fact, we see that the people launched movements to redress 
their economic and political grievances during the late 19"' century and by the turn of the ZO"" century, 
'•* Ibid., p. 433. 
D.N. Dhar, Socio-Economic History of the Kashmir Peasantry, From Ancient Times to the Presen, Day. 
(Srinagar: 1989), p. 153. 
'"' Old English Records 34/189, Jammu and Kashmir State Archives, Jammu. 
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peasant not at the mercy of the revenue officials, but he was in a position to sell his 
surplus grain to urban grain traders, thus entering the sphere of legitimate and lucrative 
trade. More importantly, peasants were now a recognizable class whose interests 
became the focal point of movements that were to emerge in Kashmir at the turn of the 
twentieth century. 
It is essential to note, however, that the reforms initiated under the auspices of the 
British colonial government made the peasantry as well as the urban poor more 
vulnerable to the market. If the peasantry had been released from the grip of the officials, 
payment of revenue in cash meant that it was now connected to the larger economic 
system, and affected by its downturns and upturns. The new settlement made the peasants 
the tenants of the state by officially converting their hereditary rights into occupancy 
rights, liable to being ejected from their land and losing their occupancy rights if they 
were unable to pay the revenue. Moreover, the access of the shawl weavers to cheap 
grain was further restricted as the state began to lose control over the grain trade. The 
artisans, for their part, not only lost access to cheap State grain, but were now at the 
mercy of grain traders, who now stood between the consumer and the market. The 
economic system of the Valley had been transformed from a tightly controlled state 
monopoly into a market-driven system, which the Dogra state found impossible to direct. 
The direct British interference also influenced the other aspects of the life of 
people in Jammu and Kashmir. The State was by no means either economically or 
culturally isolated from the outside world prior to the establishment of the Residency and 
the deposition of Maharaja Pratap Singh. A brisk trade in commodities such as salt, cloth, 
" Khan, Census of India, 1901, p. 10. 
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tea, metals, and tobacco was carried on by the people of Jammu and Kashmir as the\ 
migrated seasonally particularly between the Kashmir Valley and the plain.^  of the 
Punjab. However, it was the opening of the Jhelum Valley Cart Road cornecting 
Kashmir to the Punjab, to wheeled traffic in 1890, which led to an almost instantaneous 
increase in trade with British India. Silk, having replaced the shawls in the export-
economy of Kashmir, became a commodity of increasing value at the turn of the century. 
In 1890, the State took over the direct control of the industry to establish t on a 
commercial footing and by 1900 it had become clear that Kashmir could produce silk on 
a large scale.^ ^ The nature and volume of trade from Jammu and Kashmir had undergone 
a major transformation, leading to a period of urban growth. Trade, coupled v\ ith the 
construction of the cart road and the Gilgit road, and a steady increase in tourism to 
Kashmir, led to an influx of money into the State. 
However, these developments did not usher in a period of peace, and conflicts 
within and between communities escalated in this period. Despite the rhetoric of 
prosperity, not everyone was prosperous. The landed elite, as has already been pointed 
out, lost economic and political influence in the wake of the land settlement. Moreover, 
revenue officials, mostly Pandits, not only lost their traditional occupations to outsiders 
with the establishment of the State Council and the influx of Punjabis in the State they 
were also unable to profit from their positions as a result of the regulation of the revenue 
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system. 
Zutshi, Languages of Belonging, pp. 101-3. 
"" Lawrence, The Valley of Kashmir, p. 303. 
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Educational Reforms 
The system of education in Jammu and Kashmir prior to the late nineteenth 
century was informal and indigenous. Under this system, Pandits and Moulvis imparted 
education to local Hindu and Muslim boys in pathshalas and madrasas, respectively.'°*^ 
The early Dogra rulers, placed at the head of the newly established state of Jammu and 
Kashmir, did not interest themselves in the educational affairs of the people. Gulab 
Singh, the first Dogra Maharaja, was too busy in consolidating his dominions to pay 
much attention to the educational status of his subjects. Although, Maharaja Ranbir 
Singh, his successor, was first to take an active interest in education and made some 
feeble attempts at founding a few state-supported institutions, the system of education 
continued to be unregulated and religious."^' There was no concerted effort on the part of 
the government to promote education among the mass of population. In fact, the 
government was opposed to the schools established by the Christian Missionary Society 
in Srinagar in 1880. It is obvious that in this period the State did not consider education 
either its responsibility or a priority.'*^^ 
It was after the establishment of the British ascendancy in Kashmir that some 
reform measures were initiated in the field of education. The state government could no 
longer follow a policy of non-intervention in matters of education as the reigns of the 
administration were now in the hands of the British. There were a few attempts made by 
the State Council—which was constituted after the deposition of Maharaja—to improve 
"'° Pandit was a title given to a Brahman learned in Hindu texts; he used to teach in schools referred to as 
pathshalas. A Muslim religious teacher learned in religious texts was known as moulvi; he used to run 
schools known as madrasas. Tyndale Biscoe, Kashmir in Sunlight & Shade, (London: 1922), p. 253. 
'°' The number of educational institutions in the entire state in 1872-73 remained only 44. Sufi, Kashir, vol. 
11, pp. 790-1; Hari Om, Muslims of Jammu and Kashmir: A Study in the Spread of Education and 
Consciousness, 1857-1925, (New Delhi: 1986), p. 21. 
'"^  Zutshi, Languages of Belonging, pp. 172-3. 
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the educational system of Jammu and Kashmir. The administration report of 1890-91 
noted the lack of proper school buildings and methods of teaching in the schools and the 
need for opening more primary schools. A few primary schools were established b> the 
Council, with the number rising from 8 to 31 during 1891-92.'°^ There \vas a 
corresponding increase in the number of students in town and village schools from 836 in 
1889-90 to 4214 in 1892-93.'°'* The Council also took steps to encourage private 
enterprise to promote education. Bhag Ram, the Home and Judicial member-in-charge of 
the state education department, went to the extent of appealing to the private purses of the 
Maharaja, the Resident, the members of the Council by asking them to "to prove \ ery 
liberal... for subscribing to education". ^ 
Although some steps were taken following the British intervention to impro\ e the 
educational standards of the people in Jammu and Kashmir, the State Council, in the 
initial years of its rule, did not make any serious attempt to reform the educational sector 
of Jammu and Kashmir. The reason for this inaction was that the State did not feel the 
necessity to educate the local masses. The purpose for the introduction of modern 
education among the native subjects in British India was to create a class that could help 
with the task of administering the vast country. Contrarily, this urgency was not felt in 
Jammu and Kashmir as the State simply imported these individuals, particularly from 
Punjab, to run its growing bureaucracy."'^  Even the State Council was composed almost 
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Administrative report of Jammu and Kashmir State, 1890-91, p. 99. 
Administrative report of Jammu and Kashmir State, 1892-93, p. 72. 
'"^  Ibid., p. 72. 
'°* Commenting on the importation of the Kashmir bureaucracy, P. N. Bazaz made a scathing re!narl<: 
"Armies of outsiders trailed behind the officers from the plains with no more interest than to draw as inuch 
as they could, and then to depart leaving behind their kindred as successors to continue the drain; ant thus 
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entirely of Indians imported from British India; and it followed a policy of recruiting 
Dogras and other Punjabis to run all branches of the administration. The replacement of 
Persian with Urdu as the language of administration in 1889 further justified the 
importation of Punjabis into the state administration.'"^ As late as 1909, the Resident in 
Kashmir, Sir Francis Younghusband was to admit that there was a distinct tendency 
among these Punjabi officials of the state to "secure Kashmir not for the Kashmiris... but 
for the Punjabis and the other Indians"."'^ 
However, by the early twentieth century, the State Council under the auspices of 
the British Residency began to present itself as the promoter of education among the local 
population of the State. The schools in the state were reorganized along the lines of the 
Punjab University syllabus and affiliated to the University. An Arts college was 
established at Jammu in 1905 to commemorate the royal visit of the Prince of Wales. The 
government set up a Normal School in Srinagar in 1906, and opened girl's schools in 
several parts of the state. The government also instituted a number of college scholarships 
for the students of the State studying in Punjab. Dr. Annie Besant started a Hindu College 
in Srinagar in 1905, which was taken over by the government in 1911 and renamed Sri 
Pratap College. By the second decade of the twentieth century education had become one 
was established a hierarchy in the services with the result that profits and wealth passed into the hands of 
the outsiders". Bazaz, The History of Struggle for Freedom in Kashmir, p. 135. 
"" One of the first steps taken by the State Council after its institution in 1889 was to replace Persian with 
Urdu as the language of administration, the language being imported alongside numerous administrative 
servants from neighboring British Punjab. Administration Report of Jammu and Kashmir State. 1893-94. p. 
46. 
"" Zutshi, Languages of belonging, pp. 176-7. 
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of the most expressive indicators of the greater economic and political integrat on of 
Jammu and Kashmir with British India. 
By the first decade of the twentieth century, however, it became clear that the 
State failed to impart education to the vast majority of its subjects because it consdered 
education to be the preserve of the upper class. The Dogra State seemed to have imported 
the colonial educational system along with its ideological content."" The state did not 
focus much on the education of the common masses who happened to be the Muslims, 
while the administrative class which largely consisted of the Punjabi Hindu and Kashmiri 
Pandits, reaped the maximum fruits of the educational policies launched by the Dogra 
state under the guidance of the British Indian government." 
'"" Ibid., pp. 178-9. 
"" The Dogra State's policies in the field of education in the late nineteenth century can only be understood 
in terms of the British colonial project of education. Education had become central to the project of 
colonialism in British India by the early nineteenth century. If the empire that had already been won b\ the 
urban bourgeoisie had to be preserved for profit, then the dominant groups in Indian society hac to be 
included in the colonial enterprise. This involved a creation of a civil society among the natives and iheir 
inculcation into the ethos, rules and symbols of the new order, which could only be achie\ed tiirough 
education. Education thus had a significant role to play in the transformation of a commercial institution 
into a colonial state. The changes in the educational system introduced in the early nineteenth centur/ were 
part of this process. For instance, Persian was abolished in official correspondence in 1835 and the 
government's weight was thrown behind English-medium education. At the same time, the idea of different 
types of education for different classes came to define the Brifish educational system in India. Krishna 
Kumar, Political Agenda of Education: A Study of Colonialist and Nationalist Ideas, (New Delhi: 1991). 
pp. 24-6, quoted in Chitralekha Zutshi, British Intervention in a Princely Stale: The Case of Jamnu and 
Kashmir in the Late-Nineteenth and Early-Twentieth Centuries, Paper presented at the 18* Euiopean 
Conference on Modern South Asian Studies, 2004, p. 12. As propounded by J.S. Mill and Macauii y. the 
elite would gain western education through the English language and the rest of the population would be 
consigned to, if anything, studying their own languages, while receiving western ideas from thi- elite 
through "downward filtration." See; Gauri Viswanathan, Masks of Conquest: Llteraiy Study and British 
Rule in India, (New York: 1989), p. 149. 
Private institutions were growing at a much faster rate than the public educational institutions n this 
period. For instance, while the number of public institutions for males and females from 1901-04 increased 
by 24, the number of private institutions increased by 75 in the same period. This also shows the lack of 
enthusiasm on the part of the government for the mass education. See Zutshi, British Intervention in a 
Princely State, p. 16. 
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The State's focus on class in defining the role of education in Kashmiri society 
meant that the majority of the Kashmiri population remained out of the state-backed 
education system. The Kashmiri Muslim leadership recognized that the Muslim 
community, a majority in the state and yet forming an extremely small proportion of the 
educated, stood much to lose by being excluded from this state-sponsored education 
system. " The leadership recognized that the Dogra state was not interested in promoting 
education among the Kashmiris because it did not desire to appoint them to government 
positions. The traditional system of education was no longer enough if Muslims were to 
be integrated into the state education department. The task of reforming society entailed 
in awakening people to the benefits of modern education. The first leader who took upon 
himself to reform the Kashmiri Muslim community through his activities on the 
educational front was Mirwaiz Rasool Shah, head preacher at the Jama Masjid in 
Srinagar. He founded the Anjuman Nusrat-ul-Islam, literally meaning the Society for the 
Victory of Islam. A school was soon attached to the Society. Similar moves were made 
by the heads of various shrines to establish schools within a few years of the Anjiiman-i-
Nusrat-ul-Islam. Initially the aim of these schools was to provide their students 
traditional Islamic education. The political and economic needs of the time, however, 
dictated that these institutions alter their nature ad project. As a result, the Arijunnw and 
"^ In the year 1891-92, out of a total population of 757, 433 Muslims, only 233 were being educated in the 
State run schools, while out of a population 52, 576 Hindus, 1,327 were receiving state instruction. The 
figures show that the though the Hindus formed less than 7 per cent of the population, they monopolized 
the over 83 per cent of the education bestowed by the state. See Lawrence, The Valley of Kashmir, pp. 228-
29. The figures given by Lawrence did not improve much in the coming years. By the census of 1921, 
there were only 19 educated Muslim males as compared to 508 Hindu males per thousand of population in 
Kashmir province. Mohammad, Census of India, 1921, p. 121. 
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other such type of schools reorganized their course of study that included a tlrm 
grounding in Islamic theology along with a study of secular subjects."^ 
Although, the leadership of the Muslim educational reform movement in Kashmir 
was composed entirely of the religious elite, the discourse of this movement attempted to 
provide for the regeneration of the Muslim community alongside its advancement in 
western education. There are recurrent references to Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan's model of 
educational advancement of the Indian Muslims. The frequent references to Sir Sayvid in 
the discourse of this movement are significant as unlike in British India, when; the 
Deobandi and Farangi Mahali ulema were launching bitter critiques of Sir Sayyid, the 
Kashmiri religious elite had appropriated his methods as a model for the educationa' and 
ultimately the economic advancement of the Kashmiri Muslim community.' ''* 
The advent of the British on the political scene of Jammu and Kashmir and the 
simultaneous state regulation of the education system had given the Kashmiri Muslim 
leadership the opportunity to press its social and political demands on the state. Since the 
Dogra state was modeling its education system on British lines, it also followed that those 
who went through the system would be advantageously placed for state employment. 
Thus, the informal system of indigenous education that had prevailed in Jammu 
and Kashmir before the ascendancy of the British on the political scene of the State was 
systematically converted into a state-sponsored system, far more centralized ad 
homogenous in nature. But the State's educational policies were not intended to i^ve 
education to the common masses. With the result, majority of the population which 
Zutshi, British Intervention in a Princely State, p. 18. 
"" Zutshi, Languages of Belonging, pp. 186-7. 
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consisted of the Muslims continued to be submerged in the depths of illiteracy. In the 
coming decades, the backwardness of Muslims in the field of education, and the 
insistence on state recognition of Muslims as a separate category in the field, became 
central components of the Kashmiri Muslim leadership's appeals to the Residency, and 
after the return of powers to Maharaja Pratap Singh in 1924, directly to the colonial state. 
Conclusion 
The defeat of the Sikhs in the Second Anglo-Sikh War finally sealed any prospect 
of the Punjab being an independent empire and the boundaries of the British Indian 
Empire were now directly touching the territories of Jammu and Kashmir. This changing 
geo-political scenario made the British authorities to pursue their policies which would 
suit the best interests of their Indian Empire. Consequently, the focus of the British policy 
now shifted directly towards Jammu and Kashmir. The mal-administration of the 
Kashmir Darbar, the British failure in the Afghan war of 1878, the ruthless criticism of 
the Anglo-Indian and British press of the Governments' policies, particularly of the 
Kashmir Government in the famine of 1877, and the political nature of the activities of 
the Officer on Special Duty provided a pretext to the British Indian authorities to provide 
for "efficient" political ascendency and supervision in Jammu and Kashmir which 
manifested itself in the establishment of the British Residency in Kashmir in 1885 and 
stripping the Maharaja of all his powers in 1889. The British ascendancy exposed the 
state structures to the British influences. The land revenue settlements created a settled 
class of peasantry which played a prominent role in the movements that were launched in 
Kashmir at a later stage. With the British intervention in Kashmir, the trading activities 
with British India received a boost which in turn brought the Kashmiri elite closer to their 
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counterparts in colonial India and provided much needed financial, moral and physical 
support for their endeavors on socio-political fronts. The half-hearted attempts by the 
State Council to reform the educational sector in turn helped create an environme it for 
the Kashmiri leadership to launch the educational reform movements. It was after 
consolidating their position through these educational reform movements tha the 
Kashmiri leadership, with the aid and advice of different political and social 
organizations of British India, particularly the Punjab, began pressuring the state to play a 
more active role to address the socio-economic and political issues of the people of 
Jammu and Kashmir. 
Thus, the appointment of the Resident and removing Maharaja Pratap Singh Vom 
the throne provided the British Indian Government with a firmer control over the 
administration of Jammu and Kashmir. Of course, the measure was dictated much b} the 
imperial considerations as by the internal maladministration in the state. In what waj did 
the establishment of the Residency and the deposition of the Maharaja clear the wa} for 
the imperial British Indian government to implement their comprehensive defence 
scheme without any opposition from the Kashmir Darbar shall be discussed in the next 
chapter. 
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Chapter Five 
Jammu and Kashmir as a Frontline State 
Henry Hardinge, the Governor-General, resolved to exploit the creation of the 
state of Jammu and Kashmir as the chosen instrument of the Government of India for the 
protection of what came to be known as the north-western frontier of the British hidian 
Empire. Although, there was much that the Government of India had yet to learn about 
the north-western frontier, it was somewhat aware of the major features of geo-political 
and commercial importance of the region because of the individual travels of William 
Moorcroft during the early 1820s.' However, the official British exploration of the 
frontier territories of the Kashmir began immediately after its sale to Gulab Singh when 
the Boundary Commissions were dispatched to work out the eastern boundaries cif the 
newly founded state. One of its Commissions fixed the border between Ladakh and 
British-occupied Lahoul and Spiti to the south. Two other commissions, however, failed 
to demarcate the boundary between Ladakh and Tibet due to the non-cooperation from 
Tibet and China. However, Vans Agnew, a member of one of the commissions, 
optimistically observed that "the line was... already sufficiently defined by naturt, and 
recognized by custom, with the exception of its two extremities". But those on the other 
side apparently did not accept the claim.^  Thus, the eastern boundary of Kashmir 
Technically an unofficial traveler, ostensibly concerned with the supply of horses for the East India 
Company, Moorcroft travelled extensively in the north-western border of Indian empire, between 1812 and 
1825, investigating its trade, natural resources and most importantly politics. See, William Moororatl & 
George Trebeck, Travels in the Himalayan Provinces of Hindustan and the Punjab from 1819 to ;825. 2 
vols. (London: 1841, repr.. New Delhi: 1971.) 
^ This long simmering dispute between the government of India and the China finally culminatec in the 
Chinese invasion of Ladakh in 1962. Jammu and Kashmir's eastern limits thus have remained undecided to 
this day. 
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remained undefined. However, the general result of the Boundary Commissions was that 
they explored the frontier regions of Jammu and Kashmir, though there remained a great 
deal to discover about their geo-political potential in the context of the British Indian 
Empire.^  
The new state's frontiers to the north and north-west also remained undefined 
because the Treaty of Amritsar was extremely vague about the exact boundary of the 
state to its north.'* There was a reference in Article 1 to the river Indus, to the "eastward" 
of which lay the state of Jammu and Kashmir.^  But what was the situation to the 
northward of that river, in that the Indus for much of its course through the state ran in a 
generally east-west direction? Here, between the Indus and the unexplored mountain 
crests beyond which lay Eastern Turkistan, there were a number of small states, Chitral, 
Hunza, Nagar, Gilgit, Punial, Dir, Swat, Ishkoman and Yasin, and Chilas. The whole 
region was called Dardistan.'' The key to this whole region was Gilgit. Situated on a river 
flowing into the Indus from the north, Gilgit controlled access to Hunza and the passes 
leading into Eastern Turkistan. From Gilgit it was also possible to travel to Chitral and 
' For details of the delimitation, see Aitchison, A Co/lection of Treaties, Engagements and Sanads. vol.. xi, 
p. 248-9. 
'' The task of defining the boundary was further made difficult by two other factors; one was the almost 
impenetrable mountain terrain of this area, and the other by the fiercely independent spirit of its inhabitants. 
' Aitchison, A Collection of Treaties, Engagements and Sanads, vol. vi, pp. 165-6. 
*• Dardistan is a group of mountain polities extending from north-western edge of the valley of Kashmir up 
to the Karakoram crest. Dr. G.W. Leitner, the first European visitor to Gilgit in 1866 who produced a 
written description of the region, is largely responsible for the use of the term Dardistan. His linguistic 
studies convinced him that the inhabitants of this part of the world spoke languages which belonged to a 
distinct group. Me further wrote that the people were neither Indian, nor Tibetan, nor of the Turkish stock of 
Central Asia. They appeared totally a distinct group. He called them Darads after the Daradas of Sanskrit 
literature and the Daradae of classical geographers. Needless to say, the term Dard has no meaning among 
the local inhabitants of "Dardistan"'. John Keay, The Gilgit Game, The Explorers of Western Himalayas 
1865-95, (Oxford: 1993), pp. 15-6. 
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that remote and mysterious corner of what was then called Kafiristan/ Any outside 
control on the Gilgit region was extremely difficult because the people of the region were 
known for their fiercely independent spirit. By 1842, however, the Sikhs had imposed 
their authority on this region and Nathu Shah, an official appointed by Lahore, ruled as 
governor. When Gulab Singh became the Maharaja, Nathu Shah transferred his loyally to 
him, and the area officially passed under Dogra hegemony. But the people of that region, 
who had only reluctantly accepted Sikh domination, did not remain reconciled to iheir 
new rulers. As early as 1847, an anti-Dogra uprising occurred during which Nathu Shah 
was murdered.^  The rebels were subdued, but additional insurrection in 1852 markec the 
end of Dogra rule. In this revolt almost a thousand Dogras lost their lives. Thus, Gilgit 
had to be given up and the Indus became the boundary of the state, with Bunji as its most 
northerly outpost. Gilgit was finally recaptured by Maharaja Ranbir Singh in I860 and 
annexed to the state of Jammu and Kashmir as the capital of the Gilgit Wazarat.'' 
Hunza (and Nagar, its traditional rival to its immediate east) had long been in 
contact with Gilgit. Maharaja Ranbir Singh tried to extend his influence northward into 
this mountain state which dominated the frontier passes. By 1870 some treaty 
relationship had been established between the ruler of Hunza and the Dogras which was 
interpreted by Ranbir Singh to mean that Hunza had accepted Dogra suzerainty. But at 
Kafiristan covered the present day Nuristan province and its surroundings in north-eastern Afghanista i. 
* James P. Ferguson, Kashmir An Historical Introduction, (London: 1961), pp. 62-3; Thomas Thon son. 
Western Himalaya and Tibet, (London: 1852), p. 249. 
Ferguson, Kashmir An Historical Introduction, pp. 63-4. 
131 
the same time, the ruler of Hunza accepted the suzerainty of China. The Chinese regarded 
Hunza as a border district of Sinkiang.'" 
The Dogra designs in Dardistan were viewed with considerable hostility by the 
ruler of Chitral, the Mehtar, who in 1860s reigned over what was to all intents and 
purposes an independent kingdom. Chitral competed with the Dogras for influence over 
other Dardistan polities, notably Yasin; and it posed a constant challenge to the Dogra 
position in Gilgit. Chitral had long been involved in the world of Afghan politics. Geo-
politically, in 1860s it was in fact a buffer of sorts between the territories of Jammu and 
Kashmir and the sphere of authority of the rulers of Kabul. In 1878 Chitral was to 
acknowledge Dogra suzerainty, confirmed formally under British supervision in 1914." 
Propelled by the commercial and strategic needs, Russia, by !860s, started 
moving towards the southern and eastern regions beyond its empire.'^ Chinkent, 
Tashkent, Kohj and Samarkand were occupied in 1865, 1866 and 1868 respectively. By 
1870 Bokhara and Samarkand were also brought under the Russian influence.'"* With 
these conquests the Russian influences had touched Afghanistan, and was getting 
alarmingly close to the northern frontier of the British Indian Empire.''' The Russians also 
appeared to be fast approaching Chinese Turkistan'^ at the moment when it looked as if 
'" Alastair Lamb, Crisis in Kashmir 1947 to 1966, (London: 1966), pp. 25-7. 
" The suzerainty was confirmed by the Mastuj Agreemet of 1914, by which the Mehtar. Shuja-ul-Muli<, 
agreed to recognize the Kashmiri suzerainty and to pay the Maharaja an annual tribute of three horses, five 
hawics. ad five hounds. This was a confirmation of the Chitral agreement with Maharaja Ranbir Singh in 
1878. F. M. Hassnain, Gilgil The Northern Gate of India, (Delhi: 1978), pp. 7-8, 44. & 62-3. 
'^  G.J. Alder, British India's Northern Frontier 1865-1895, (London: 1963), p. 33. 
'^  hxcK\hd\dK.Co\q\i\\o\m,Riissia Against India The struggle for Asia, (London: 1901). pp. 19-22. 
''' Ibid., pp. 22-24; Bishewar Prasad, The Foundation of India's Foreign Policy. 1860-1882, (Bombay: 
1955), p.22. 
" The Chinese Turkistan not only included Kashgar and Yarkand but its territories extended to the borders 
of China proper and also included the city of Urumchi (Tihua) and the Mongolian borderlands along the 
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Chinese rule over its Muslim subjects in Central Asia would collapse to leave Nvhat 
British perceived as an extremely dangerous power vacuum. So it became clear tc the 
British policy makers that the security of the north-western frontier of India either was 
being, or shortly would be, threatened.'^ 
The rapid Russian advances made the government of India to give a serious 
thought to the question of defence of the northern frontier. With the result, by 1870s the 
strategic importance of Dardistan began to be studied by the British with some intensity. 
It was considered the barrier which protected colonial British India from attack or 
subversion from northern Afghanistan and Chinese Turkistan, both of which were 
perceived by the government of India as potential targets.'^ In these years, as the crisis 
leading to the second Afghan war developed and the suspicions of the Russian intentions 
increased, the government of India concluded that, as a substitute for the direct British 
control, their best interests lay in supporting the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir in 
stabilizing his influence in these northern tracts of Dardistan. '* 
With this end in view. Lord Lytton, the Viceroy decided to allow the Maharaja to 
take possession of Chitral and Yasin, in return of a British Agent to be stationed at 
Gilgit.'^ The arrangement would secure to the Indian government an effective control 
over the Ishkoman and Baroghil passes and thus serve as a check upon Russian or even 
Afghan encroachment upon the northern frontier of India. With a firm control over 
Altai mountains. It was under China till 1861, when her control began to slacken over these territories 15\ 
1878, Kashgar was recaptured and the Chinese Turkistan was finally declared a province of Sinkiang by 
China in 1884. 
'" Adler, British India's Northern Frontier 1865-1895, p. 24. 
" Foreign, Sec, 34-60B K.W., Progs, July 1877, NAl. 
'^  Gadru, Kashmir Papers, pp. 21-2. 
''' Foreign, Sec, 34-60B K.W., Progs, July 1877, NAI. 
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Chitral and Yasin, the British Indian government hoped to secure the north-western 
frontier of India against any invading army.^ '' The arrangement was discussed by the 
Viceroy with Ranbir Singh at Madhopur—a town in British India— on 17 and 18 
November 1876.'' The Maharaja was but too willing to extend his political influence 
over Chitral and Yasin, if necessary with British aid, but he had qualms over the 
appointment of a British Agent at Gilgit. He had the bitter experience of the political 
officer at Leh a decade earlier. The officer had acted as an open sesame to the entire 
frontier of Kashmir to the British surveillance.'^ ^ But Lytton made it a sine qua mm of the 
proposed arrangement, and at one stage it seemed as if the negotiation would fall through. 
The matter, however, was settled when Lytton gave assurances to Ranbir Singh that the 
Gilgit Agent would not interfere in his domestic affairs, but would only be concerned 
with obtaining information as to the progress of events beyond the Kashmir frontier.^ ^ 
Thus, the Madhopur settlement resulted in the establishment of the Gilgit Agency and 
Captain Biddulph became the first Political Agent at Gilgit in 1877. 
John Biddulph was sent with the clear instructions to involve himself actively in 
tribal affairs and obtain reliable information in regard to occurrences beyond the border. 
However, things did not go well. Relations between the Gilgit Agent and the Maharaja of 
°^ Ibid. 
-' Foreign. Sec, No. 38, Progs., July 1877, NAI. 
'^  In 1867, the British government decided to appoint an Officer on Special Duty in Ladakh in order to "get 
the inlbrmation beyond the Ladakh Irontiers" and will not interfere in internal administration. The 
Maharaja appealed that such posting amounted to interference in his internal administration. But the 
government of India was not ready to make any changes to the proposal. In the beginning, the arrangement 
was made only for one year but later on it was decided to send a British officer every year to Ladakh. File 
No. 375 of 1867, .lammu and Kashmir Archives, Srinagar. 
" Viceroy to Maharaja, 22 Dec. 1876, Foreign, Sec, no. 40, Progs, July, 1877; Foreign. Sec. No. 39. 
Progs.. July, 1877. NAI. 
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Kashmir were not always cordial.'^ '* The intelligence derived from this outpost was 
considered to be disappointing.^ ^ Hunza was not brought within the British sphere. In 
fact, it was agreed on all hands that the experiment of placing a British officer in that out-
of-the-way place merely to observe and report, without direct powers of dealing with the 
frontier chiefs, had not been advantageous to British policy.^' Tribal intrigues and their 
mutual jealousies had made it clear that unless the Gilgit position was sufficiently 
strengthened nothing could be done from that isolated post to establish British influence 
along the Kashmir frontiers.^^ Timely supply of men and material to Gilgit in any 
emergency was very difficult because of the weak and inadequate means of 
communications between Srinagar and Gilgit. The Gilgit army, the mainstay of the 
Agency was "ill-paid, ill-fed and ill-disciplined" and thus "unfit for an active service in a 
mountainous country".^ ^ To Lord Ripon, Lytton's successor in India, the appointment of 
Bidulph at Gilgit was a "part of the forward policy" that contained the dange- of 
involvement in the paltry intrigues of the small states beyond the Kashmir border; at the 
same time it was likely to excite the suspicions of the Maharaja as well as of the Afghan 
Amir.'^ ^ The Russian threat, which the Agency was designed to meet, appeared for the 
moment to be less than what had once been thought.^' Further, Ripon's doubts about the 
usefulness of the Agency were confirmed by the attack of the ruler of Yasin on Gilgit in 
'^' Adler, British India's Northern Frontier, p. 130. 
" Henvy to Lyall, November 22,1880, (Confdl.), Foreign, Sec, January 1882, Nos. 83-153. NAl. 
'^' Adler, British India's Northern Frontier, p. 132. 
" Foreign., Sec. Nos. 393, (K.W.), Progs., July, 1881, NAI. 
" Foreign, Sec F, January 1888, Nos. 115-118, NAI. 
^^  Biddulph's Report on Kashmir Army, Foreign, Sec. E, No. 346, July 1883, NAI. 
^° D.K. Ghose, England and Afghanistan, (Calcutta: 1960), Chapter 1. 
•" Government of India to Viscount Granbrook, No. 160, July 7, 1879, GOI, Foreign, Sec, July 1879. No. 
185, NAI. 
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October 1880. Thus, Ripon finally decided to withdraw the Gilgit Agent from this distant 
post in 1881." 
However, the withdrawal was by no means considered final." Giving the 
Maharaja a broad hint of the future policy of the government, Ripon impressed upon the 
Maharaja that the government of India reserved full discretion to send back an officer to 
Gilgit if that should be considered necessary. The Maharaja was further informed that his 
relations with the states on his northern frontier could not but be a matter of permanent 
concern to the British Indian government. He would therefore be expected to supply early 
and accurate information on the course of events in that region.'''' Ripon availed himself 
of the withdrawal of the Gilgit Agent to raise and strengthen the status of the Officer on 
Special Duty in Kashmir, and the Maharaja was asked to consult him on all matters 
effecting the relations of his state with any one of the adjoining chiefships.^'' 
There was a difference of opinion between the government of India and the home 
authorities at London. Although the proposal of Ripon was accepted, they had expressed 
reservations regarding the withdrawal of the Gilgit Agency. Fearing that the Amir of 
Afghanistan might bring the states on the frontiers of Jammu and Kashmir under his 
control, Burne, the Secretary of the Political Department, remarked that the withdrawal of 
the Gilgit Agent meant the removal of "a sentry from a vulnerable point of the Indian 
" For. Sec. Progs, .luly, 1881, No. 396, NAI. 
" For. Sec, No. 314-399(K.W. Note of 19"' May, 1881), Progs. July, 1881, NAI. 
^"Government of India to Secretary of State, No. 130, July 15, 1881, GOl, Foreign. Sec. E. August 1884. 
Nos. 4-19. NAI; Henvy to Foreign Secretary, IS* June, 1881, Foreign., Sec, No. 388. Progs., July. 1881. 
NAI. 
" Viceroy to Maharaja, 18"' June, 1881, Foreign., Sec, No. 388, Progs., July, 1881, NAI. 
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frontier."^^ Hartington, the Secretary of State for India, wrote in his despatch—which 
sanctioned the withdrawal proposal—that, "it cannot be overlooked that the effect of the 
withdrawal of the Agent may possibly be practically to close a valuable channel of 
information as to the course of events in the countries between Kashmir and Russian 
Turkistan, at a moment when such information is likely to be of particular interest.' 
Hartington seconded the opinion of Lord Ripon regarding the right of the British 
government to re-establish the Gilgit Agency in future. He flirther recorded, for the 
Viceroy's consideration that the withdrawal of the Gilgit Agency was merely a temporary 
expedient, and its continuance would only depend upon the Maharaja's capacitv to 
preserve the influence of the Indian government in the regions beyond his nortnern 
frontiers.'^  
However, the situation at the frontiers soon began to change which led the 
government of India to reconsider its policy towards Jammu and Kashmir. The 1880s saw 
Anglo-Russian competition in Asia rapidly coming to a climax. The Russians were 
approaching, with alarming velocity, the northern borders of Afghanistan both from what 
is today Turkmenistan and from the Pamirs. The Russian advance upon Panjden, a 
territory of disputable ownership upon the northern frontiers of Afghanistan, in 1885, 
very nearly precipitated a war between England and Russia. Although, the war was 
"^  Political Departmenl, Secret E, (Confidnl.) progs., Nos. 331-37, NAI. 
" Ibid. 
*^ Secretai-y of State to Government of India, No. 36 (Sec), September 16, 1881, GOI, Foreign. Sec. 
January 1882, Nos. 741-776, NAI. 
137 
avoided as the issue was submitted to arbitration, the circumstances led to a serious 
reconsideration of the question of imperial defence.^ ^ 
There were also reports of Russian intrigues along the Kashmir frontiers/" 
Rumour spread around that Russia was contemplating an advance by the Baroghil pass to 
occupy Yasin, and that the rulers of Chitral and Yarkand had concluded an alliance with 
Russia."" In 1888, a Russian surveyor Captain Gromchevsky was reported to have visited 
Hunza to explore the possibilities of the Russian penetration across the Hindukush. There 
was a certain gap between the eastern boundary of Afghanistan at Wakhan and the 
western-most tip of the Chinese Empire at Aktash through which small Russian forces 
could easily penetrate further south, and disturb the peace of the Hindukush regions. In 
fact, this tract was considered by Russia as a sort of "no-man's land" so that 
Gromchevsky's visit to Hunza and his movements along the Pamirs drove the point home 
that an adequate defensive measure for the protection of the northern frontier was a 
necessity that admitted of no indefinite postponement."*^ 
Reports were also received from Peshawar and other frontier districts that Russia 
had sent two spies to India—one to Bombay and Calcutta—for the purpose of collecting 
'" Government of India, Foreign, Sec. F, September 1885, Nos. 44-61, NAl; Government of India, Foreign. 
Sec. F. September 1885, Nos. 1107-1114, NAI; Arthur Swinson, North-West Frontier. (London: 1967). p. 
201. 
'"' The Russian spies were said to have even visited the territories of Jammu and Kashmir and taken notes of 
the different routes to the state. 
"" Peshawar Confidential Diary No 17 of September 14, 1887, Government of India, Foreign. Sec. F. 
January 1888, Nos. 246-269, NAl. 
^^  F.E. Younghusband to R. Parry Nisbet, October 24, 1889, GOl, Foreign Dept.. Sec-F, February 1890. 
Nos. 59-84, NAI; Barbara Mons, High Road to Hunza, (London: 1958), p. 94; Ghose, Kashmir in 
Transition, p. 169. 
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information and fomenting trouble against the British government.'*^ The trans-Caspian 
railway was also making rapid progress, and it was feared that on its completion Russian 
forces would be gathered in Central Asia "with a view to threatening India." 
Although, these reports were highly exaggerated and the government of India did 
not show any aggressive reaction, the Viceroy appointed a Defence Committee to suggest 
the measures for "a complete and thorough plan" for the northern frontier.''^ He alsc sent 
Colonel Lockhart on an expedition via Gilgit and Chitral to explore the passes of the 
Hindukush.^ ^ 
Stressing the strategic importance of Gilgit, the Defence Committee 
recommended, as a measure of precaution against any attack upon Kashmir, the 
construction of a road between Srinagar and Gilgit."*^  
Lockhart reported that although there was no serious threat to the security of the 
northern frontiers and that a large army might not be able to reach India by the Gilgit-
Chitral route, the appearance of small bodies of Russian troops in the midst of the frontier 
chiefships under the Hindukush would produce a disquieting effect throughout India. It 
was to counter this threat that he suggested the re-establishment of a British Agent at 
Gilgit. He hoped that with a British Agent in that quarter of Jammu and Kashmir, there 
•"^  Memorandum of Information regarding the North-West Frontier, October. 1886, pp. 985-93. c ted in 
Ghose, Kashmir in Transition, pp. 164-5. 
"'' The central Asian railway was progressing fast in the direction of Samarkand and Bokhara. H. Lansdell. 
Through Central Asia, (London: 1887), pp. 633-4; G. Dobson, Russia's Railway Advance, (London: 1890). 
p.413. 
•*' The Defence Committee among others included the Commander-in-Chief, Sir Donald Stewart followed 
by Fredric Roberts, Sir George Chesney— the Military Member of the Viceroy's Council. F. S. Roberts. 
Forty -one Years in India, (London: 1898), vol. ii, p. 424. 
•"* A.G. Durand, The Making of a Frontier, (London: 1899), p. 4; Foreign Dept.. Sec. F., Nos. r'5-186 
(K.W.), Progs., April 1885, NAl. 
•*' F.S. Roberts, Forty-one Years in India, (London: 1898), vol. ii, p. 424-5. 
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would be no danger. In short, Lockhart stressed the importance of Gilgit as the defensive 
nucleus of Dardistan. He was also in favour of a substantial control over the ruler of 
Chitral.^* 
Although Dufferin believed that Russia could hardly afford a war with England in 
Central Asia—and mainly in view of her pre-occupations in Europe—he could not but 
agree with Cross, the Secretary of State for India that the policy of his government must 
be "steady and unceasing preparation to put [themselves] in a complete state of defence." 
He wrote to Cross that "under any circumstances, [they] must not shut [their] eyes to the 
fact that in the north-west [they were] facing an excitable and credulous population and 
that if the Russians were to come..., the rumour of such a circumstance would 
undoubtedly have an inconvenient effect."'*^ 
In any case, "the establishment of such a power as Russia in strength and 
security" in close proximity of the Indian Empire could not but produce "very 
momentous, if not disastrous, consequences, especially when so uncertain and unknown a 
quantity as Afghanistan and adjacent border tribes form an essential element of the 
problem."^" Thus it became clear that Lord Dufferin was fast becoming a convert to the 
Forward Policy; he certainly began to feel the need for a more active policy on the 
Kashmir frontier when Russian activities spread beyond the Hindukush and seemed to 
threaten the security of the Indian Empire. 
"** Lockhart also reported that the Baroghil Pass which had hitherto been considered to be "the easiest 
avenue to Gilgif did not really lead to that place. The easiest route to Chitral from the side of Badaichshan 
was the Dora Pass which was about 14,800 feet high. For Chitral, Lockhart recommended the appointment 
of a native agent to ensure the continued loyalty of its ruler. Lockhart and Woodthorpc, Gilgit Mission. 
(London: 1889), p. 109, 275-80 & p. 348; Durand, The Making of a Frontier, p. 119. 
'*' Dufferin to Cross, 22 Feb. 1887, cited in Ghose, Kashmir in Transition, p. 165. 
'° Dufferin to Cross, 3 June 1887, Ibid. 
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Expressing his opinion regarding the frontier defence scheme, Mortimer Durand, 
the Foreign Secretary believed that if the government of India were in serious difficulties 
with Russia, Jammu and Kashmir would be "more or less shaky and inclined to hedge." 
He recommended the re-establishment of the Gilgit Agency under one or more English 
officers, assisted by a good corps of Dogras raised from Kashmir. From Gilgit, efforts 
should be made to cultivate the friendship of the tribes on the Kashmir frontier, and a 
direct road to Chitral via Dir ought to be opened to facilitate communication between 
British territories and the Kashmir frontier.^' 
Apart from the Russian advance in Central Asia, there were reports of the Afghan 
intrigues in the frontier regions of Kashmir that urged upon the consideration of the 
government of India the question of defence of the northern frontier. Abdul Rehmaii, the 
Afghan Amir was claiming suzerainty over the territories to the north-west of Kashmir/'" 
Although, the Amir disavowed all his aggressive intentions on Chitral in 1881, some 
months later he reassured his claims to suzerainty over its ruler." He even tried to 
establish his influence over the neighbouring chiefships of Bajaur, Swat and Dir. "inhere 
were rumours that Amir also wanted to extend his influence up to Gilgit.''* 
' ' Memo on the present position in Central Asia by H.M. Durand, Government of India, Foreign, Scc-F. 
October 1887, Nos. 286-291, NAI. 
" The Amir of Afghanistan had always held the opinion that Chitral, Dir, Swat, Bajaur, Jindal anci other 
tribal territories to the north of Peshawar, and on the north-western frontier of Kashmir, were dependencies 
of Kabul, and thus he made persistent endeavors to assume sovereignty over these territories. The 
government of India, however, never recognized any claim on the part of the Afghan ruler to allegiance 
from these states. 
" S. Gopal, The Viceroyalty of Lord Ripon, (London: 1953), p. 38. 
'" Lt. Col. Sardar Mohammad Afzal Khan to the Secretary government of India, Foreign Dept., ho. 61. 
AugustlO, 1883, NAI; Alder, British India's Northern Frontier, p. 149. 
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Ripon, the Viceroy warned the Amir that the British government was bound by 
treaty obligations to recognize Kashmir's suzerainty over Chitral, and therefore his 
violation of Chitral territories would be considered by them an unfriendly act.^^ The Amir 
was also warned that Bajaur, Swat and Dir were regarded by the government of India '"as 
being beyond the proper limits of Afghan influence."^^ But this did not seem to have 
produced any effect upon the Amir and the Afghan threat continued to grow; the rulers of 
Chitral, Dir and Jandol were so unnerved by the Amir's proclaimed intentions that they 
made friendly overtures to the British government for protection against him. The ruler of 
Chitral was even anxious to receive a British Resident at his court.^^ Finally, when the 
Afghan ruler moved to Jalalabad early in 1888, and was reported to mediating an attack 
on Bajaur, even the Punjab government could not ignore it; they urged the government of 
India to take the matter up with the Amir.^^ 
Taking a stand on the issue, the Secretary of State for India pressured the British 
Indian government to consider the desirability of establishing "closer relations with the 
tribes on the frontier from Chitral to Baluchistan with a view to bringing them under 
control and utilizing them for defence in the event of any hostile attack from that side."^ 
Lord Dufferin who was certainly aware of the importance of the tribal problem, agreed 
with the Secretary of State. Although he still did not commit himself to establish close 
relations with these frontier chiefs, he was well aware of the fact that the reconsideration 
of the policy towards the tribal regions of Jammu and Kashmir could not be long 
" Gopal. The Viceroyalty of Lord Ripon, (London: 1953), p. 38. 
"^  Foreign Dept., Secret-E, May 1884, Nos. 296-343, NAl. 
" Madhavi Yasin, British Paramoiintcy in Kashmir, p. 89. 
** Ibid., p. 89. 
'" Secretary of State to the government of India, 21 July 1887, quoted in Ghose, Kashmir in Transition, p. 
167. 
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postponed and the relations with these independent tribes ought to be put on more 
satisfactory footing." '^' 
At the time of the withdrawal of the Gilgit Agency, Maharaja Pratap Singh was 
asked by the British government to maintain his influence over the states on the Kashmir 
frontier but the recent disturbances at Hunza and Nagar, which shall be discussed at a 
later stage in this chapter, demonstrated to the British government that the Maharaia had 
"failed" in his "duty". The Maharaja was also expected to "maintain constant watch (wer 
events on the frontier", and to convey "the fiiliest and earliest information regarding all 
such matters" to the government of India through their Agent at Kashmir Darbar. But at 
Kashmir, complained of the Maharaja's lack of frankness to keep him informed of the 
course of events beyond the northern frontier. He reported that the Maharaja often 
concealed information on frontier matters and acted in a manner the British did not 
relish. '^ 
All these events collectively persuaded the British Indian government to redefine 
their policy towards Jammu and Kashmir. The first step taken in this direction was the 
appointment of a British officer. Captain Algernon Durand, to the Gilgit frontier to 
examine the situation at Gilgit and the other frontier tribes and to report about the luture 
possible complications with Russia. He was asked to work out a scheme for rendering 
Gilgit secure without the aid of the British troops, and for dominating from Gilgit through 
Charles E. Black, The Marquess of Dufferin and Am, (London: 1903), p. 241. 
"' Governmeni of India to Secretary of State, 25 Sept. 1882, (Confdl.), Foreign, Sec-E. September 1X82. 
Nos. 586-628, NAl. 
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Kashmir forces the country up to the Hindukush.^ ^ The appointment of Durand was 
prelude to the re-establishment of the Gilgit Agency. 
Durand submitted his report in December 1888." In his report, he complained 
that the military position at Gilgit was unsatisfactory. He especially made the mention of 
the gap between the Afghan and Chinese frontiers that was left unguarded through which 
Russia could penetrate down to Hunza at any time and make her influence felt along the 
Kashmir frontier. As a remedy he, like Lockhart, also strongly recommended a scheme of 
frontier defence based upon the re-establishment of the British Agency at Gilgit 
consisting of four officers and a brigade of Kashmir troops. He also proposed for 
subsidizing the rulers of small states at the Kashmir frontier in return for their allegiance 
to the Indian government. He also recommended the construction of a direct road to 
Chitral from the Peshawar frontier via Dir.^ '' 
In the meantime, the British Indian government had got a firmer control over the 
administration of Jammu and Kashmir. As a part of the imperial defence scheme, the 
government had already appointed a permanent British Resident in Jammu and Kashmir. 
Of course the measure was, as already discussed in the previous chapter, dictated much 
by the imperial considerations as by the internal maladministration in the state. After the 
establishment of the Residency, the Kashmir government was asked to raise and equip a 
force of 2500 men for India's defence. This was readily accepted by the Kashmir 
" H.M. Durand to Captain A.G.A. Durand, .lune 22, 1888, Foreign Dept. Secret-F, September 1888. Nos. 
176-190, NAl. 
" Durand's Report, December 5, 1888, encl. in Government of India to Secretary of State. May 6, 1889. 
NAI. 
" Foreign Dept.. Progs., Frontier B, October 1889, Nos. 104-151, NAl; Durand's Report. December 5, 
1888. encl. in Government of India to Secretary of State, May 6, 1889, NAI. 
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government because the administration was now under the virtual control of the British 
Resident. Moving ahead with their plans, in April 1889 the government of India took the 
extreme step of removing Maharaja Pratap Singh from the throne. After his deposition 
the administration was brought under the overall control of the government of Indie, fhis 
further cleared the way and made it easy for the imperial government to implement their 
comprehensive defence scheme without any opposition from the Kashmir governmenl. 
The government of India thought it convenient to accept the Durand 
recommendations because Lansdowne—the Viceroy—opined that the new arrangement 
had many advantages. The British would be in control of frontier policy, yet many of the 
resultant cost could be charged to the Kashmir government which would also both 
provide a considerable proportion of the military force required and maintain the major 
access route from Srinagar through Bunji.^ ^ 
Thus soon after the deposition of Pratap Singh, the recommendations of Algernon 
Durand were given a practical shape when he himself was instructed to re-establish the 
Gilgit Agency, but this time on a much firmer footing.^ ^ The Kashmir government was 
asked to bear a part of the cost of the Agency.^ ^ It is apt to note here that the State 
"' Alastair Lamb, Kashmir A Disputed Legacy 1846-1990, (Oxford: 1993), p. 30. 
** Durand was asked to visit Hunza and Nagar in order to win their allegiance to the government ol India. 
He was asked to offer them the subsidies of Rs. 2000 each per annum, contingent up on the cessa ion of 
their raiding of the neighbouring regions and the grant of free access to their countries by British olficers. 
He was also ordered to visit Chitral and set on foot the new arrangement there. H. M. Durand to ResiJenl in 
Kashmir, No. 1234, August 5, 1889 (Confdi.), Foreign Dept., Secret F, October 1889. Nos. 104-13:; Col,. 
NAI; Durand, The Making of a Frontier, p. 119. 
'"' The British not only burdened the Kashmir treasury, they also did not hesitate in exacting man-power 
from the state in the form of forced labour. The Gilgit begar, as it was [in]famously known, was perhaps 
the most dreaded form of forced labour exacted by the state. In this form of forced labour the people, in the 
absence of proper transport system, were used to carry loads of grain, ammunition and food articles to 
Gilgit, and that too without any, or nominal, remuneration. Reportedly, this practice, which was i siiall\ 
employed during winters, took a heavy toll of life. There is sufficient evidence to show that although the 
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Council—which was acting under the strict control and supervision of the British 
Resident— "readily" accepted the government of India's proposal. There was no such 
type of opposition from the Kashmir government as was seen when the Agency was 
established for the first time in 1877.^ ^ 
The states within the Gilgit Agent's supervision were: Chitral and Yasin, Hunza 
and Nagar to the north; the petty state of Punyal, adjoining on the west; and the states of 
Gor, Chilas, Darel and Tangir, all on the Indus. To mark the permanent re-establishment 
of the Gilgit Agency, all the tribal chiefs were invited to Gilgit, wherein a darbar was 
held and the formal announcement was made by which the chiefs were informed that 
their subsidies would in future be regularly paid every year.^^ 
The Indian opinion was deadly against the establishment of the Gilgit Agency. 
They were of the view that Jammu and Kashmir was put into an indirect control of the 
government of India through a Resident at Srinagar and an Agent at Gilgit, as the 
government was gripped with a fear psychosis of an invasion on India, and therefore it 
wanted to plug every passage which might lead an enemy to India and it was with this 
end in view that Kashmir was taken in indirect possession through a Resident. The 
government of India, it was alleged, was squandering its resources in fruitless 
fortifications. In spite of the heavy expenditure the "scientific frontier" was still 
British authorities outwardly pressurized the state government to abolish this practice, they were very much 
aware of the -benefits' of this practice. For details, see A. Rashid Shiekh, -Institution of Begar in Kashmir 
(1846-1947)', Central India Journal of Historical and Archaeological Research. Vol. 2. No. 7, 2013. pp. 
88-92; Suhail R. l.one, Indian National Movement and the Freedom Struggle of Jammu and Kashmir, pp. 
10-12. 
** Jammu and Kashmir State Council Resolution No. XVI of 1" June of 1889, JK 21 of 1889. Jammu and 
Kashmir State Archives, Jammu; Col. R.P. Nisbet to H.M. Durand, June 4, 1889. Government of India. 
Foreign Dept., Secret F, July 1889, Nos. 43-50, NAI. 
"*' Durand, The Making of a Frontier, p. 227. 
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untraceable. It shifted from one place to another. At first, the place of danger was 
Baluchistan, afterwards it centered on Gilgit. It did not matter with the Indian offic iais if 
a work of enormous cost was found useless and then abandoned forever. 
The British Indian government, however, justified their actions by saying that 
they had no desire to have sovereign authority over these frontier tribes, but they only 
wanted to watch the foreign relations of these tribes. For this they offered psychological 
justification. Lord Lansdowne thought that in political geography, nature abhors a 
vacuum. Therefore, if any space was left vacant on the Indian frontiers, it would certainly 
be filled by others. It would be utter foolishness on their part to be indifferent towards 
that "no man's land". Lord Lansdowne also thought that the Gilgit outpost ought to be 
made "a centre of British influence" on the northern frontier of Kashmir. He justified that 
in reality Gilgit was the watch tower to the defence of the Indian subcontinent, '^ 
Soon after the establishment of the Gilgit Agency, the British focused to secure 
the north-western frontiers of their empire in India. They needed to work on two 
interconnected fronts simultaneously: (i) to prevent any sudden attack by the Russian 
forces descending by the Baroghil or the Hunza group of passes; (ii) to consolidate their 
position in the tribal kingdoms. To achieve this end, they needed to have an effective 
control on the entire tribal region to the south of the Hindukush. Captain Francis 
Younghusband, who had been sent on deputation to the northern frontiers of Kashmir in 
the summer of 1889, discovered that not only the known routes in the frontier region 
were vulnerable to any foreign attack, but there were certain other passes as well, which 
The Imperial and Asiatic Quarterly Review and Oriental Colonial Record, July and October 1893; 
Amrila Bazar Patrika, January 30, 1890, cited in Yasin, British Paramountcy in Kashmir, p. 95. 
" G.W. VQtr:t,s\, Administration of Lord Lansdowne, 1888-1894, (Calcutta: 1894), pp. 52-3. 
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could be used by the enemy forces to invade the territories of Hunza. Durand, the Gilgit 
Agent, also drew the attention of the government of India to the possibility of a Russian 
force penetrating southward through these outlets. Both Durand and Younghusband 
agreed that in order to prevent such an attack the British government should assume the 
practical sovereignty of the entire tribal region up to the Hindukush. Lansdovvne fell in 
line with his subordinates that the tribes along the Kashmir frontiers should be 
assimilated "as rapidly as possible" and must never be allowed to "pass on to the wrong 
side of the account." It was indeed a conviction with the Viceroy that the mountain 
barrier to the north of Kashmir should "be the limit of [their] political jurisdiction."^" 
In order to achieve this, the government of India ordered Durand, the Agent, to 
consolidate the British position in Gilgit. Following the orders, Durand, immediately after 
his arrival at Gilgit, set himself to the task of consolidating the British influence over 
these tribes. He took the measures to strengthen the forts at that place and improve the 
transport system between Gilgit and Srinagar to help the smooth supplies for the troops 
stationed at Gilgit. The Gilgit-Srinagar road was gradually pushed up, and the question of 
improving the local communications was exhaustively examined. In his opinion, the road 
was necessary not only to keep tribal states in check, but also for any offensive action 
against a Russian force advancing towards Gilgit.^^ The detailed information was 
received about the neighbouring principalities, and constant relations were kept up among 
the tribal chiefs. The tribal politics, Russian expansion, Hunza and Nagar expeditions, 
" Government of India to Seeretary of State, Foreign Dept., Secret F, 14 July 1890, Nos. 557-60. NAI. 
" Durand, The Making of Frontier, pp. 227-8. 
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and the Amir of Afghanistan's covetous eyes on the tribal states involved the government 
of India in every direction 74 
However, the news of the re-establishment of Gilgit Agency was not received 
with much enthusiasm by the tribal chiefs. The Gilgit Agency was looked upon as the 
first step towards the annexation of the entire tribal region. There was a feeling of 
"uneasiness amongst the neighbouring tribes." There was the absence of peace amongst 
the states within the circle of the Gilgit Agency itself As early as in January 1888, Hunza 
had expelled the Jammu and Kashmir garrison from two key posts on the road lo the 
north of Gilgit. The rising chief of Jandol, Umra Khan, was constantly at war wiih his 
neighbouring chiefships. The ruler of Chitral was at loggerheads with Umra Khan and he 
even wished the British government to interfere with the Jandol chief to put a restraint 
upon his aggressive tendencies. The crisis was deepened by the interference of the Amir 
of Afghanistan in the politics of northern frontiers. The Amir tried to press his suzciainty 
over Bajaur and thus continue his intrigues against the chief The British Agent at Gilgit 
took stock of the situation on the frontiers and accordingly started preparing himself to 
meet the challenges posed by the tribal politics.^ ^ 
The Strengthening of the Agency 
The most urgent task facing the Gilgit Agency under Durand was to deal with 
Hunza and Nagar. Of all the Dard states which lie on the Kashmir frontier, Hunza and 
Nagar were strategically very important. They were only second to Chitral in their 
influence on the question of the defence of the northern frontier and were much less 
Ghose, Kashmir in Transition, p. 177. 
" A. Nave, Thirty Years in Kashmir, (London: 1926), p. 183. 
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subservient to the Kashmir Darbar than Chitral. They commanded the various passes of 
the Hindukush. Of these two states Hunza, though smaller in population than Nagar, was 
of greater importance on account of its geographical position. From it Chinese Turkistan 
could be reached without much difficulty; immediately to its north, across the Kilik Pass, 
lay the gap between Afghanistan and China, through which Russian forces could march 
to Hunza, and via Gilgit to Kashmir. Safdar Ali, the ruler of Hunza, who had murdered 
his father, Ghazan Khan, in 1886 and had succeeded him, was fully aware of the strategic 
importance of his state. Though on his accession to the throne he had rendered his 
allegiance to the Kashmir Maharaja, Safdar Ali acknowledged at the same time the 
suzerainty of the Chinese, as his father had done before him. Of course, the recognition of 
Chinese suzerainty by the chief of Hunza hardly ever exceeded a nominal tribute, but the 
Chinese regarded Hunza as a border district of Sinkiang and even talked of ultimately 
incorporating it within their province.^^ However, the government of India was ready to 
tolerate the Hunza ruler's allegiance to both Kashmir and China so long as it did not 
threaten their security at the frontiers. But demonstrating a totally defiant attitude, in 
January 1888, in a rare alliance with its neighbour Nagar, Hunza had rebelled against 
Dogra authority and expelled the Jammu and Kashmir garrisons fi-om two key posts on 
the road north of Gilgit, Chalt and Chaprot, and held them for several months before 
withdrawing. Strategically, these forts were very important for the defence of Kashmir 
and had been occupied by the Maharaja's troops since 1876. For a while Gilgit itself was 
Durand. The Making of a Frontier, p. 137. 
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threatened. Also threatened in 1888, of course, following the Hunza raid on Shahiduliah, 
was trade along the caravan route across the Karakoram pass/^ 
These disturbances unnerved the British Indian government so much tfiat it 
summoned Algernon Durand to Simla to discuss the matter. Durand put forward his 
action plan before the higher authorities. In the light of the recent disturbances and on the 
recommendations of Durand, the government of India, in order to preserve its influence 
along the northern frontiers of Kashmir, decided to bring the states of Hunza and Nagar 
under its complete control. Durand was asked to address the letters to the Rajas of Hunza 
and Nagar; clearly pointing out that for the safety of Kashmir and its dependencies the 
government should have free access to their territories whenever required. The Viceroy 
further ordered that the states should be plainly told that while the government of India 
had no intention to interfere in their internal affairs, it was determined to act as the 
paramount power, to reserve to themselves the right to build military roads through their 
territories as far as necessary to secure the command of the Hindukush passes, and to 
place the British officers in their territories, if deemed necessary. Durand was also 
commanded to inform the Rajas that if they should refuse to comply with these demands, 
troops from Gilgit would march into their countries, put down all opposition by fcrce, 
and would construct the roads in spite of the opposition offered. Though these measures 
were certain to evoke protests from these two states, yet the government was still in 
favour of implementing them. At the same time the Gilgit Agency was strengthened by 
increasing the guard by 200 Gurkhas, more guns, a telegraph line from Srinagar to Gilgit, 
and fourteen more officers for the Agency staff. This was considered necessary to train 
" Ibid., pp. 139-143, 231 & 238; E.F. Knight, Where Three Empires Meet, (London: 1893). p. 382. 
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the Kashmir troops of the Agency so that they might be able to hold their own against 
any Russian advance 78 
Initially Algernon Durand tried to control Hunza and Nagar by diplomacy; but he 
soon concluded that the rulers of both these states were far from being in a conciliatory 
mood/^ The negotiations between the Gilgit Agent and these rulers broke down and by 
late 1891 the British found themselves at war with both Hunza and Nagar. The British 
won the war of 1891-92 and Safdar Ali, the Hunza ruler, fled and took refuge at Chinese 
Sinkiang.*" 
There was a great uneasiness in China with regard to the British expedition of 
Hunza because of their claim over this tribe. Anxious enquiries were made by the 
Chinese authorities from the government of India. They also informed the British 
government that they would like to send a Chinese envoy to Gilgit to discuss the future of 
Hunza.^ ' However, the British Indian government took a strong exception to the Chinese 
reaction and the Viceroy was not disposed to recognize the Chinese rights in Hunza. He 
had made it clear even before Hunza war of 1891-92 that "in this quarter [Hunza] we 
should keep the Chinese and every other power to the north of the barrier formed by the 
Himalayas and Hindukush, we must...maintain our right to deal with Hunza direct." 
The Viceroy made it clear that the ruler of Hunza had long been a feudatory of the 
Kashmir Maharaja, receiving a yearly pension and paying tribute.^ ^ Pertinently, the 
*^ Durand. The Making of a Frontier, pp. 245-7. 
'" Ibid., pp. 238-242. 
'"ibid., p. 264. 
*' Knight. iVhere Three Empires Meet, p. 336. 
*^  Foreign Dept.. Sec. Branch. Ref. No. 57. 30 June, 1888, NAl. 
" Ibid. 
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Viceroy was not ready to concede the Chinese request for being the part of the Hunza 
negotiations, but as the matter was related to the British imperial defence, he forwarded it 
to the home authorities for final decision. 
Considering the wider implications of the Hunza question on the security of the 
British Indian Empire, Salisbury, the Secretary of State for India, was very anxious to 
avoid any complications with China at this particular stage/^ The Chinese diplomats in 
London on their part took the advantage of this "weakness" of the British government 
and tried to make the most of it. So the imperial compulsions combined with the Chinese 
diplomatic pressure persuaded the Secretary of State to concede the Chinese demand. '' 
However, the British Indian government expressed serious doubts about the proposal. 
They agreed only when two clear reservations were obtained by the Foreign Secretary 
first, that the Chinese representative was only to be at Hunza as witness and by express 
invitation from the Viceroy; and secondly, that Chinese participation on this occasion 
would not be considered a precedent for a similar claim on future occasions. ^ ^ 
In the negotiations which took place in the middle of September 1892, 
Muhammad Nazim Khan, a legitimate son of the former Raja Ghazan Khan, was put on 
the throne by the British. The British arrangements for Hunza also includeti the 
appointment of a British Political officer to supervise the general administration of the 
state. The subsidy hitherto paid to the state needed to be altogether stopped. In all these 
proceedings, China was represented by Brevet Brigadier-General Chang Hung Chow. 
*'' Foreign., Sec, B K.W. No. 265, March, 1892, NAI. 
*' Foreign Dept., Sec. Branch, Ref. No. 128, 5 March 1892, NAI. 
87 
SecretaryofStatetoGovernmentoflndia, Foreign, Sec. E,Nos. 17-18, 18 March 1892, NAI. 
Government of India to Resident, 12 May 1892, end. in Government of India to Secretary of State. 
Foreign Dept., Secrel-F, Nos. 625-26, NAI. 
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Chang Hung was considered only as an "honoured spectator" and not as an active 
participant.** 
The state of Nagar, it was decided, ought to be restored to Jafar Khan who had not 
taken part in the recent fight. A British Political officer was also appointed in Nagar and 
the subsidy hitherto enjoyed by its rulers must be stopped.*' 
It is pertinent to note here that in the war with Hunza and Nagar, the British 
force—the Hunza-Nagar Field Force—consisted of some 600 Jammu and Kashmir State 
troops out of a total strength of under a thousand men. Interestingly, the post-war 
settlement provided that the cost for the British administrative supervision over the states 
of Hunza and Nagar should be borne by the treasury of Jammu and Kashmir. The 
expenses also included the construction of roads and other similar works necessary for 
imperial purposes. In other words, the state of Jammu and Kashmir, with Maharaja 
utterly powerless was made to bear, willingly or unwillingly, the large part of the cost of 
British Indian defence in this crucial sector.'^ 
As soon as Durand, the Gilgit Agent was free from the Hunza-Nagar war, he 
shifted his attention from there, as there were reports of the unrest in the two other tribal 
states: Chilas and Chitral. Practically since the re-establishment of the Gilgit Agency in 
1889 Chilas had maintained a persistent attitude of hostility towards it. At the end of 
** Durand, The Making of a Frontier, p. 265; India to Resident, 12 May 1892, end. in Government ol'lndia 
to Secretary of State, Foreign Dept., Secret-F. Nos. 625-26, NAl. 
*' Durand. The Making of a Frontier, p. 265. 
°^ The Gilgit Agency garrison had originally, except in the time of crisis as during the I lunza war, consisted 
almost entirely of the Jammu and Kashmir troops (over 2,000 in number). Most of the cost was born by the 
Kashmir treasury. It was not until 1913 that the British were able to find troops for Gilgit. which were, so to 
say, their own. In that year the Corps of Gilgit Scouts was founded. The Scouts were recruited locally from 
within the area of the Gilgit Agency trained and commanded by the British officers. Alastair Lamb. 
Kashmir A Disputed Legacy 1846-1990, pp. 56-7. 
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1891 the state openly assumed an attitude of defiance and expelled the Kashmir Agent 
from Chilas. In the first place, the government of India decided to further strengthen the 
Gilgit Agency by increasing its staff in order to control the tribes and states along the 
northern frontier of Kashmir. While dispatching two Political and four Military Olficers 
to Gilgit, Lansdowne remarked that, "the near approach of the Russians renders it 
necessary for us to keep Political Officers in both Chitral and Hunza, to obtain eari> 
information and to counteract Russian activity."^' 
The British soon got an opportunity to attack Chilas when the ruler of Cior, a 
small principality at the Kashmir frontiers pleaded with the British to help him against the 
ruler of Chilas. For Durand it was too good an opportunity to establish the complete 
British control over Chilas. Accordingly, on 11 November 1892, Surgeon Major 
Robertson, the Assistant Agent at Gilgit, was asked to lead an expedition of Chilas on the 
pretext of protecting the Gor tribe. The Chilas forces fought desperately but could not 
hold their ground in the face of the powerfiil Imperial Service Troops, and with the result. 
Chilas was occupied. The Imperial Service Troops were ordered by the Gilgit Agent to 
remain stationed there till a man of his choice was found to be put on the throne of 
Chilas. 
In the meantime, the situation at Chitral had taken a sudden turn which persuaded 
the British Indian government to fiirther reconsider its policy towards the northern 
frontiers of Jammu and Kashmir. With the death of Aman-ul-Mulk in 1892, Chitral 
entered into a period marked by anarchy and murders. Both Afghanistan and the British 
"' Government of India to Secretary of State, 19 Oct. 1892, Foreign Dept., Progs. Nos. 897-903. Pan A. 
NAl. 
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Indian government backed the candidates of their choice. Finally Nizam-ul-Mulk—with 
the help and backing of the British Gilgit Agent—defeated Sher Afzal, the Afghan-
backed contender and ascended the throne himself Nizam-ul-Muik, at the time of his 
deal with the British, had promised that if he should succeed in his attempt to secure the 
throne he would agree to the British officers being stationed in Chitrai and to the 
establishment of a telegraph line between Gilgit and his territory. As soon as Nizam-ul-
Mulk sat on the throne, a British mission led by Robertson and accompanied by 
Younghusband and Lieut. Gordon with an escort of 50 Sikh soldiers, was sent to Chitrai 
to help the ruler to secure his throne and to safeguard the British interests there. On 
reaching Chitrai, the mission reported that people had not reconciled themselves to the 
rule of Nizam-ul-Mulk and were up in arms against him; the Afghan lobby was still 
powerful and, by the aid and support of the Amir of Afghanistan, was trying to dislodge 
the British backed candidate. Sensing that the British interests were in jeopardy, 
Robertson himself decided to return to Gilgit but left behind the whole British contingent 
at Chitrai under the command of Younghusband and Lieutenant Gordon. 
Now the task before the government of India was to secure the permanent British 
interests in Chilas and Chitrai in the face of the Russian advance upon the Pamirs. The 
question was discussed in the Viceroy's Council at the beginning of June 1893, and the 
majority favoured the retention of Chilas by the Imperial forces and the stationing of a 
permanent British Officer with an escort of the Imperial Service Troops in Chitrai. 
Though there were a few dissenting voices against the complete British control 
over these tribes and argued that the continuous interference in these states might lead to 
a large scale uprising against the Gilgit Agency, Lansdowne believed that the presence of 
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Imperial Service Troops in Chilas, along with the offer of a subsidy and an assurance that 
the British Indian government had no desire to annex the country, would not lead to any 
trouble. On the contrary, it would impress upon the Chilas that "the [British] were strong 
enough to hold [their] own."^ ^ Lansdowne laid great stress on Chilas as an important 
factor for the safety of the Gilgit Agency. He declared that Chilas was indeed the ' sheet 
anchor" of British policy upon the northern frontiers.^ ^ With regard to Chitral the Viceroy 
argued that it could not be left "unprotected" and "alone"; "it must be under the influence 
of Russia or of the Amir, or under ours. We do not mean it to be under Russian influence, 
and we do not believe that it would be safe, or just, to hand it over to the Amir. We must, 
therefore, look after it ourselves."^ "* He remarked that if left "alone", Chitral would be 
used by the Afghan ruler as a launch-pad for the intrigues upon the northern frontiers 
against the British Indian government. Lansdowne fially agreed with Durand that for the 
preservation of the British influence upon Chitral it must "remain a portion of the Gilgit 
Agency."^^ But the Secretary of State for India was not ready to take any such measure 
which would increase its liability unless it was proved that there was "absolutely no 
tolerable alternative." He was not in favour of any permanent measures for Chitial so 
long as the results of the Durand Mission to Kabul or the Pamir boundary negotiations 
were not known. (The provisions of the Durand and Pamir Agreements will be discussed 
later in this chapter.) So he gave the go-ahead for the British Political Officer 
Lansdowne to Brackenbury, 8 April, 1893, Lansdowne Papers/Vii (i), cited in Ghose. Kashin 
Transition, p. 204-5. 
''^ Lansdowne to Kimberley, 12 Sept. 1893, Lansdowne Papers/lX(e), Ibid. 
"' Lansdowne to Kimberley, 11 July 1893, Lansdowne Papers/IX(e), Ibid, p. 106. 
' ' Kimberley to Lansdowne, 18 August 1893, Ibid. 
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accompanied by a garrison of Imperial Service Troops, but as a temporary measure. The 
officer was to act under the supervision of the Gilgit Agency. ^ ^ 
The appointment of the Political officer was "supposed to bring" peace to Chitral; 
contrarily the British presence and the consequent interference in the internal affairs of 
Chitral led to an uprising. On January 1, 1895, Nizam-ul-Mulk was murdered by the 
followers of his younger brother, Amir-ul-Mulk. Amir sent several deputations to Lieut. 
Gurdon, the British Political Officer at Chitral, asking to recognize him as the de facto 
ruler of the state, but the officer refused to accept the request of the Amir. Instead, he 
detained Amir-ul-Mulk and declared Shuja-ul-Mulk, the infant son of Aman-ul-Mulk as 
the ruler of Chitral. The officer himself acted as regent of the young prince. This led to a 
general uprising of the people led by Sher Afzal, the ftjgitive ruler and Umra Khan of 
Jandol. Consequently, the fort of Chitral was stormed by the rebels led by Sher Afzal. 
The attack on the Chitral fort by Sher Afzal created the feeling of uneasiness in 
the colonial India. The government immediately decided to reinforce the Chitral garrison 
with the Relief Force from Peshawar. It became necessary because the attempts by the 
Gilgit Agency to help the British garrison at Chitral had failed due to the attacks by the 
men of Sher Afzal and Umra Khan on the routes leading to Chitral. The reinforcements 
helped the British garrison to over-awe the mutineers and with the result, Sher Afzal and 
Umra Khan raised the siege of the Chitral fort and fled. 
The British now decided to retain Chitral under their complete supervision. This, 
the British thought, was made necessary "keeping in view the strategic importance of 
' ' Secretary of State to government of India, 1 Sept. 1893, Political and Secret Despatches to India. Ibid., p. 
207. 
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Chitral in the frontier scheme of British Indian Empire."^^ The British gave the 
impression that if the frontier tribes were left outside the British surveillance: '"Russia 
which had advanced her frontiers to the Hindukush because of the Pamir Agretment 
would walk in and play all the tribes off against the British."'* The British also believed 
that though Afghanistan had been bound by the Durand Agreement'^ '^  not to interfere in 
Swat, Bajaur, or Chitral but the Amir had always proved to be a hard nut to crack The 
agreement with the Amir did not mean that all the threats from Afghanistan were over. 
So, it was finally decided to retain Chitral under the control of the British. The foreign 
affairs of the state were brought entirely under the control of the British. In regard lo the 
internal affairs, a British appointed council of regency was appointed to "advise" the 
young Shuja-ul-Mulk on administrative matters. A British garrison consisting of two 
battalions of Indian Infantry, two mountain guns and one Company of Sappers were to be 
stationed in the state. 
However, the most important result of the British intervention in the state was 
produced in the next year when the government of India decided to remove Chitral from 
the supervision of the Political Agent in Gilgit and was brought under the supervision of 
Malakand Agency. The Agency was brought into being with the purpose of looking after 
Chitral and its neighbouring states of Dir and Swat. Thus in 1896 Chitral. which 
undoubtedly had in 1878 accepted the suzerainty of the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir. 
C. Collin, Davies, The Problem of the North-West Frontier 1890-1908, (London: 1975). pp. 85-6. 
'* Ibid. 
" According to the -'Durand Line Agreement" the Amir renounced all claims to Chitral, Swat, Buner. Dir, 
Chilas, Kurram, and all other areas south-west of the line. Full details of the Agreement will be discussed in 
the following pages. 
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was effectively removed from a British administrative relationship with that state and 
established as an Indian princely state in its own right.'°^ 
While the British Agent was strengthening the Gilgit Agency, a new aspect had 
been added to the question of defence of the northern frontier by the arrival on the Pamirs 
of certain parties of the Russians whose avowed object was to annex the Great, Little, and 
Alichur Pamirs. Their activities, as Younghusband'"' reported, were very brisk, and the 
officers from the Gilgit Agency were sent up to watch the Russian proceedings. Matters 
came to a head when on 13 August 1891 Younghusband was expelled from Bozai 
Gumbaz on the Little Pamirs by a Russian Colonel Yanoff. Whether Bozai Gumbaz was 
within the Afghan territory, or in the debatable lands outside it, is another matter. It 
certainly was not in Russian possession, and the forcible expulsion of an accredited 
British officer was therefore considered by Lansdowne "a piece of great efllrontery".'"~ It 
created an awkward, if not dangerous, situation for the Indian government. Especially the 
Russian move to Bozai Gumbaz, if followed by annexation of that territory—as the 
British authorities apprehended—would bring the "Russians to the crest of the Hindoo 
Koosh passes". Immediate measures were, therefore, taken to check further Russian 
encroachment south of the Hindukush and to strengthen the Gilgit Agency. The Gilgit 
""' Hashmatullah Khan, Tarikh-i-Jammu, p. 887. 
"" In June 1889 the government of India decided upon sending a small party, under the command of F.E. 
Younghusband, to examine the northern frontiers of the state of Jammu and Kashmir. The general 
instructions given to him were, to enquire into the means of defending the Leh-Yarkand road (which was 
used by the British for trade purposes) from the raids from Hunza; to explore the main range of Mustagh 
Mountains, from the Karakoram Pass to the Kilik Pass at the bend of the Hindukush, which had been 
previously explored by Colonel Lockhart's Mission; to make a rough survey of the regions explored; and 
finally to vwite a report upon the strategic value of this northern frontier with a view to any possible 
invasion of Kashmir from the direction of the Pamirs or Yarkand. E.F. Younghusband. The Northern 
Frontier of Kashmir, (London: 1890, repr., Delhi: 1973), pp. iii-iv. 
'°^ Indian Officer, Russia's March towards India, (London: 1894), p. 261. 
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Agent was asked not to allow the Russians to advance to Chitral or Hunza, or to permit 
them to descend the Ishkoman, Yasin or Chalt Valley. Hunza and Nagar were warned 
that no foreign armed parties were to be allowed to cross the passes into their territor> 
To strengthen the Gilgit Agency, a guard of 200 Gurkhas was added to it. On the 
diplomatic front, the British government registered their protests at St. Petersburg against 
the Russian movements on the Pamirs and the treatment meted out to YounghusbancL ' 
There was a lot of confusion on the northern frontiers and this confusior was 
confounded by the activities of the Amir of Afghanistan. As already mentionec, the 
Amir—though warned from time to time by the British government—had never given up 
his efforts to bring the tribal chiefs along the Kashmir frontiers under his influence. In 
1892, making a forward move. Amir occupied Asmar, a small tribal state just south t>f the 
Chitral territory." '^' Justifying the occupation, he declared that "Asmar as a matter of 
urgency [had to be] occupied, because it was the frontier of [Afghanistan] and was 
included in the limits of Kunar [province of the country]."'°^ As the news of the Alghan 
occupation of Asmar reached the British authorities they became anxious. Ihe 
government of India refused to recognize the Amir's rights to Asmar; they even asked 
him to vacate the territory, but the Amir refused. The government of India believed that 
the occupation of Asmar had brought Amir to within forty miles of Chitral which v>as 
bound to engender a sense of general uneasiness, if not really "very serious troubles" 
among the tribes. Though the British Indian government was not ready to accept the 
Amir's claim to Asmar, yet the government did not want to take any direct confrontation 
"" E.F. Younghusband, The Heart of a Continent, (London: 1896), p. 332. 
"" John Keay, The Gilgit Game, (Oxford: 1993), pp. 237-8. 
"" Amir to Viceroy, 25 Feb. 1892, end. in Government of India to secretary of state. Foreign Dept.. 
Political A, 24 May 1892, Nos. 549-51, NAI. 
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with the Amir and, therefore, contended themselves with a warning that any further 
breach of peace in the tribal regions, if attributable to the Amir's aggression, would force 
the government of India to ask him to vacate the territory.'"^ 
However, the Amir of Afghanistan continued his forward move; he reoccupied 
Somatash, from which he had been forced out by the British in 1891. Soon afterwards, 
the Amir advanced a claim to Bozai Gumbaz. This put the government of India really in a 
fix. Since Younghusband's expulsion from that territory the government of India had 
been unable to determine whether Bozai Gumbaz actually belonged to Afghanistan or the 
"no-man's land" beyond the Afghan frontiers. When the complaint against 
Younghusband's expulsion from that territory was initially made at St. Petersburg, it was 
claimed that Bozai Gumbaz was in Afghan Wakhan. But only a few days later it was 
affirmed that Bozai Gumbaz lay beyond Afghan territories. The vacillation of the Indian 
government not only irritated the Foreign Office in London; it annoyed the Amir as well. 
Despite the fact that the ownership of Bozai Gumbaz was uncertain, the English 
Foreign Office pressed Russia to apologize for the conduct of Yanoff in expelling 
Younghusband. Initially the Russian government was not impressed, but finally rendered 
"full apology". The British was still in the celebratory mood over this diplomatic triumph 
when the news arrived that the Russian forces under the command of Yanoff turned out 
the Afghan forces from Somatash and occupied it. This turn of events whipped the 
government of India into action. 
'"* Amir to Viceroy, 3 August 1892, end. in Government of India to Secretary of State. Foreign Depl. Sec. 
E, 13 September 1892, Nos. 799-802. NAI. 
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The strengthening of British position on the northern frontiers of the E r^itish 
Indian Empire was not sufficient. They thought that something must be done cm the 
diplomatic front too. They thought it better to sit on the negotiation table with both 
Russia and Afghanistan to end the wonisome situation created by the Russian and 
Afghan activities on the Pamirs. The colonial government thought that the occupation of 
Somatash first by Afghanistan, followed by Russia necessitated a clear understanding 
about the extent of Anglo-Afghan and Anglo-Russian boundaries on the Pamirs. Keeping 
this end in view, Lansdowne the Viceroy suggested to the Home authorities that the 
diplomatic pressure should be put on Russia to withdraw her forces from Somatash and 
arrange for a joint delimitation. The Home authorities readily accepted the proposal and 
instructed Morier to open consultations with Russia. 
Though the Russian government received the British diplomatic mission 
regarding the Pamir question, no basis for a discussion could be agreed upon for quite 
some time because the Russians laid down certain basic conditions on which the 
negotiations could be carried forward. The first demand that St. Petersburg made was that 
the Russian frontiers must run upon the Pamirs itself This was in total contrast t(> the 
agreement signed between the British and the Russian government.'°^ Stall, the Russian 
'"'' The "Russian Peril" proved the key factor in the formulation of the English policy in respect of C-ntrai 
Asia, Afghanistan and the trans-Indus area. In this respect two schools of thought emerged in England One 
advocated the "Close Border Policy" while the second was in favour of the "Forward Policy". 
Correspondence and overtures were made between the Russians and the English in respect of Central Asia. 
It was agreed in principle that a neutral zone be acknowledged in Central Asia, for which Afghanistan 
would be an ideal place. But instead the agreement of 1873 came out under which, states James W. Spain. 
"The Oxus was accepted as the basis of the yet un-demarcated northern boundary of Afghanistan. The main 
results were; (1) establishment of the Oxus as the dividing line between Afghan and Russian lerritor;. \2) 
Russia's formal exclusion of Afghanistan from its sphere of influence, and (3) acceptance by the British of 
eventual absorption by Russia of all of the khanates north of the Oxus, including areas once under the 
suzerainty of the Amir of Kabul. By this agreement Afghanistan became a buffer state between Russia and 
163 
Ambassador in London, also demanded that Afghanistan should be persuaded to evacuate 
Roshan and Shignan.'"* 
The colonial Indian government was ready to give up its claims on Roshan and 
Shignan, even at the risk of alienating the Afghan ruler, but it was determined not to 
allow Russia a line of frontier which would afford her a happy hunting ground upon the 
slopes of the Hindukush. But the Russian demand would mean exactly what the British 
government wished to avoid. All the British wanted was to keep Russia at a safe distance 
from the Imperial frontiers. Accordingly, in reply to Russian claims, the British 
demanded status quo on the Upper Oxus west of Lake Victoria. In regard to the Russian 
claims of Roshan and Shignan, though Lansdowne suggested that the British Foreign 
Office should begin by standing out for the retention of Roshan and Shignan, they could 
eventually fall back on Wood's Lake line as a compromise. This was precisely the stand 
taken by Rosebery in negotiations with the Russian government. 
British India. Neither the British nor the Russians consulted the Amir in making the arrangement and 
therefore Afghanistan never reconciled to the terms of the agreement, which created anxiety at occasions. 
The Russians too did not keep themselves to the provisions of the treaty. The Russians advanced, in Central 
Asia, towards Afghanistan and occupied Merv in 1884, in its North-Westem comer. They now had kept 
their eyes on Panjdeh, which under the terms of the Treaty of 1873 was the territory of Afghanistan. The 
attempts of a peaceful settlement of the dispute bore no fruits and the Russian troops occupied Panjdeh on 
30 March 1885. Amir Abdur Rahman, who was in Rawalpindi at the time, by suggesting that Russians may 
retain Panjdeh but the Zulfiqar Pass would remain in the Afghans hands, averted the would-be war for the 
possession of Panjdeh. The Russians accepted the suggestion and in July 1886 a Boundary Commission 
was set to demarcate the boundary between Russia and Afghanistan, in light of the protocol signed on 10 
September 1885. The Commission completed its work in June 1888 and the fmal boundaries between 
Afghanistan and Russia were confirmed on 12 June 1888. Afghanistan's boundary with Russia was thus 
defined and demarcated but its boundary with British India was still undefined and un-demarcated. There 
were areas upon which both the sides had either their claims or kept their coveted eyes or wanted to be 
under their control or sphere of influence." See, James W. Spain, The Pathan Borderland, (Karachi: 1985), 
pp. 123-5. 
'°* The Amir of Afghanistan had been in possession of the trans-Oxus provinces of Roshan and Shignan 
ever since the conclusion of the Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1873, but the colonial Indian government had 
never accepted the Amir's rights to these territories. 
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Initially, the negotiations between the two governments were not making any 
considerable progress, but once both the sides flexed their stands, the prospectus of the 
negotiations seemed hopeflil. The British government now set out to persuade the Amir 
of Afghanistan to surrender Roshan and Shignan as a compromise. The colonial 
government was ready to allow the Amir to retain the strip of Wakhan in return lor the 
surrender of Roshan and Shignan. The government was also considering some 
concessions to the Amir elsewhere on the frontier to compensate for the territories he 
would lose. With this end in view, the British government asked the Viceroy Lord 
Lansdowne to send a diplomatic mission to Kabul in order to explain the Amir "the 
course of negotiations with Russian government regarding the frontier of Upper Oxiis and 
in the direction of the Pamirs." 
Giving effect to this British policy, Lansdowne dispatched a mission under the 
command of Sir Mortimer Durand to Kabul, which left Peshawar on 9 September 1893. 
The Durand Mission had two main purposes: to persuade the Amir to evacuate Roshan 
and Shignan and to settle the Anglo-Afghan frontier from Chitral downward. There had 
been negotiations between the British colonial government and Afghanistan in regard to 
the Anglo-Afghan frontier even before the Durand Mission, but the nature of discussions 
used to be somewhat different. Earlier, the emphasis had been indeed upon the tribal 
regions between Kashmir and Afghanistan, but the Russian threat upon the Pamirs 
changed the entire nature of the talks. For British, while the main aim of Durand Mission 
was to arrest the Russian advance towards the Pamirs and the Hindukush, so that Jammu 
and Kashmir with its dependencies and other tribal regions within the British sphere of 
influence could be safe from the Russian intrigues, the Afghan Amir wanted the British 
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Mission to settle his eastern and southern boundaries with them.'^ ^ The Afgiian Amir's 
emphasis on setting out his boundaries with India persuaded him to soften his position 
over Roshan and Shignan. Amir also accepted to retain Wakhan under his suzerainty. He 
also promised non-interference in the frontier states of Jammu and Kashmir. In return of 
this, Abdur Rehman was allowed to keep Asmar within his territories. All this came in 
the form of an Agreement which was signed between the two sides, concluded on 12 
November 1893 by Amir Abdur Rahman and Henry Mortimer Durand, commonly known 
as Durand Line Agreement."" 
After the successful completion of Durand Mission, the settlement about the 
Pamirs appeared to be well within sight. The British overcame the first major hurdle by 
convincing the Afghan ruler to evacuate Roshan and Shignan for Russia. In return for 
Roshan and Shignan, St. Petersburg agreed to accept a line east of Lake Victoria as a 
fi"ontier line between the two countries and leaving Bozai Gumbaz to the British sphere of 
influence. Thus the acceptance of Lake Victoria, which was to run from the east end of 
the Lake along the neighbouring mountain crests till it reached the Chinese frontier, 
'"'' See Anonymous, Durand Line, (n.p., n.d.), pp. 4-5. 
"" The single-page "Durand Line Agreement" which contains seven short articles laid down that the 
eastern and southern frontier of the Afghan dominions, from Wakhan to the Persian border, would follow 
the line agreed upon by both the sides. "The Government of India would at no time exercise interference in 
the territories lying beyond this line on the side of Afghanistan, and the Amir should at no time interfere in 
the territories lying beyond this line on the side of India." The British Government also agreed to allow the 
Amir to retain Asmar and the valley above it. In return, the Afghan ruler pledged to exercise no 
interference in Swat, Bajaur, or Chitral. The British Government also agreed to leaxe to Amir the Birmal. 
who relinquished his claim to the rest of the Waziri country and Dawar, "The frontier line would thereafter 
be laid down in detail and demarcated, wherever this might be practicable and desirable, by joint British 
and Afghan commissions, having due regard to the existing local rights of villages adjoining the frontier. 
Both the Government of India and His Highness the Amir undertake that any differences of detail, should 
be settled in a friendly spirit, so as to remove for the fijture as far as possible all causes of doubt and 
misunderstanding between the two Governments." For further readings see, Sultan Mahomed Khan, Ed. 
The Life of Abdur Rahman: Amir of Afghanistan, with a New Introduction by M. E. Yapp, Vols. 2. 
(London: 1900. reprint in Karachi: Oxford University Press,I980), vol. 2, pp. 154-5. 
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leaving Bozai Gumbaz within the British sphere of influence as the frontier line by 
Russia, persuaded the British Foreign Office to proceed cordially with the negotiations. 
The final agreement signed between the British government and Russia on I I 
March 1895 with regard to Pamirs in Central Asia is known as Pamir Agreement.' ' The 
Agreement recognized Lake Victoria as the southern boundary of the Russian sphere of 
influence in that region. Those portions of Roshan and Shignan lying on the right bank of 
the river Oxus were shorn from the territories of the Amir of Afghanistan, and Russia was 
to be allowed to annex the Gund and Shakedara Valleys. The British and Russian spheres 
were to be divided by a strip of neutral territory, and Russia was to be effectually 
debarred from entrance to the passes in the Hindukush Mountains leading to Hunza, 
Nagar and Chitral. 
So, it were the Russian and Afghan activities in the trans-Oxus region vhich 
forced the British authorities to engage themselves with these two key players in ihe 
region to reach an agreement because the primary concern of the British was to secure the 
frontiers of the British Indian Empire. It was the outcome of these negotiations which 
provided the basis for the future British policy towards the north-western frontier o r" the 
Indian Empire. So far as the northern frontier was concerned, both the Afghan and 
Russian missions secured all that was necessary for the safety of Kashmir and its 
dependencies. The combination of the 1893 Durand Line and the 1895 Anglo-Russian 
' " The agreement concluded between the British government and Russia in April 1895 with regaid to 
Pamirs in Central Asia is known as Pamir Agreement. The Agreement recognized Lalce Victoria a:, the 
southern boundary of the Russian sphere influence in that region. Those portions of Roshan and Shignan 
lying on the right bank of the river Oxus were shorn from the territories of the Amir of Afghanistan, and the 
Russia was to be allowed to annex the Gund and Shakedara Valleys. The British and Russian spheres • vere 
to be divided by a strip of neutral territory, and Russia was to be effectually debarred from entrance tc liie 
passes in the Hindukush Mountains leading to Himza Nagar and Chitral. 
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Pamir Agreement created the background for the subsequent history of the Northern 
Frontier. 
The Russo-Afghan conflict in the Pamirs also prompted the British Indian 
government to strengthen their position at the Jammu and Kashmir frontiers. The 
government believed that though a large scale Russian army could not descend south of 
the Hindukush but it apprehended that there was always a threat of the small and lightly 
equipped Russian troops to descend south of mountain slopes which would create 
disturbances in the frontier tribes. So, as a precautionary measure, Lansdowne decided to 
consolidate the British influence in the frontier region. This, he thought, would be done 
by further strengthening the Gilgit Agency. As he observed, the Gilgit outpost of the 
Indian Empire ought to be "a centre of British influence" upon the northern frontiers of 
Kashmir. 
The Gilgit Lease 
As has already been discussed in the previous chapter that the British ascendancy 
had reached its climax during the reign of Maharaja Pratap Singh and the government of 
India had a strong influence on the administrative affairs of the Jammu and Kashmir 
state. However, with the turn of the twentieth century, due to the growing nationalist 
sentiments in colonial British India against the imperialist rule, the government began to 
loosen their grip over the administrative affairs of Jammu and Kashmir. With the result, 
by the time of the accession of the new ruler Maharaja Hari Singh in 1925, most of the 
curbs on the powers on the Kashmir administration had been lifted and the Kashmir 
Maharaja began to enjoy considerable autonomy in the governance of his state. 
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Obviously there was a clash of interests between the British imperial government and the 
Dogra Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir. This clash manifested itself in tht fast 
deteriorating relations between the British Agent at Gilgit and the Jammu and Kashmir 
government. 
At Gilgit there now existed a form of "dyarchy", in which the matters of delence. 
foreign relations and communications were the concern of the British, but the Maharaja 
still had the responsibility of civil government which he exercised through a governor. 
Wazir-i-Wazarat, who also acted as the Maharaja's representative in matters arising from 
the tributary relationship between the Dogra rulers and states like Hunza and Nagar. 
Maharaja Hari Singh was not happy with this state of affairs at Gilgit because the British 
Agent often interfered in the administrative affairs of the Wazarat. This resulted in 
considerably undermining the position of the Wazir-i-Wazarat as the representative of the 
Jammu and Kashmir government, and in developing a sort of "dyarchy" which was not a 
good omen for the administrative affairs of Gilgit."^ 
The proactive role of the Gilgit Agent also made it clear that the Jammu and 
Kashmir government appeared to be helpless and the Maharaja of Kashmir was not iure 
about the boundaries of his state. He knew that the region belonged to him by conquest 
but he was equally aware of the fact that the then British government of India had 
practically usurped the region, which was now administered by the Political Agent at 
Gilgit in the name of the crown.'" 
"^ Prime Minister of Jammu and Kashmir State, to Resident Kashmir, March 20 1933, Foreign Dept.. I'oL. 
Secret. File o. 401-X of 1933, Nos. 1-57, NAI. 
"Mbid. 
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After the Russian Revolution of 1917 and the establishment of the Socialist 
regime there, Britain again found herself at loggerheads with this new Russian ideology. 
As expected, Jammu and Kashmir felt the repercussions of this new Anglo-Russian 
rivalry. The British imperialist government thought that while the formidable geography 
of the Karakoram pass of the north-west frontier would most probably prevent any 
Russian army to pass by, it was not an adequate barrier against individuals. The Political 
Department feared that Russian agents would be more easily able to cross into British 
India to spread the Bolshevik "virus" among Indian politicians. Already, in the eyes of 
the British, they were dangerously exposed to such infection. Thus, the northern frontier, 
a substantial section of the British Indian officials thought, was again under threat from 
Russia. The remedy, they suggested to this threat, was that the Gilgit Agency be taken 
under direct British control and the system of "dyarchy" be terminated.' '** 
In 1931, as a result of the impact of the world financial crisis on the budget of the 
government of India, the Kashmir Darbar, which was already paying the half of the cost, 
was asked to bear the three quarters of the total budget on the Gilgit Agency. Maharaja 
Hari Singh, whose authority was greatly undermined by the British representative at 
Gilgit, wanted to end this embarrassing state of affairs once for all. lie came up with his 
own alternatives to the British proposal. He offered that he would agree to take the entire 
responsibility for the defence of the Gilgit Agency, paying all the costs provided that the 
system of "dyarchy" was terminated and complete authority returned to the Wazir-i-
Wazarat. Alternatively, the government of India could establish both military and civil 
'•* Ibid.: Hassnain. Gilgit The Northern Gate of India, p. 140; Lamb, Kashmir A Disputed Legacy, p. 58-9. 
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control over the political districts and the Gilgit Wazarat area which lay to the north of 
thelndus."^ 
The government of India availed themselves of this opportunity to further 
undermine the sovereignty of Jammu and Kashmir at Gilgit and to establish their 
complete ascendancy on the frontiers of Jammu and Kashmir. They readily accepted the 
second option and decided to ask for the transfer of all rights in the region to the British. 
An agreement was signed on 26 March 1935 between the Maharaja of Jammu and 
Kashmir and the representatives of the British Indian government by which the Gilgit 
Wazarat, north of the Indus and its dependencies were leased out to the British for a 
period of sixty years. All civil and military administration of the area was transferred to 
the government of India. The agreement mentioned that "in normal circumstances' no 
British Indian troops shall be dispatched throughout the leased territory. The British 
would rely on the Corps of Gilgit Scouts."^ On 1 August 1935 the Political Agent in 
Gilgit, Major G. Kirkbride, formally assumed his new responsibilities for the leased 
areas. Thus, from that moment the region passed right out of the orbit of the Jammu and 
Kashmir state government. On the eve of partition in 1947, however, the British 
surrendered their lease with the result that, in theory, sovereignty reverted to Jammu and 
Kashmir."^ 
' " Lamb, Kashmir A Disputed Legacy 1846-1990, pp. 60-1. 
"" Foreign, Pol, Sec, Frontier, File No. 366-Xof 1935, NAl. 
' " Some confusion appears to exist as to the precise limits of Jammu and Kaslimir State in the Gilgit 
region. Gilgit which now forms the part of the Pakistan administered Kashmir (until 2009 Gilgit along with 
Baltistan was called the "Northern Areas"; now it is "Gilgit-Baltistan"), was shown by many British maps 
up to 1947 outside Kashmir with the exception of Gilgit town and its immediate surroundings. India, 
however, has always regarded the entire Gilgit Agency as being part of Kashmir. The area which was 
leased out was only 1, 480 square miles, while the whole Gilgit Agency was over 14. 500 square miles. 
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Conclusion 
The Russian advances towards the southern and eastern regions by mid-nineteenth 
century, the deteriorating relations with the Amir of Afghanistan and the territorial 
contiguity with China made the British Indian Government to give a serious thought to 
the question of defence of the northern frontier. With this end in view, the British decided 
to support the Kashmir Darbar in stabilizing its influence in the northern tracts of 
Dardistan, in return of a British Agent to be stationed at Gilgit with the purpose of 
securing the north-western frontiers of their Indian Empire. Gilgit was considered as "a 
watch tower to the defence of the Indian Empire" and the Agent who remained stationed 
there till the British withdrew from Indian subcontinent as "a sentry at a vulnerable point 
of the India frontier." The establishment of the British Residency and the deposition of 
Maharaja Pratap Singh resulted in a firmer British control over the administrative affairs 
of Jammu and Kashmir which in turn helped them to use Kashmir as a frontline state 
more effectively; without any opposition from its government. Interestingly, Jammu and 
Kashmir not only acted as a frontline state but was made to bear, willingly or unwillingly, 
the large part of the cost of the defence of British Indian Empire. 
Yet, by the lease agreement the British certainly considered that they had acquired rights over the whole 
Gilgit region and not merely the leased area. 
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Conclusion 
The creation of Jammu and Kashmir State on 16 March 1846, closely followed b\ 
the uprising of 1857 and the subsequent Queen's declaration protecting the territorial 
rights of Indian princes, granted it protection from complete merger in British India but 
short of that the British established complete sway on its internal and external affair.^ . The 
Treaty of Amritsar, which was instrumental in the creation of the state, had granted 
somewhat a "special status" to the state giving It in the "independent possession" of the 
Maharaja so far as its internal affairs were concerned. But not withstanding that guarantee 
we see the state not only reduced to the position of any other princely state of British 
India but in effect witnessed more interest and intervention in its affairs because of its 
geopolitical and strategic importance as a frontline state. As the state assumed an 
important position in the security of the British Empire from the emerging Russian trireat 
and since the defence from foreign threat was the responsibility of the British themselves 
it provided them a convenient excuse to Intervene in the affairs of the state. While the 
treaty only provided the broader frame work for conducting the relations the actual policy 
towards the state flowed, to a significant degree, from the geo-political and strategic 
considerations of the English East India Company ever alert to the dangers of Afghan or, 
indirectly, Russian intervention on the north-western frontier of its expanding Indian 
dominion. 
The formation of the state was made by bringing together territories formerly 
separate and part of diverse political histories and placed under the control of Gulab 
Singh, the erstwhile Raja of Jammu, a former subordinate of Lahore and an ally of the 
British in their wars against the Sikhs. The creation of the state is, thus, seen to be a 
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major stroke of the British policy. It was in the interest of maintaining a stable polity on 
its sensitive north-western frontier that the East India Company decided to strengthen the 
hands of the Dogra rulers to exercise their authority in the newly founded state. But at the 
same time, the British vested a territorially limited and a lesser degree of powers in the 
hands of the Dogra rulers. 
Going by the literal interpretation of the clauses of the Treaty of Amritsar there 
was a very limited scope for the British intervention in the affairs of Jammu and Kashmir. 
The Treaty of Amritsar recognized Maharaja Gulab Singh in "independent possession'" of 
Kashmir. The treaty no doubt gave both the parties some rights and obligations. But 
because of the overwhelming power and prestige of one party over the other, the British 
always had the upper hand. Since Gulab Singh was at the receiving end, the British were 
always in a better position to use the provisions of the treaty to their own advantage. 
More importantly, if the British were recognized by the treaty as arbiters in any dispute 
arising with the neighboring states, how could their arbitration be challenged with regard 
to the dispute with the British itself? These inner contradictions in the treaty gave them 
the role of both the judge and the jury in any dispute and they successfully gave their 
every act a legal cover of the treaty. 
A careflil reading of the Treaty of Amritsar makes it clear that so much 
ambiguity was left in the document that anything could be made out of it. The British 
would always be in search of an opportunity to tighten its noose around the Kashmir 
Darbar, and even if such an opportunity did not come its way, the government could still 
invoke any of the justifications that it had used in the case of the other states to tamper 
with the status of the state. The capacity to act in such a manner lay in its military and 
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political strength and could not be curbed by any treaty or engagement whatsoever. 
Whenever there was a controversy regarding any issue—be it imposition of the Resident, 
stationing of the British troops or appointment of any British Indian in the services olthe 
Maharaja—the British argument always prevailed whether convincinglv or 
unconvincingly. 
The princely state of Jammu and Kashmir was, right from its emergence, included 
within the pale of British Paramountcy—a relationship whose limits were undefined and 
depended solely on the configuration of relative forces at a given time. Further, having 
created the state for the furtherance of their imperial interests always expected the 
Maharaja to serve those interests and give them precedence to even his own personal, 
family or state interests. In the event of a failure on the part of the Kashmir Darbar to 
play its expected role, the British Indian authorities felt justified to exercise their 
paramount power. The means they would employ and to what extent, would depend upon 
the exigency of the situation and the demands of the time. 
Broadly speaking, the British intervention was made on two grounds: the first 
being the security of the state, as the state of Jammu and Kashmir had to be used as a 
frontline state, and the second being Maharaja's capacity to govern his subjects with 
"justice". The British intervention in the state started with the appointment of the Officer 
on Special Duty to look after the interests of the European tourists in the state. The mal-
administration of the Kashmir Darbar, the British failure in the Afghan war of 1878, the 
ruthless criticism of the Anglo-Indian and British press of the Governments' policies, 
particularly of the Kashmir Government in the famine of 1877, and the political nature of 
the activities of the Officer on Special Duty persuaded the British Indian authorities to 
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provide for "efficient" political ascendency and supervision in Jammu and Kashmir 
which manifested itself in the establishment of the British Residency in Kashmir in 1885 
and stripping the Maharaja of all his powers in 1889. As revealed in the preceding 
chapters although the British intervened primarily to secure their imperialistic motives, 
they presented themselves in the guise of benevolent power. This "benevolence" indeed 
resulted in some positive changes in the state. It exposed the state structures to the major 
influences of British India. It also brought the princely state and the people into closer 
contact with the ideologies and movements prevalent in British India. The half-hearted 
state-led land and educational reforms created a context in which the Kashmiri leadership 
launched their educational and other reform movements. It was after consolidating their 
position through these reform movements that the Kashmiri leadership with the aid and 
advice of different political and social organizations of British India, particularly the 
Punjab, began pressuring the state to play a more active role to address the socio-
economic and political issues of the people of Jammu and Kashmir. 
The research theme also emphasized that the British measures of appointing a 
Resident and removing Maharaja Pratap Singh from the throne were dictated more by the 
imperial considerations than the concern for internal mal-administration in the state. The 
establishment of the Residency and the deposition of the Maharaja cleared the way for 
the imperial British Indian government to implement their comprehensive defense 
scheme without any opposition from the Kashmir Darbar. 
British imperial policy towards the state of Jammu and Kashmir in the late 
19* century was guided primarily by fear of a Russian advance towards India through the 
Pamir mountains, as well as by events in the expanse of land north of the Hindu Kush and 
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Himalayas, known as Turkestan, the eastern part of which was under the nominal ri;le of 
China. In addition, the British were continually troubled by the independent policy 
adopted by the Amir of Afghanistan, whose lands also extended as far as the north-
western frontier of the sub-continent. On account of its strategic location, the state of 
Jammu and Kashmir appeared to be a sort of buffer against potential incursions from 
Russia, Afghanistan and China into the sub-continent. Provided the British could 
maintain a workable alliance with the maharaja they would not be obliged to incur the 
expense of fortifying the northern frontier themselves. With this end in view, the British 
decided to support the Kashmir Darbar in stabilizing its influence in the northern tracks 
of Dardistan, in return of a British Agent to be stationed at Gilgit with the purpose of 
securing the north-western frontiers of their Indian Empire. Gilgit was considered as "a 
watch tower to the defence of the Indian Empire" and the Agent who remained stationed 
there till the British withdrew from Indian subcontinent as "a sentry at a vulnerable point 
of the India frontier". The establishment of the British Residency and the deposition of 
Maharaja Pratap Singh resulted in a firmer British control over the administrative affairs 
of Jammu and Kashmir which in turn helped them to use Kashmir as a frontline state 
more effectively without any opposition from its government. Interestingly, Jammu and 
Kashmir not only acted as a frontline state but was made to bear, willingly or unwillingly, 
the large part of the cost of the defence of British Indian Empire. 
So it is clear from what this study has shown that the British Indian government 
was always in search of an opportunity to maintain a firm grip over the administrative 
affairs of Jammu and Kashmir in order to fiilfiU their imperial interests. The British 
secured this decisive power in the state especially from deposition of Maharaja Pratap 
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Singh till second decade of the twentieth century. Though the British adopted the 
pretence of being the guardians of the people of Kashmir against the very ruling dynasty 
imposed by them, the supreme power held by them in the state was primarily used to tal<e 
care of the best imperial interests and the bogey of maladministration was raised to mal<e 
room for fijrther intervention. However, the physical relief it provided to the people of 
Jammu and Kashmir made them, at least, look better imperialists in the eyes of the 
people. 
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Appendix I 
Relevant Portions of the Treaty of Lahore 
March 9,1846 
Article 3 
The Maharaja (of Lahore) cedes to the Honourable Company, in perpetual sovercigntv. 
all his forts, territories and rights, in the Dooab, or country, hill and plain, situated 
between the Rivers Beas and Sutlej. 
Article 4 
The British Government having demanded from the Lahore State, as indemnification for 
the expenses of the war, in addition to the cession of territory described in Article 3, 
payment of one and a half crores of rupees; and the Lahore Government being unable to 
pay the whole of this sum at this time, or to give security, satisfactory to the British 
Government, for its eventual payment; the Maharaja cedes to the Honourable Company, 
in perpetual sovereignty, as equivalent for one crore of rupees, all his forts, territories, 
rights, and interests, in the Hill Countries, which are situated between the Rivers Beas 
and Indus, including the Provinces of Cashmere and Hazarah. 
Article 12 
In consideration of the services rendered by Rajah Golab Sing, of Jammoo, to the Lahore 
State, towards procuring the restoration of the relations of amity between the Lahore and 
British Governments, the Maharajah hereby agrees to recognize the independent 
sovereignty of Raja Golab Sing by separate agreement between himself and the British 
Government, with the dependencies thereof, which may have been in the Rajah's 
possession since the time of the late Maharajah Kurruk Sing; and the British Governinent. 
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in consideration of the good conduct of Rajah Golab Sing, also agrees to recognize his 
independence in such territories, and to admit him to the privileges of a separate treaty 
with the British Government. 
Article 13 
In the event of any dispute or difference arising between the Lahore State and Rajah 
Golab Sing, the same shall be referred to the arbitration of the British Government; and 
its decision the Maharajah engages to abide. 
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Appendix II 
Treaty of Amritsar (March 16,1846) 
The treaty between the British Government on the one part and Maharajah Gulab Singh 
of Jammu on the other concluded on the part of the British Government by Frederick 
Currie, Esq. and Brevet-Major Henry Montgomery Lawrence, acting under the orders of 
the Rt. Hon. Sir Henry Hardinge, G.C.B., one of her Britannic Majesty's most Honorable 
Privy Council, Governor-General of the possessions of the East India Company, to direct 
and control all the affairs in the East Indies and by Maharajah Gulab Singh in person-
1846. 
Article 1 
The British Government transfers and makes over for ever in independent possession to 
Maharajah Gulab Singh and the heirs male of his body all the hilly or mountainous 
country with its dependencies situated to the eastward of the River Indus and the 
westward of the River Ravi including Chamba and excluding Lahol, being part of the 
territories ceded to the British Government by the Lahore State according to the 
provisions of Article IV of the Treaty of Lahore, dated 9th March, 1846. 
Article 2 
The eastern boundary of the tract transferred by the foregoing article to Maharajah Gulab 
Singh shall be laid down by the Commissioners appointed by the British Government and 
Maharajah Gulab Singh respectively for that purpose and shall be defined in a separate 
engagement after survey. 
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Article 3 
In consideration of the transfer made to him and his heirs by the provisions of the 
foregoing article Maharajah Gulab Singh will pay to the British Government the sum of 
seventy-five laichs of rupees (Nanukshahee), fifty lakhs to be paid on or before the 1st 
October of the current year, A.D., 1846. 
Article 4 
The limits of territories of Maharajah Gulab Singh shall not be at any time changed 
without concurrence of the British Government. 
Article 5 
Maharajah Gulab Singh will refer to the arbitration of the British Government any 
disputes or question that may arise between himself and the Government of Lahore or 
any other neighboring State, and will abide by the decision of the British Government. 
Article 6 
Maharajah Gulab Singh engages for himself and heirs to join, with the whole of his 
Military Forces, the British troops when employed within the hills or in the territories 
adjoining his possessions. 
Article 7 
Maharajah Gulab Singh engages never to take to retain in his service any British subject 
nor the subject of any European or American State without the consent of the British 
Government. 
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Article 8 
Maharajah Gulab Singh engages to respect in regard to the territory transferred to him. 
the provisions of Articles V, VI and VII of the separate Engagement between the British 
Government and the Lahore Durbar, dated 11th March, 1846. 
Article 9 
The British Government will give its aid to Maharajah Gulab Singh in protecting his 
territories from external enemies. 
Article 10 
Maharajah Gulab Singh acknowledges the supremacy of the British Government and will 
in token of such supremacy present annually to the British Government one horse, shelve 
shawl goats of approved breed (six male and six female) and three pairs of Cashmere 
shawls. 
This Treaty often articles has been this day settled by Frederick Currie, Esq. and Brever-
Major Henry Montgomery Lawrence, acting under directions of the Rt. Hon. Sir Henry 
Hardinge, Governor-General, on the part of the British Government and by Maharajah 
Gulab Singh in person, and the said Treaty has been this day ratified by the seal of the Rt. 
Hon. Sir Henry Hardinge, Governor-General. 
Done at Amritsar the sixteenth day of March, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight 
hundred and forty-six, corresponding with the seventeenth day of Rubee-ui-Awal (1262 
Hijri). 
(Signed) II. Hardinge (seal) 
(Signed) F. Currie 
(Signed) H.M. Lawrence 
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Appendix III 
Did Gulab Singh pay for Kashmir?* 
According to the third article of the Treaty of Amritsar, Gulab Singh was required 
to pay the stipulated sum of seventy-five lakhs of rupees in two installments, "fifty lacs,. 
on ratification of this treaty, and twenty-five lacs on or before the 1^ ' of October of the 
current year, A.D. 1846." Some sources, like the anonymous author of Kashmir~ke-
Halaat, have stated that the sale was a hoax, and that the British never really collected the 
required sum form the Dogra ruler.' Such gossip continues to be heard occasionali> on 
the Indian subcontinent till this day. However, there is substantial evidence that, though 
late, Gulab Singh did pay the amount in full. In a letter dated May 12, 1846, Hardinge 
informed Ellenborough, that the Maharaja "has paid his first installment of 50 lacs."' The 
Governor-General communicated similar information to the Secret Committee in 
September.'' Even more important, however, is the following table of payments prepared 
on October 10, 1848, by the Company's financial department at Calcutta, which clearly 
indicates that by the end of July 1848 Gulab Singh had paid most of his debt: 
In 1845/46 497,204-4-9 
In 1846-47 5,619.581-10-0 
In 1847-48 858,541-12-8 
May 97,997-13-0 
June 48,156-7-6 
July 146,154-4-6 
7,121,481-15-11 
Balance due to the British Government on the 31" July 1848 378,518-0-1'' 
^ Kashmlr-ke-Halaat (Qadian: 1931), cited in Bawa, Jammu Fox, p. 235, ft 1. 
^ Ellenborough Papers, re. 30/12/21, no. 7, cited in Ibid, fn 2. 
' Governor General's letter dated Sept. 3, 1846, cited in Ibid, fn 3. 
* Daihousie Papers, ref. 45/254, MSS in the SoUish Record Office, Edinburgh, cited in Ibid, pp. 235-6. m 4. 
* This Appendix is reproduced from Bawa Satinder Singh, Jammu Fox. p. 192. 
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The rest of the amount, totaling less than four lakhs of rupees, was paid by the end 
of march 1850, and a copy of "The Final Receipt for the purchase of Kashmir," signed by 
the members of the Board of Administration of Punjab, is on exhibition at the Punjab 
Record Office Museum in Lahore.^  
^ A.N. Sapru, The Building of the Jammu and Kashmir State—Being the Achievement of Maharaja Giilab 
Singh, Lahore: 1931), cited in Ibid. pp. 236, Ih 5. 
185 
Bibliography 
Sources that have been consulted but not cited in the thesis have not been 
mentioned in this bibliography. 
Sources: 
I. Unpublished 
a. Archival Material 
i. National Archives of India, New Delhi 
Foreign Department Records 
Foreign and Political Department Records 
Home Department Records 
ii. Jammu and Kashmir State Archives, Jammu 
Education Department Records 
General Department Records 
Old English Records 
Political Department Records 
Publicity Department Records 
Vernacular Department Records 
iii. Jammu and Kashmir State Archives, Srinagar 
Ex-Governor's Records 
General Department Records 
II. Published 
a. Administration Reports 
Administration Report of Jammu and Kashmir State, 1890-91, 1892-93, 1893-94. 
Administration Report of Jammu and Kashmir State, 1924. 
Nath, Diwan Bahadur Amar, Administrative Report of the Jammu and Kashmir State, 
1912-13. 
186 
Ram, Diwan Kirpa, Majmui Report Riyasat-i-Jammu-wa-Kashmir (1872-73) (Urdu), 
Srinagar. 
Report of Mr. Logan on the Financial Conditions of the Kashmir State, 1892. 
Shri Ganga Nath Commission Report on Administration ofJammu and Kashmir, Jammu; 
1944. 
Wingate, A. Preliminary Report of Settlement Operations in Kashmir and Jammu. 
Lahore: W. Ball & Co., 1888. 
b. Reports of Enquiries, Committees and Commissions 
Dalai, Barjor, Report of the Srinagar Riot Enquiry Committee, 1931, Srinagar: 1932. 
Glancy, B.J., Report of the Commission appointed under the Orders of His Highness the 
Maharaja Bahadur, dated 12''' November 1931, to Enquire into the Grievances 
and Complaints, Jammu: Ranbir Government Press, 1932. 
Government of India, White Paper. 
Indian Round Table conference Proceedings, Calcutta: Government of India Central 
Publication Branch, 1931. 
Orders on the Recommendations contained in the Glancy Commission's Report, .lammu: 
Ranbir Government Press, 1932. 
Report of the Committee to Define the Term "State Subject", 1927. 
Report of the Indian States committee 1928-1929, Calcutta: Foreign Office Press, 1929. 
c. Census Reports 
Gait, E.A., Census of India, 1911, Volume 1, Part 1 - Report, Calcutta: Superintendent 
Government Printing, 1913. 
Khan, Bahadur Munshi Ghulam Ahmed, Census of India, 1901, Vol. XXIII, Kashmir, 
Part I, Lahore: Civil and Military Gazette Press, 1902. 
Khan, Muhammad Matin-uz-Zaman, Census of India, 1911. Vol XX. Kashmir, Part I, 
Lahore: Mufid-i-Am Press, 1922. 
Risley, H.H., Census of India. 1901, Vol. I-A, Calcutta: Office of the Superintendent of 
Government Printing India, 1902. 
Wreford, R.G., Census of India, 1941, Vol. xxii, Jammu and Kashmir, Parts 
I and II, Essays and Tables, Ranbir Government Press, 1943. 
187 
d. Gazetteers 
Bates, Charles E., A Gazetteer of Kashmir and the Adjacent Districts of Kishtwar. 
Badrawar, Jammu, Naoshera, Punch, and the Valley of the Kishen Gauga. 
Calcutta: 1873 , Reprint, Srinagar: Gulshan Publishers, 2005. 
Gazetteer of Kashmir and Ladak, Calcutta: 1890, reprint. New Delhi: Vivek Publ shing 
House, 1974. 
The Imperial Gazetteer of India, Vol. xv, Oxford: At the Clarendon Press, 1909. 
e. Manuscripts, Memorandums, and Resolutions 
Memoranda on the Indian States, 1936, Delhi: Manager of Publications, 1937. 
Representation of Sanatan Dharam Youngmen 's Association, Srinagar. to the i ^ rime 
Minister and his Reply Thereto, September 6, 1931. 
Representation made by the Deputation of Muslim Representatives to His Highness. 
August 15, 1931. 
Saifuddin Mirza, 'Mirza Saifuddin Papers.' 12 Vols., Srinagar: Manuscript Section, 
Research and Publication Department, University of Kashmir. 
f. Travelogues 
Biscoe, C.E. Tyndale, Kashmir in Sunlight & Shade: A description of the beauties of the 
country, the life, habits and humour of its inhabitants, and an account q >' the 
gradual but steady rebuilding of a once downtrodden people, London: }. B. 
Lippincott Company, 1922. 
Hervey, Mrs., The Adventures of a Lady in Tartary, Thibet, China and Kashmr. 3 
Volumes, London: Hope and Co., 1853. 
Knight, E.F., Where Three Empires Meet, London: Longmans, Green and Company, 
1893. 
Moorcraft, William & Trebeck, George, (ed.) H.H. Wilson, Travels in the Himalayan 
Provinces of Hindustan and the Punjab in Ladakh, Kunduz, and Bukhara, from 
1819 to 1825, 2 vols., London: John Murray, first published 1841, reprint, New 
Delhi: Sagar Publications, 1971. 
Vigne, Godrey Thomas, Travels in Kashmir, Ladak, Iskardo, 2 Vols., c. 1842, reprint. 
New Delhi: Sagar Publications, 1981. 
III. Contemporary Works 
a. Books 
Aitchison, C.U., A Collection of Treaties, Engagements ad Sanads Relating to India and 
Neighbouring Countries, vol. 6, Calcutta: Foreign Office Press, 1909. 
Alder, G.J., British India's Northern Frontier 1865-1895, London: Royal Commonwealth 
Society by Longmans, 1900. 
Ali, Shahmat, The Sikhs and Afghans, London: John Murray, 1874. 
Bazaz, Prem Nath, Inside Kashmir, c. 1941, Srinagar: Gulshan Publishers, 2002. 
. The History of Struggle for Freedom in Kashmir Cultural and Political: From 
the Earliest times to the Present Day, New Delhi: 1954, reprint, Srinagar: 
Gulshan Publishers, 2003. 
Baird, J.G.A., ed. Private Letters of the Marquis of Dalhousie, London: William 
Blackwood and Sons, 1910. 
Barton, William, The Princes of India, London: Nisbet & Company Limited, 1934. 
Black, Charles Edward Drummond, The Marquess of Dufferin and Ava, London: 
Hutchinson, 1903. 
Chakrabarty, D. and Bhattacharyya, C , (ed.) Congress in Evohilion~-A Collection of 
Congress Resolutions from 1885-1934 and Other Documents, Calcutta: The Book 
Company Ltd., 1935. 
Colquhoun, Archibald R, Russia Against India The struggle for Asia, London: Harper & 
Brothers, 1901. 
189 
Cunningham, J.D., A History of Sikhs, 2"'' edition, London: John Murray, Albt marie 
Street, 1853. 
Digby, William, Condemned Unheard, London: Indian Political Agency, 1890. 
Dobson, G, Russia's Railway Advance into Central Asia, London: W.H. Allen & 
Company, 1890. 
Dodwell, H.H. (ed.), The Cambridge History of India, The Indian Empire, 1858-1918, 
Vol. VI, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1932. 
Drew, Fredric, The Jammu and Kashmir territories, Jammu: Jay Kay Book House, 1999. 
Dutt, Rajni Palme, India Today, c. 1940, reprint, Calautta: Manisha Granthalya (P) Ltd.. 
1979. 
Durand, A.G., The Making of a Frontier, London: John Murray, Albemarle Street, 1900. 
Dutt, Romesh, India in the Victorian Age, An Economic History of the People, London: 
K. Paul, Trench & Co., Ltd., 1904. 
Eoreest, G.W., Administration of Lord Lansdowne, 1888-1894, Calcutta: Office cf the 
Superintendent of Government Printing, 1894. 
Griffin, Lapel Henrey, Punjab Chiefs, Lahore: C.F. Massey, 1890. 
Hardinge, C, Viscount Hardinge. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1891. 
Hunter, W. W., The Life of the Earl of Mayo. London: Smith Elder & Co, 1876. 
Hussain, Mirza Shafiq (compiled), Kashmiri Musalmanon ki Siyasi Jadujehd, 193'-39: 
Muntakhab Dastawaizat (Urdu), Islamabad: National Institute of Research, 
History, and Culture, 1985. 
Jacquemont, Victor, Letters from India, vol.2, London: Richard Bentley and Son. 18.4. 
Kalhana, Rajatarangini, Tr. M.Aurel Stein, 2 vols, Westminster: Archibald Constable 
and Company Ltd., 1900. 
Kaul, Har Gopal, Guldasta-e-Kashmir, Lahore: Farsi Arya Press, 1833. 
Keith, A.B., Speeches and Documents on Indian Policy, 1750-1921, London; Oxford 
University Press, 1922. 
Knowles, Rev. J. Hinton, A Dictionary of Kashmiri Proverbs and Sayings, Bombay: 
Education Society's Press, 1885. 
190 
Lai, Lala Ganeshi, Siyahat-i-Kashmir, (monograph), Simla: The Punjab Government 
Record Office, 1846. 
Latif Syed Mohammad, History of Punjab, Lahore: Albert Press, 1891, reprint, 1984. 
Lansdell, H., Through Central Asia, London: Sampson Low, Marston, 1887. 
Lawrence, Walter R., The India We Served, London: Cassell and Company, 1928. 
Lawrence, W, The Valley of Kashmir, Srinagar: Kaiser Publication, 1967. 
Lockhart and Woodthorpe, Gilgit Mission, London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1889. 
Ludlow, John Malcolm, Thoughts on the Policy of the Crown towards India, London: 
James Ridgway, Eiccadilly, 1859. 
Menon, V.P., The Story of the Integration of the Indian States, London: Longmans, 
Green and Co., 1955. 
Morison, John L, Lawrence ofLucknow, London: G. Bell ad Sons, Ltd., 1934. 
Murray, Ansley J.C., Our Visit to Hindostan, Kashmir and Ladakh, London: William 11. 
Allen and Co., 1879. 
Nave, A.,Thirty Years in Kashmir, London: Edward Arnold, 1913. 
Nicholson, A.P, Scraps of Paper: India's Broken Treaties, The Princes and the Prolilem, 
London: William Blackwood and Sons, 1930. 
Napier, William, Sir, The Life and Opinions of General Sir Charles James Napier, 4 
Vols., London: John Murray, Albemarble Street, 1857. 
Officer, An Indian, Russia's March towards India, London: Sompson Low, Measton & 
Company, 1894. 
Pannikar, K.M. The Founding of the Kashmir State, London: Martin Hopkinson, 1930. 
, Relations of Indian States with the Government of India, London: Gorge Allen 
and Unwin, 1927. 
, His Highness the Maharaja of Bikaner: A Biography. London: Martin 
Hopkinson, 1937. 
Ram, Diwan Kirpa, Gulab Nama, English translation, S.S. Charak & A.C. Billawaria, 
Delhi: Sterling Publishers, 1977. 
191 
Roberts, F.S., Forty-one Years in India, 2 Vols., London: Richard Bentley and Son, 1898. 
Sapru, Arjun Nath, The Building of the Jammu and Kashmir State—Beiny The 
Achievement of Maharaja Gulab Singh, Lahore: Punjab Government Record 
Office, 1931. 
Saraf, Muhammad Yusuf, Kashmiris Fight for Freedom, 2 Vols., l" published 1977. 
reprint, Lahore: Ferozsons, 2005. 
Rashid Taseer, Tehreek-i-Huriyat-i-Kashmir, 1931-39, Vol. 1, Srinagar: Muhaafiz 
Publications, 1968. 
Taylor, Bayard, Travels in Cashmere, Little Thibet and Central Asia, New York: Charles 
Scrinber's Sons, 1982. 
Temple, Richard C, Journals kept in Hyderabad, Kashmir, Sikkim and Nepal, 2 v'ols., 
London: W.H. Allen & Co.l887. 
Thomson, Thomas, Western Himalaya and Tibet, London: Reeve and C, 1852. 
Thorp, Robert, Cashmere Misgovernment, London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1870 
Torrens, Lieut. Colonel, Travels In Ladakh, Tartary and Kashmir, London: Saunders, 
Otley, and Co., 1978. 
Trotter, Lionel James, 77?^  Life of Hodson of Hodson's Horse, London: J. M. Dent & 
Sons, 1901. 
, The Life of John Nicholson, London: John Murray, 1897. 
Tupper, Charles Lewis, Our Indian Protectorate, London: Longmans, Green and Co., 
1898. 
Wakefield, W., The Happy Valley, Delhi: first published 1908, Srinagar: Gulshan 
Publishers, 2008. 
Warner, Lee, The Native States of India, London: Macmillan & Co. 1910. 
, The Life of the Marquess ofDalhousie, 2 Vols., London: Macmillan and Co.. 
1904. 
192 
Younghusband, Sir Francis, Kashmir, r published 1908, reprint, Srinagar: Gulshan 
Publishers, 2008. 
Younghusband, E.F. The Heart of a Continent, London: John Murray, 1896. 
, The Northern Frontier of Kashmir, first published 1890, reprint, Delhi: 
Oriental Publishers, 1973. 
b. Other Printed Sources 
Anonymous, Durand Line, (n.p., n.d.) 
Anonymous, The Foreign Policy of Lord Rosebery, London: Humphreys, 1901. 
Anonymous, Letters from India and Kashmir, London: G. Bell, 1874. 
Government of India Act, 1935, 26 Geo. V & 1 Edw. VIII Ch.2, Great Britain: H. M. 
Stationery Office, 1940. 
Maharaja Pratap Singh, Diary of an Inspection Tour to the Gilgit Road, Lahore: Civil and 
Military Gazette Press, 1893. 
Nehru, Jawaharlal, Unity of India, 1937-1940, New York: The John Day Company, 1942. 
The Directorate of the Chamber's Special Organization, The British crown & the Indian 
States, London: 1929. 
Proclamation of Maharaja Hari Singh to the Praja Sabha, 1934. 
IV. Newspapers and Periodicals 
a. English 
Hindustan Times, Delhi. 
Muslim Outlook, Lahore. 
Ranbir, Jammu. 
Tribune, Lahore. 
Times of India, Bombay. 
Young India, Ahmedabad, 1919-1931, 13 Vols., Vol. IV, 1922. 
b. Urdu 
Hamdard, Srinagar. 
Inqilab, Lahore. 
Khalid, Srinagar. 
Martand, Srinagar. 
193 
Siyasat, Lahore. 
V. Books and Articles 
a. Books 
Abdullah, Sheikh Muhammad, Flames of the Chinar, c. 1986, New Delhi: Oxford 
University Press, 1993 
Akber, M.J., Kashmir Behind the Vale, New Delhi: Viking, 2002. 
Bamzai, Prithvi Nath Kaul, A History of Kashmir: Political, Social, Cultural, From the 
Earliest Times to the Present Day New Delhi: Metropolitan Book Company, 
1962. 
, Cultural and Political History of Kashmir, Vol. 3, New Delhi: M.D. 
Publications, 1994. 
Bayly, C.A., The New Cambridge History of India, II, i. Indian Society and the Making of 
the British Empire, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993. 
Behera, Navnita Chanda, Demystifying Kashmir, Washington: The Brookings Institution, 
2006. 
Bose, Sumantra, Kashmir: Roots of Conflict, Paths to Peace, Cambridge and Lcndon: 
Harvard University Press, 2003. 
Breacher, Michael, The Struggle for Kashmir, New York: Oxford University Press, 1953. 
Bruce, George, Six Battles for India, London: Arther Barker, Ltd., 1969. 
Campbell-Johnson, Alan, Mission With Mountbatten, London: Robert Hale, 1951. 
Chararak, Sukhdev Singh, A Short History of Jammu Raj, Jammu: Ajaya Prakashan, 
1985. 
Chohan, Amar Singh, The Gilgit Agency 1877-1935, New Delhi: Atlantic Publishers and 
Distributors, first published 1985, reprint, 1998. 
Copland, Ian, The Princes of India in the Endgame of Empire 1917-1947, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1999. 
Dar, Nazir Ahmad, Anjuman-i-Nusrat-ul-Islam: An Overview, Srinagar: An Ess 
Publishing House, 2005. 
194 
Davies, Cuthbert Collin, The Problem of North-West Frontier, 1890-1908, London: 
Curzon Press, 1975. 
Dhar, D.N., Socio-Economic History of the Kashmir Peasantry, From Ancient Times to 
the Present Day, Srinagar: Centre for Kashmir Studies, 1989. 
Ellinwood, D.C. & Pradhan, S.D., (eds.), India and World War I, Delhi: Sterling 
Publishers, 1978. 
Ernest Waltraud and Pati Biswamoy, India's Princely States: People, princes and 
colonialism, Routledge: Taylor & Francis Group, 2007. 
Fauq, Mohammad-ud-Din, Shabab-e-Kashmir, Srinagar: Gulshan Publishers, 1993. 
Fazili, Manzoor A., Socialist Ideas and Movements in Kashmir, 1919-47, New Delhi: 
Eureka Publications, 1980. 
Ferguson, James P., Kashmir An Historical Introduction, London: Centaur Press, 1961. 
Gadru, S.N., Kashmir Papers, Srinagar: Forethought Literature Company. 1973. 
Ghose, D.K., England and Afghanistan: A Phase in their Relationship, Calcutta: The 
World Press, 1960. 
, Kashmir in Transition~1885-1893, Calcutta: The World Press, 1975. 
Glendevon, John, The Viceroy at Bay: Lord Linlithgow in India, 1936-1943, London: 
Collins, 1971. 
Gopal, S., The Viceroyalty of Lord Ripon, London: Oxford University Press, 1953. 
Habib, Irfan, The Agrarian System of Mughal India, 1556-1707, Bombay: Asia 
Publishing House, 1963. 
Handa, R.L., History of Freedom Struggle in Princely States, New Delhi: Central News 
Agency, 1968. 
Hassnain, Fida Muhammad, Freedom Struggle in Kashmir, New Delhi: Rima Publishing 
House, 1988. 
, British Policy Towards Kashmir—1846-1946, (Kashmir in Anglo-Russian 
Politics), New Delhi: Sterling Publishers, 1974. 
, Gilgit: The Northern Gate of India, New Delhi: Sterling Publishers, 1978. 
195 
llodson, H.V., The Great Divide: Britain-India-Pakistan, London; Hutchinson, 1969 
Jalal, Ayesha, Self and Sovereignty: Individual and Community in South Asian 'slam 
Since 1850, London & New York: Routledge, 2000. 
Huttenback, Robert A., Kashmir and the British Raj, Karachi: Oxford University I'ress. 
2004. 
Jeffrey, Robbin, ed. People, Princes and Paramount: Society and Politics in the indain 
Princely States, Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1978. 
Kamal-ud-Din, Mirza, Khulasat-u-Tawarikh (Urdu tr. of Mirza Saif-ud-Din's 
Akhabarat), Srinagar: Gulshan Books, 1974. 
Keay, John, The Gilgit Game, The Explorers of Western Himalayas J865-95. Kasachi: 
Oxford University Press, 1993. 
Khan, G.H., Freedom movement in Kashmir, 1931-1940, Delhi: Light and Life 
Publishers, 1987. 
Khan, Molvi HashmatuUah, Tarikh-i-Jammu, Mirpur: Verinag Publishers Azad Kashinir. 
1991. 
Khan, M. Ishaq, History of Srinagar 1846-1947: A Study in Socio-Cultural Change. 3"^ 
ed., Srinagar: Gulshan Books, 2007. 
Khan, Nyla Ali, (ed.) The Parchment of Kashmir—History, Society and Polity, New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012. 
Khan, Sultan Mahomed (ed.), The Life ofAbdvr Rahman: Amir of Afghanistan, Vols. 2. 
London: 1900, reprint in Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1980. 
Kumar, Krishna, Political Agenda of Education: A Study of Colonialist and NatiomilisI 
Ideas, New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1991. 
Lamb, Alastair, Crisis in Kashmir 1947 to 1966, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. 
1966. 
— —, Kashmir, A Disputed Legacy 1846-1990, Karachi: Oxford University Press. 
1993. 
, Incomplete Partition: The Genesis of the Kashmir Dispute 1947-1^)48. 
Hertingfordbury: Roxford Books, 1997. 
196 
Majumdar, R.C., British Paramountcy and Indian Renaissance, Part 1, Bombay: 
Bharatya Vidya Bhavan, 1963. 
Manor, James, Political Change in an Indian State: Mysore 1917-1955, New Delhi: 
Manohar Publishers & Distributors, 1977. 
Manserg, Nicholas, (ed.). Constitutional Relations Between Britain and India: the 
Transfer of Power, vols. 12, London: Her Majesty's Stationary Office, 1970-
1983. 
Metcalf, Thomas R., The Aftermath of Revolt: India, 1857-1870, Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1965. 
Mishra, D.P., People's Revolt in Orissa: A Study of Talcher, New Delhi: Atlantic 
Publishers and Distributors, 1998. 
Mons, Barbara, High Road to Hunza, London: Travel Book Club, 1958. 
Nargis, Nargisdas, Zorwar Singh, Jammu: Ranbir Government Press, 1964. 
Natarajan, S., A History of the Press in India, New Delhi: Asia Publishing House, 1962. 
Nicholson, A.P., Scraps of Paper: India's Broken Treaties, The Princes and the Problem, 
London: William Blackwood and Sons, 1930. 
Om, Hari, Muslims of Jammu and Kashmir: A Study in the Spread of Education and 
Consciousness, 1857-1925, New Delhi: Archives Publishers, 1986. 
Phillips, C.H., (ed.). The Evolution of India and Pakistan, 1858-1947: Selected 
Documents, London: Macmillan & Co. 1962. 
Prasad, Bishewar, The Foundation of India's Foreign Policy, 1860-1882, Bombay: 
Orient Longmans Ltd., 1955. 
Prasad, Bishewar, Our Foreign policy Legacy: A Study of British Indian Foreign Policy 
Delhi: Peoples Publishing House, 1965. 
Rai, Mridu, Hindu Rulers, Muslim Subjects, Islam Rights and the History of Kashmir. 
Delhi: Permanent Black, 2004. 
197 
Raina, N.N., Kashmir Politics and Imperialist Manoevueres, 1846-1980, New Delhi: 
Patriot Publishers, 1988. 
Raina, A.N., Geography ofJammu and Kashmir, New Delhi: National Book Trust, 1981. 
Ramusack, Barabara N., The Princes of India in the Twilight of Empire: Dissolution of a 
Patron-Client System, 1914-1939, Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1978. 
. The Indian Princes and their States, Cambridge: Cambridge University '^ress. 
2008. 
Rangaswami, Vanaja., The Story of Integration: A New Interpretation, New Delhi; 
Manohar Publisher & Distributors, 1981. 
Rao, M.S.A. (ed.). Social Movements in India, Vol., 2, New Delhi: Manohar Publisher & 
Distributors, 1979. 
Ray, Heman, How Mocow See Kashmir, Bombay: Jaico Publishing House, 1985. 
R. Metcalf, Thomas, The Aftermath of Revolt: India, 1857-1870, Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1965. 
Robb, P.G., The Government of India and Reform: Policies toward Politics ana the 
Constitution, 1916-1921, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976. 
Schofield, Victoria, Kashmir in Conflict -India, Pakistan and the Unending War, l.B. 
New York & London: Tauris & Co. Ltd., 2003. 
Singh, Bawa Satinder, The Jammu Fox: A Biography of Maharaja Gulab Singi^ of 
Kashmir (1792-1857), New Delhi: Heritage Publishers, 1988. 
Snedden, Christopher, Kashmir, the Unwritten History, HarperCollins, Noida, 2013. 
Singh, Ganda, cd.. Private Correspondence relating to the Anglo-Sikh Wars. Madras: Ci. 
S. Press, 1955. 
Singh, Khushwant, A History of the Sikhs Vols. 2, Princeton: Princeton Universitj Press, 
1963, 1966. 
Sufi, G. M. D., Kashir: Being a History of Kashmir From Earliest Times to our Own. 
Vols. 2, Delhi: Light and Life Publications, 1974. 
198 
Swinson, Arthur, North-West Frontier, London: Hutchinson, 1967. 
Viswanathan, Gauri, Masks of Conquest: Literary Study and British Rule in India, New 
York: 1989. 
Vaikuntham, Y., (ed.). People's Movements in Princely States, Delhi: Manohar, 2004. 
Yasin, Madhavi, British Paramountcy in Kashmir, Delhi: 1984. 
Zutshi, Chitralekha, British Intervention in a Princely State: The Case of Jamnm and 
Kashmir in the Late-Nineteenth and Early-Twentieth Centuries, Paper presented 
at the 18"' European Conference on Modem South Asian Studies, 2004. 
Zutshi, Chitralekha, Languages of Belonging: Islam Regional Identity, and the Making of 
Kashmir, Panikeet: Permanent Black, 2003. 
Zutshi, U.K., Emergence of Political Awakening in Kashmir, New Delhi: Manohar 
Publications, 1986. 
b. Articles 
Copland, Ian, islam and Political Mobilization in Kashmir, 1931-34', Pacific Affairs, 
Vol. 54, No. 2, Summer: 1981. 
Habib, Irfan, 'Civil Disobedience 1930-31', Social Scientist, Vol. 25, No. 9/10, Sep.-
Oct., 1997. 
Huttenback, Robert A., 'Gulab Singh and the Creation of the Dogra State of Jammu, 
Kashmir, and Ladakh', 77?^  Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 20, No. 4 (Aug., 1961), 
pp. 477-88. 
Kaul, Gaush Lai, 'The Freedom Struggle of Kashmir', Studies of Kashmir Council of 
Research, Vol. Ill, Special Number, November, Srinagar: 1978. 
Keralaputra, 'The Internal States of India', Annals of the American Academy of Political 
and Social Science, Vol. 145, Part 2: India (Sep., 1929), pp. 45-58. 
Nair, Kusum, 'Where India, China and Russia Meet', Foreign Affair, Vol. 36, No. 2, 
(Jan. 1958), pp. 330-39. 
Pauker, Guy, J., 'Pannikarism, the Highest Stage of Opportunism', World Politics. Vol. 
7, No. l(Oct. 1954), pp. 157-77. 
199 
Pir, Ali Mohd. & Shiekh, A. Rashid, 'Formation of the Princely State of Jammii and 
Kashmir: The Historical Perspectives', Susugular: Journal of History Education 
and Historical Studies, Volume 1, No. 2, 2013. 
Pir Ali Mohd, 'Kashmir and the Defence of the British Indian Empire: Tiie digit 
Agency', Central India Journal of Historical and Archaeological Research, VOL 
2, No. 7, 2013. 
Poleman, Jenny F., 'The Indian Princes' Treaty Rights', Far Eastern Survey, Vol. 11, No. 
19 (Sep. 21, 1942), pp. 196-201. 
Pundit Munphool, 'Relations between Gilgit, Chitral, and Kashmir', The Journal of the 
Ethnological Society of London (1869-J 870), Vol. 2, No. 1 (1870), pp. 35-9. 
Puri, Balraj, 'Who Fathered Political Awakening in Kashmir?', Economic and Political 
Weekly Vol. 23, No. 19 (May 7, 1988), pp. 953-4. 
Qanungo, Bhupin, 'A Study of Relations with the Native States of India, 1858-62'. Hie 
Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 26, No. 2 (Feb., 1967), pp. 251-265. 
Singh, Bawa Satinder, 'Raja Gulab Singh's Role in the First Anglo-Sikh War', Modern 
Asian Studies, Vol. 5, No. 1, 1971. 
Shiekh, A. Rashid, 'Institution of Begar in Kashmir (1846-1947)', Central India JomniJ 
of Historical and Archaeological Research, Vol. 2, No. 7, 2013, pp. 88-92. 
c. Dissertations and Theses 
Lone, Suhail R., Indian National Movement and the Freedom Struggle of Jammu and 
Kashmir (1931-1947 A.D.), M.Phil. Dissertation, Aligarh Muslim Universii>. 
Aligarh, 2013. 
Witmer, Michael David, The 1947-1948 India Hyderabad conflict: Realpolitik and ihc 
Modern Indian State, The Temple University, United States, 1996. 
Wood, 11. Dunseth, The Relationship between the Indian States and the Indian Ceniiai 
Government, 1921-1933, Ph.D. The University of Chicago, United States, 1951. 
